

# REMOVAL AND RETURN

*The Socio-Economic Effects of the War  
on Japanese Americans*

BY

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## INTRODUCTION

THIS PAPER is first of all a study in the social differentiation of Americans of Japanese ancestry.<sup>1</sup> By detailed analysis of occupational data, we have described not only the occupational adjustments of a population, but the distinctive part the population has played in the economy of a region. The nature of the social organization of the group appears to be such that analysis of job status serves as a description of social stratification within the group. A proper auxiliary study would be the description of the evaluative attitudes underlying Japanese American status judgments. This would test the validity of our structural criteria. The analysis of status attitudes would throw light on the organization of the ethnic community, and it would be very interesting to discover the extent to which Buddhist-Christian, agricultural-nonagricultural, and Issei-Nisei cleavages express themselves in attitudinal schema. At this point in time, it would be necessary to further complicate the design by relating attitudes to prewar as well as postwar status.

The topical contribution of the paper is a description and appraisal of some of the effects of the Evacuation. So far as we have been able to compile comparable data, we have compared prewar socioeconomic status with the postwar status. In addition to this comparison, we have obtained a measure of economic losses that were incurred as a direct consequence of the Evacuation. These findings are offered as a basis for assessing the way in which the Government may settle claims deriving from the Evacuation.

The classification of major occupational groups used in the 1940 Census was designed to provide a rough index of socio-economic stratification for the general population. When applied to the Japanese American population, which has distinctive occupational characteristics, it obscures the differentiation of the group, but broad generalizations can be inferred from the relative concentrations of ethnic groups in the occupational structure. In table 1 we compare the employment status and occupational distribution of whites, Negroes, and Japanese in Los Angeles in 1940. Comparisons of the employment status of the ethnic groups may be interpreted directly. The reader will note the higher proportion of Negro females in the labor force, the large proportion of Negroes who were unemployed or on public emergency work, and the remarkably low percentage of Japanese Americans who were unemployed or on work relief.

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<sup>1</sup> For notes see pp. 207-213.

TABLE 1

EMPLOYMENT STATUS AND OCCUPATION OF PERSONS 14 YEARS AND OLDER: WHITES, NEGROES, AND JAPANESE, LOS ANGELES CITY, 1940

Employment status and major occupational group	Whites		Negroes		Japanese	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Number of persons 14 years and older	573,196	615,919	24,625	28,540	10,489	7,864
Percentage in labor force	77 9	30 9	79 0	44 8	77 4	36 8
Number of persons in labor force	446,775	190,354	19,460	12,800	8,118	2,896
Percentage, total	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Employed (except on public emergency work)	85 2	87 4	70 9	77 2	96 0	96 5
Public emergency work	2 7	1 8	10 8	5 0	0 1	0 1
Seeking work	12 0	10 8	18 3	17 8	3 9	3 4
Number of employed persons	380,811	166,342	13,800	9,878	7,793	2,794
Major occupational groups, percentage	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Professional and semi-professional	10 5	14 7	4 5	4 4	3 8	4 9
Farmers and farm managers	0 4	0 1	0 1	*	4 3	1 4
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	14 3	7 2	3 0	1 7	19 8	8 9
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	21 8	38 0	6 9	3 8	21 2	24 8
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	19 0	1.2	7 0	0 3	2 9	0 9
Operatives and kindred.	17 2	14.5	15 4	3 9	6 2	15 1
Domestic service workers	0 3	9 0	6 0	67 6	2 3	13 0
Protective service workers	2 5	0 1	1 9	*	8 3	18 5
Service workers, except domestic and protective	6 4	14 2	38 2	17 1		
Farm laborers and foremen	0 8	0 1	0 1	0 0	4 6	8 7
Laborers, except farm	6 3	0 3	16 6	0 5	26 4	3 3
Occupation not reported	0.6	0.6	0 5	0 6	0 2	0 6

SOURCE U. S. Census, 1940.

\* Less than 0.05 per cent.



In general, contrasts between the occupational distribution of white and Negro employed persons are unambiguous, but for Japanese Americans the components of some of the categories were quite different. Among Japanese Americans, the group of "Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm" was composed almost entirely of independent proprietors, whereas for whites there were many paid managers in this category. In addition to those Japanese Americans in the category of "Proprietors . . .," many independent workers ("own-account" workers) were included in other categories: boarding-house proprietors and barber-shop and beauty-shop operators were classified by the Census as service workers; trucking contractors, repairmen, garage mechanics, and so on were classified as craftsmen and operatives; fishermen and contract gardeners were the largest components of "Laborers, except farm." Many unpaid family workers were clerical and sales workers, operatives, service workers except domestic, and farm laborers. A better comparison of Japanese Americans with the other groups would have been possible had the Census published its data on class of worker by race. Precise comparisons, however, would require a special cross-tabulation of class of worker and occupation by race.

In handling our Japanese American samples, we have modified the Census classification by taking account of the large number of small-scale family enterprises and the distinctive concentrations in gardening, fishing, and produce. In each case we have attempted to record the original data in such a way that they can be tabulated either according to our modified scheme or according to the Census classification.

The occupational structure of Japanese Americans in Los Angeles delineates the stratification of the population. The hierarchy of occupations from independent professional worker to employed casual laborer formed a continuum coinciding with a series of status positions in which the ordering of economic and social power and prestige are clear. At the top, along with independent professionals, were the proprietors and managers of large wholesale produce houses and export-import firms, the few large-scale farmers and nurserymen, and the like. Below them were the great mass of retail proprietors, small farmers, and other independent workers such as contract gardeners and fishermen. Next was a group of workers with some prestige deriving from education and skills and the character of the work performed, including religious and educational officers of the Japanese American community, employed professionals and semiprofessionals such as nurses and artists, hired managers in retail produce, salesmen in wholesale produce, and other

persons whose jobs involved responsibility but not independence. Below them were the mass of clerical and sales personnel, individuals in clean work but with less prestige and little power. Following these were members of fishing crews, cannery and other factory operatives, domestic and other service workers, and at the bottom laborers, both farm and nonfarm

Unpaid family workers were distributed throughout the hierarchy, each individual's status depending on the size and character of the family enterprise and his position within the family. On the one hand were elderly Issei who had turned over to their sons active management of successful businesses and farms, but who retained their patriarchal positions; and on the other hand were young Nisei in enterprises dependent wholly on family labor. As we shall see, the concentrations at the several levels of the hierarchy are very different in the postwar period, but the ordering of the status positions seems to be unaltered



If many proponents of the Evacuation were motivated by economic considerations, as is commonly assumed, their wishes have been satisfied, at least in part. Japanese Americans lost much of the economic ground they had gained in more than a generation. Their holdings of rural land and urban property were greatly reduced, their financial reserves dissipated, and their occupational distribution drastically altered. A study complementary to this might explore the question of what groups profited from the Evacuation and to what extent. We do know that a part of the loss incurred by Japanese Americans benefited no one and that much property simply deteriorated or was destroyed incidental to the Evacuation. A smaller part, of course, was deliberately destroyed. It would be difficult but feasible to compile the transfers of agricultural lands and urban businesses, but such findings would require discriminating interpretation and the results at this late date would probably be little more than suggestive.



The ambitions of this study were too great for the funds available. As a consequence, we weighed the choices of intensively working a smaller part of the picture or of resorting to the expedient of piecing out demonstrable facts with statistical inferences and guesses. We decided on the latter alternative because the more delimited approach would be much less meaningful, even though it might yield a safer, more aesthetically

satisfying result. As far as description is concerned, we have tried to follow where the large and factually important questions led. Because we could not do each piece of empirical research that we thought desirable, we have gone to pains to specify the kind of foundation on which each part of the analysis is based. On the one hand are facts which were extracted from a segment of a universe by described procedures and which may be tested to determine the limits within which they mean what they say. On the other hand are hunches lacking in precise documentation, but based on some familiarity with the phenomena being considered. The reader will match this exercise in self-restraint if he will keep in mind the varying firmness of the empirical foundations.



The following catalogue of indebtedness, which is necessarily incomplete, indicates how heavily the research depended on the generosity of individuals in many capacities. For scientific counsel and practical assistance we are grateful to William S. Robinson, Eshref Shevky, Dorothy S. Thomas, Richard Nishimoto, and Robert C. Myers. For guidance, administrative aids, and friendly interest we are indebted to Ralph L. Beals. Former members of the War Relocation Authority and its successor, the War Agency Liquidation Unit, were helpful in a number of ways, and Tom Sasaki was cooperative during his field work in Los Angeles. For guidance and for supplying official documents and access to records, we are indebted to the U. S. Bureau of the Census, the Deputy Commissioner of Agriculture for Los Angeles County, the General Manager of the Los Angeles Harbor Department, the Research and Agriculture Departments of the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, the Research Department of the California State Chamber of Commerce, the Federal-State Market News Service in Los Angeles, the officers of the Los Angeles City Market and of the Wholesale Terminal Market, the Secretary-Manager of the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles, and the following representatives of Los Angeles County welfare agencies: Genevieve Carter, Walter Heath, and Beulah Lewis. Among the representatives of the Japanese American Citizens League, Mike and Etsu Masaoka, Eiji Tanabe, and Frank Chuman were especially helpful. Rollins and Helen McGroarty of the Tenant Council of Los Cerritos Trailer Court made possible the Loss Survey by providing facilities and organizational assistance, and under their direction the staff of volunteer workers from the trailer camp patiently and unstintingly participated in a wide variety of ways in conducting the Loss Survey. Clarence

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## CHAPTER I

### PREWAR OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

THE MIGRATION of Japanese male laborers to the continental United States began toward the end of the last century and was terminated by the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907. Immigration of other Japanese, principally women and some businessmen, continued until the mid-twenties.

It is generally known that most of the Japanese immigrants came from farm families, although some were from urban areas, chiefly the sons of shopkeepers. The migration from Japan to the United States was only one manifestation of a general demographic process under way at the turn of the century, and is related to the movement to urban centers in Japan. Here the process of international migration is a correlate of the process of Japanese urbanization. The Japanese farmer migrants were a peasantry only recently released from feudal controls, accustomed to the intensive cultivation of exceedingly small farms organized in a village society.<sup>1</sup>

In 1890, Japanese in the United States numbered hardly more than 2,000. By 1900 the population had increased more than ten times, and by 1910 it was 72,000. Although the proportion of males steadily declined, the sex ratio in 1910 was still high, 562.8 males per 100 females.<sup>2</sup> Japanese workers entered the labor market on the West Coast as unskilled laborers in agriculture, railroads, lumbering, and mining. Of the agricultural workers, a heavy representation had previously been contract laborers in Hawaii. Agricultural labor persisted in importance, but mining, work on railways, and lumbering rapidly declined. Immigrant businessmen and Japanese "schoolboys" who worked as domestics provided a nucleus for the urban migration and for the development of entrepreneurial activity.

The history of the Japanese population in the United States is characterized by progressive urbanization and progressive concentration in the Los Angeles area. Table 2 presents these data for the period 1900-1940. It is interesting to note that the Los Angeles population increased between 1930 and 1940, while the other important urban Japanese American populations decreased, as did the total number of Japanese Americans.


By 1924 the main occupational patterns of the Japanese minority were clearly delineated.<sup>3</sup> First in importance was agriculture, especially

TABLE 2  
CONCENTRATION AND URBANIZATION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS

Area	1940	1930	1920	1910	1900
	NUMBER				
United States	126,947	138,834	111,010	72,157	24,326
California	93,717	97,456	71,952	41,356	10,151
Los Angeles County	36,866	35,390	19,911	8,461	204
Los Angeles City	23,321	21,081	11,618	4,238	150
United States	126,947	138,834	111,010	72,157	
Urban	69,673	74,675	53,830	35,181	
Rural	57,274	64,159	57,180	36,976	
California	93,717	97,456	71,952	41,356	
Urban	52,252	53,397	33,209	18,612	
Rural	41,465	44,059	38,743	22,744	
	PERCENTAGE				
United States	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
California	73 8	70 2	64 8	57 3	41 7
Los Angeles County	29 1	25 5	17 9	11 7	0 8
Los Angeles City	18 4	15 1	10 5	5 9	0 6
United States	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	
Urban	54 9	53 8	48 5	48 8	
Rural	45 1	46 2	51 5	51 2	
California	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	
Urban	55 8	54 8	46 1	45 0	
Rural	44 2	45 2	53 9	55 0	

SOURCE. U. S. Census.


the intensive operation of small farms supplying produce to Western urban markets. Second, with the growth of Japanese ghettos there developed eating places and shops designed to serve the needs of a culturally differentiated group, and also to exploit the romantic aspects of the ethnic colony by supplying Oriental specialty goods. Parallel to the growth of these businesses was the development of such services as cafés, laundries, cleaning, and barber shops for the residents of the slum areas of which the ghettos were a part. Fishing and fish cannery



SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census. Reproduced from WCCA *Final Report*.

Fig. 2. Industry of employed Japanese Americans 14 years and older, by sex and nativity, three Western states, 1940.

work claimed a substantial proportion of Japanese workers, and these activities were well established by World War I. Japanese rapidly entered the wholesale and retail produce business and in large part were responsible for the distinctive produce displays that characterized the Southern California food markets. Contract gardening—the supplying of gardening services to urban homes—emerged at the time of the Alien



SOURCE: U. S. Bureau of the Census. Reproduced from WCCA Final Report.

Fig. 3. Japanese American employed workers 14 years and older in agriculture and wholesale and retail trade, three Western states, 1940.





Land Laws Domestic service was important at an early date, but declined in relative importance in Southern California.

Despite the revision of the California Alien Land Law in 1921, which made it an effective instrument of economic discrimination and resulted in a decline in the number and acreage of farms, agriculture remained the most important occupation for Japanese Americans. After 1930 the number and acreage of farms again increased, although they never attained the 1920 number and size.<sup>4</sup>



In 1940 on the Pacific Coast the Japanese American labor force was 45.1 per cent foreign-born male, 12.9 per cent foreign-born female, 28.7 per cent native-born male, and 13.3 per cent native-born female.<sup>5</sup> The Nisei were young, had recently entered the labor market, and were occupied at low levels compared with the Issei, many of whom were close to retirement.

In figure 2 we present for the Pacific Coast the industries in which Japanese Americans were employed. Comparison of the three Western states with Los Angeles County in table 3 indicates relatively fewer persons in agriculture and personal service, and relatively more in wholesale and retail trade and in manufacturing in Los Angeles County. The large amount of agriculture and the extreme concentration of trade in the Los Angeles area is shown by figure 3 and table 3. Comparison by major occupational groups of Japanese American workers in Los

TABLE 3  
INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE AMERICANS, THREE WESTERN STATES  
AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1940

Industry	Three Western states		Los Angeles County		Percentage of total in L A County <sup>a</sup>
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	
Employed (except on public emergency work)	48,691	100 0	17,005	100 0	34 9
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries	22,813	46 9	6,598	38 8	28 9
Wholesale and retail trade	11,472	23 6	5,831	34 3	50 9
Personal services	8,336	17 1	2,557	15 0	30 7
Manufacturing	1,978	4 1	717	4 2	39 9
Professional services	1,326	2 7	491	2 9	37 0
All others	2,766	5 6	811	4 8	29 3

SOURCE: U. S. Census, 1940. Published in WCCA *Final Report*, pp. 416-418, and WCCA *Stat. Bull.* 10.

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of employed Japanese Americans in each industry in three Western states (California, Oregon, and Washington) who were in Los Angeles County.

Angeles County and in the three Western states, shows that male farmers, farm managers, and paid farm labor were less numerous in Los Angeles County, as were female domestic service workers. There were in the county many more clerical and sales workers, and, as we would expect, rather more proprietors and managers. The disproportionately large number of nonfarm laborers in Los Angeles County was due to the concentration of fishermen and contract gardeners, whom the Census classified as laborers.<sup>6</sup>

The discussion that follows is limited in intensive analyses to Los Angeles County, but it should be emphasized that this area contained almost a third of all Japanese Americans in the United States. It was by far the largest prewar center, as it has once more become, and its occupational concentration gave it an importance disproportionate to its numbers in the labor market of the subregion.

In 1940 the Census reported 17,005 employed workers of Japanese ancestry in the county, of whom 29.2 per cent were native-born males, 43.0 per cent foreign-born males, 13.6 per cent native-born females, and 14.2 per cent foreign-born females. Table 4 presents the occupational

TABLE 4  
MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE AMERICANS, LOS ANGELES  
COUNTY, 1940, BY NATIVITY AND SEX

Occupational group	Total	Native-born		Foreign-born	
		Males	Females	Males	Females
Employed (except on public emergency work)	17,005	4,956	2,323	7,305	2,421
Professional and semiprofessional	535	114	96	243	82
Farmers and farm managers	1,691	298	12	1,287	94
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	2,380	523	84	1,551	222
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	3,149	1,477	693	666	313
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	298	136	14	136	12
Operatives and kindred workers	1,043	341	170	250	282
Domestic service workers	864	129	419	162	154
Service workers, except domestic	1,279	155	243	554	327
Farm laborers (wage) and foremen	1,435	435	113	684	203
Unpaid family farm laborers	1,746	605	432	62	647
Laborers, except farm	2,512	726	26	1,687	73
Nonclassifiable	73	17	21	23	12

SOURCE: U S Census, 1940 Special tabulation, unpublished. Copy from files of Dr. Dorothy Swaine Thomas.

TABLE 5

ESTIMATES FROM SAMPLE<sup>a</sup> OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE AMERICANS IN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1940, AND COMPARISON WITH U S CENSUS, 1940, BY NATIVITY AND SEX

Occupational group	Total		Native-born		Foreign-born	
			Males	Females	Males	Females
			ESTIMATED NUMBER <sup>b</sup>			
Employed (except on public emergency work)	10,435	4,865±234	2,495±134	7,165±254	1,910±164	
Professional and semiprofessional	510±90	160±50	85±37	200±56	65±32	
Farmers and farm managers	1,805±160	430±82	85±39	1,340±140	30±82	
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	3,125±201	775±109	65±32	2,115±172	170±52	
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	3,065±200	1,245±136	1,075±127	145±37	275±66	
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	890±78	210±58	85±34	145±36		
Operatives and kindred workers	1,200±157	595±78	285±67	225±59	380±77	
Domestic service workers	630±102	175±34	275±66	225±50	385±71	
Service workers, except domestic	1,405±143	120±44	325±71	405±67	355±74	
Farm laborers (wage) and foremen	1,570±145	275±66	60±23	440±65	108±41	
Unpaid family farm laborers	1,430±145	635±89	295±68	85±38	425±51	
Laborers, except farm	1,535±162	845±92		1,290±138		
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 1940 CENSUS AND ESTIMATES FROM SAMPLE (IN STANDARD ERRORS) <sup>c</sup>						
Employed (except on public emergency work)	-3 3%					-6 2σ
Professional and semiprofessional		+3 2σ	+6 0σ	+6 6σ		-5 8σ
Farmers and farm managers	+7 4σ	-4 6σ		-4 0σ		
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm		-3 0σ				
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	+2 4σ	+2 6σ				+2 5σ
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	-3 7σ		+3 4σ	+2 1σ		-2 4σ
Operatives and kindred workers	-3 6σ	-3 2σ	+2 3σ	-5 0σ		-4 8σ
Domestic service workers		-4 8σ	-4 5σ			-5 5σ
Service workers, except domestic	-9 8σ		-4 0σ			
Farm laborers (wage) and foremen	-4 1σ					
Unpaid family farm laborers	-8 4σ	-3 9σ		-5 8σ		
Laborers, except farm						

<sup>a</sup> 20 per cent random sample of Japanese Americans from Los Angeles County who were employed in 1940, taken from WRA Form 28 file. See text, pp 15-16, for description of this source and sampling procedure.

<sup>b</sup> Five times sample number  $\pm 2\sigma$ . For estimate from 20 per cent sample,  $\sigma = \sqrt{\frac{8x(n-z)}{n}}$ , in which  $E$  represents estimate from the sample,  $C$  the number from the Census, and  $\sigma$  the standard error of estimate.

<sup>c</sup> Differences in standard error units =  $\frac{E-C}{\sigma}$ , in which  $E$  represents estimate from the sample,  $C$  the number from the Census, and  $\sigma$  the standard error of estimate. Differences are entered only if greater than  $2\sigma$ , i.e., if probability of occurrence by chance was less than 5 per cent. The  $\sigma$  values may be interpreted as follows: a difference as great as  $2.0\sigma$  could have occurred by chance 4.6 times in 100,  $2.5\sigma$  as often as 0.1 times in 100,  $3.0\sigma$  as often as 0.02 times in 100, etc.

grouping of this population. The salient importance of farming and entrepreneurial occupations for the Issei males and clerical functions for both male and female Nisei is impressive. We should also call attention to the large number of unpaid family farm laborers.

In order to make possible intensive analyses of the labor force, a 20 per cent random sample was extracted from Los Angeles County cases in the Form 26 file of the War Relocation Authority. The form (see Appendix C) was filled out for each person who had ever been under the jurisdiction of the WRA. Our data were taken from a complete file now in the Library of the University of California, Berkeley. The procedure was to examine every fifth case - persons fourteen years of age or older in April, 1940, who were in the labor market on or after that date, and who indicated permanent residence in Los Angeles County, were taken for the sample. The forms had been so administered that the regular prewar address was usually recorded, even though the individual had moved to a temporary address before the Evacuation. For each person in the sample we recorded the usual data on personal characteristics, information about his occupation in April, 1940, in November, 1941, and any occupational changes between December, 1941, and the Evacuation. The April, 1940, data were extracted in order to compare our sample with the findings of the 1940 Census. The November, 1941, data were taken as representing the employment characteristics of the population immediately before the outbreak of war. Subsequent changes were recorded in an attempt to discover the impact of war on this minority group.

In table 5 we present estimates for major occupational groups in April, 1940, based on tabulations of the 20 per cent sample. The second part of the table indicates all differences between the Census figures and estimates that are greater than twice the standard error of the estimate, i.e., which could not have occurred by chance more often than five times in 100. This table therefore provides a measure of the correspondence between the Census and our 20 per cent sample.

At the outset it will be noted that the estimate of total employed workers based on WRA files is 3.3 per cent (565) less than the Census. This difference as well as other discrepancies may be related to internment, migration, death, or simply the failure of some persons to report themselves as workers to WRA. Persons who died after the Census was taken were chiefly Issei and probably had a random occupational distribution for this group. It is probable that the long-term trend toward the Los Angeles County area persisted in the period between April,

1940, and Evacuation, and the net increase may slightly inflate our 1940 estimates. After the outbreak of war and up to the time when free movement of the population from Los Angeles was prohibited by military orders issued at the end of March, 1942, nearly 2,000 persons, about half of whom were members of the labor force, voluntarily left the area that was to be evacuated.<sup>7</sup> This number is sufficiently large to account for most of the deficiency of 33 per cent in the total number. Finally, there were some persons, disproportionately Issei males who worked in fishing (classified as "Laborers, except farm") and trade and financial industries (classified as "Proprietors and managers"), who were interned and were never released to WRA.

Discrepancies for specific occupations will be examined in connection with the appropriate occupational discussion. However, it may be worth while to indicate here the possible sources of inaccuracy and the more generally applicable reasons for discrepancy. Inaccuracy attributable to the Census probably derives in large part from linguistic difficulties in enumeration and some ambiguity in classifying occupations for this population. For example, it is our impression that the Census undercounted proprietors of personal service establishments. Proprietors of small hotels catering to Japanese Americans were evidently classed with rooming-house keepers as service workers; proprietors of beauty and barber shops, hand laundries, business services, auto repair shops, and so on were classed as service workers or craftsmen. The Census defines employers as proprietors, but provides no interpretation of employer status when unpaid family workers are involved. Interpretation is further obscured by the fact that the distinction between own-account workers and employers was not properly interpreted by enumerators, so that the Census combines the categories in reporting class of worker, but fails to say how this affected the occupational classifications.<sup>8</sup>

Although linguistic problems were reduced in the case of WRA and it was possible to interpret statements in terms of the occupational specialization of Japanese Americans, there were more serious difficulties. For one thing, the individual was asked to report on events two or more years in the past, instead of current facts, as in the Census. Furthermore, the situation was less anonymous than the Census, and many evacuees felt that the information being supplied would in some way affect their subsequent employment. Therefore an individual would be less likely to report jobs with low prestige, particularly if he were a part-time or unpaid worker. For example, the shortage of Issei females and female Nisei family farm workers is probably due to the failure of

some unpaid family workers to report their jobs. By shifting the date of a higher status job that had been previously held, by reporting only one of two jobs that had been held simultaneously, or simply by raising the job status, individuals could change their occupational level. This probably accounts for a part of the surplus of male proprietors and

TABLE 6  
JAPANESE AMERICANS IN MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS,  
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, NOVEMBER, 1941<sup>a</sup>  
(Estimated percentages)

Occupational group	Total	Males	Females
Total	100 0	100 0	100 0
Professional and semiprofessional	3 4	3 2	3 8
Farm and nursery operators and managers	10 3	14 0	0 8
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	18 3	23 2	5 9
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	20 1	15 4	32 0
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	2 3	3 0	0 6
Operatives and kindred workers	8 1	5 6	14 6
Domestic service workers	4 4	2 4	9 5
Protective service workers	0 2	0 3	0 0
Service workers, except domestic and protective	8 3	5 8	14 9
Farm laborers and foremen	12 9	11 2	17 4
Laborers, except farm	10 9	15 2	0 0
Unemployed, seeking work	0 7	0 8	0 5

<sup>a</sup> Percentages from 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 26. Because of certain inadequacies of the sample which are discussed in the text, these can be offered only as estimates of the November, 1941, situation.

managers and the shortage of male clerical and Nisei male domestic workers, and similarly for the surplus of Nisei females in clerical and operative positions and the corresponding shortage in domestic work.



In table 6 we present an estimate for November, 1941, of the percentages of workers by major occupational groups based on the 20 per cent sample as summarized in table 7. These figures describe the prewar status. We shall analyze the subcategories of the major occupational groups in the discussion of specific occupations.

A summary of the population by class of worker is given in table 8. It will be noted that 9.5 per cent of the employed males and 34.2 per

TABLE 7

OCCUPATIONS OF 20 PER CENT SAMPLE OF JAPANESE AMERICANS IN THE LABOR FORCE,  
LOS ANGELES COUNTY, NOVEMBER, 1941, BY NATIVITY AND SEX

Occupation	All workers			Native-born		Foreign-born	
	Total	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Total	3,527	2,537	990	1,109	601	1,428	389
Professional and semiprofessional workers	120	82	38	37	25	45	13
Farm and nursery operators and managers	363	355	8	96	2	259	6
Proprietors, managers, and officials, except farm	646	588	58	176	18	412	40
Specified proprietors and managers	568	514	54	152	15	362	39
Wholesale produce	45	45	0	15	0	30	0
Other wholesale trade	24	23	1	9	0	14	1
Retail produce	155	147	8	78	5	69	3
Retail groceries	85	80	5	22	2	58	3
Restaurants	102	88	14	9	5	79	9
Other retail trade*	95	86	9	19	1	67	8
Hotels	62	45	17	0	2	45	15
All other proprietors, managers, officials	78	74	4	24	3	50	1
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	707	390	317	293	261	97	56
Sales clerks in specified industries	486	289	197	231	149	58	48
Wholesale produce	51	51	0	37	0	14	0
Retail produce	292	176	116	153	94	23	22
Retail groceries	73	32	41	22	23	10	18
Other retail trade*	70	30	40	19	32	11	8
All other clerical and sales workers	221	101	120	62	112	39	8
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	82	76	6	47	6	29	0
Operatives and kindred workers	287	142	145	96	70	46	75
Truck and tractor drivers	43	48	0	34	0	14	0
Food canning and packing operatives	75	12	63	5	23	7	40
All other operatives	164	82	82	57	47	25	35
Domestic service workers	154	60	94	14	72	46	22
Protective service workers	8	8	0	7	0	1	0
Service workers, except domestic and protective	294	147	147	28	81	119	66
Barbers, beauticians, manicurists	51	13	38	3	31	10	7
Cooks, except private family	53	43	10	7	3	36	7
Servants, except private family	73	29	44	8	11	21	33
Waiters and waitresses	59	15	44	7	29	8	15
Other service workers	58	47	11	3	7	44	4
Farm laborers and foremen	455	283	172	181	64	102	108
Foremen	15	15	0	4	0	11	0
Laborers, wage workers	149	114	35	49	11	65	24
Laborers, unpaid family workers	291	154	137	128	53	26	84
Laborers, except farm	385	385	0	125	0	260	0
Fishermen	61	61	0	23	0	38	0
Gardeners	305	305	0	88	0	217	0
Other laborers	19	19	0	14	0	5	0
Unemployed, seeking work	26	21	5	9	2	12	3

Source: 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 28

\* Including cleaning and dyeing establishments



TABLE 8

CLASS OF WORKER AND OCCUPATIONS OF 20 PER CENT SAMPLE OF EMPLOYED JAPANESE AMERICANS, LOS ANGELES COUNTY, NOVEMBER, 1941

Class of worker and occupation	Number			Percentage		
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
Employed workers	3,500	2,515	985	100 0	100 0	100 0
Employers and own-account workers <sup>a</sup>	1,277	1,177	100	36 4	46 7	10 2
Professional and semiprofessional	46	39	7	1 3	1 5	0 7
Farm and nursery operators	347	339	8	9 9	13 5	0 8
Proprietors, except farm	531	477	54	15 2	18 9	5 5
Salesmen	12	10	2	0 3	0 4	0 2
Craftsmen	28	27	1	0 8	1 1	0 1
Operatives and kindred	18	11	7	0 5	0 4	0 7
Service workers	32	11	21	0 9	0 4	2 1
Laborers, fishermen	12	12	0	0 3	0 5	0 0
Laborers, gardeners	251	251	0	7 2	10 0	0 0
Unpaid family workers	576	239	337	16 5	9 5	34 2
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	161	46	115	4 6	1 8	11 7
Operatives and kindred	36	15	21	1 0	0 6	2 1
Service workers	79	15	64	2 3	0 6	6 5
Farm and nursery laborers	297	160	137	8 5	6 4	13 9
Laborers, except farm	3	3	0	0 1	0 1	0 0
Wage and salary workers	1,582	1,042	540	45 2	41 5	54 8
Professional and semiprofessional	71	42	29	2 0	1 7	2 9
Farm and nursery managers	9	9	0	0 3	0 4	0 0
Managers, except farm	100	98	2	2 9	3 9	0 2
Clerical, sales, and kindred	532	332	200	15 2	13 2	20 3
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	51	46	5	1 5	1 8	0 5
Operatives and kindred	230	113	117	6 6	4 5	11 9
Domestic service workers	151	60	91	4 3	2 4	9 2
Service workers, except domestic	190	127	63	5 4	5 0	6 4
Farm and nursery laborers	155	122	33	4 4	4 9	3 4
Laborers, fishermen	40	40	0	1 1	1 6	0 0
Laborers, gardeners	38	38	0	1 1	1 5	0 0
Laborers, except fishermen and gardeners	15	15	0	0 4	0 6	0 0
Class of worker not reported	65	57	8	1 9	2 3	0 8

SOURCE: 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 26

<sup>a</sup> Employers and "own-account" workers not tabulated separately because of inadequate information.

cent of the employed females were unpaid family workers in November, 1941. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that the importance of unpaid family labor, other than in agriculture, has been demonstrated on an adequate statistical base. Our findings are undoubtedly conservative. Of the unpaid family workers, 31.1 per cent of the males were under 25 years of age, whereas females were more generally distributed: 15.4 per cent were under 25 years of age, 25.4 per cent were between 25 and 44, and 17.9 per cent were between 45 and 59. The large proportion of employers and own-account workers in this minority population is equally impressive. Nearly half (46.7 per cent) of all males fell in this category, and the representation was especially heavy, of course, in the higher ages. Whereas only 13.3 per cent of males under 25 were so classified, there were 47.1 per cent between 25 and 44 years, 64.6 per cent between 46 and 59 years, and 61.9 per cent of those 60 years of age and older. Even among the few females in the labor force who were 60 or older, almost half were own-account workers.

Reliable and extensive income data are unavailable, but we thought it desirable to present what information we had in table 9; this may indicate the income levels of the major occupational groups. Unfortunately, income was not reported in 59.7 per cent of the cases, and these were not randomly distributed through the occupational groups, so that indications of bias are strong. Independent workers particularly are underrepresented. The ceiling of earnings for the majority of workers apparently was little more than \$200, only 6.3 per cent of the workers reporting incomes higher than \$250 per month. That the earning power of this population was well below the per capita income for all California civilians may be seen in figure 4, where the Loss Survey sample is used.

A measure of occupational mobility is the duration of employment in particular occupations. In 1941 about one-fourth of the Los Angeles County employed workers had spent less than two years in the specific occupations in which they were then engaged. Of these, half were Nisei under 25 years of age just entering the labor force or shifting from those jobs at which they had entered the labor market. A little more than one-fourth of the employed workers had continued in the same occupation for a period between two and five years, and the remainder had spent six or more years in their occupations. Indeed, 28.8 per cent of the workers in the sample had been continuously in the same occupation for ten or more years, an indication of remarkable stability. These persons were almost entirely Issei and their occupational stability is an expression of their specialization and an artifact of the age structure of




Fig. 4 Per capita income in 1941.

SOURCE: Per capita income for all California civilians computed from income and population figures of Department of Commerce, published by California State Chamber of Commerce, Economic Survey Series, 1945-1946, *Report No. 29*, and 1946-1947, *Report No. 1*.

Per capita income for Japanese Americans by occupational groups computed from Loss Survey and Terminal Island Survey data. For families of mixed type, wage and salary workers were classified as self-supporting and all nonworkers were classed as dependent upon income from family enterprise.

TABLE 9  
INCOME BY MAJOR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS, JAPANESE AMERICAN EMPLOYED WORKERS,<sup>a</sup> LOS ANGELES COUNTY, NOVEMBER, 1941

Major occupational group	Number reporting monthly income of <sup>b</sup>								Median income	Number reporting income	Number not reporting income <sup>c</sup>
	\$44 or less	\$45 to \$94	\$95 to \$149	\$150 to \$199	\$200 to \$249	\$250 to \$299	\$300 to \$399	\$400 or more			
All occupations	153	352	340	164	79	22	33	31	\$108	1,174	1,738
Professional and semiprof workers	6	10	13	9	2	3	2	1	125	46	74
Farm and nursery operators and managers	5	13	17	13	8	4	9	8	163	77	285
Proprietors, except farm	14	18	40	31	26	11	17	16	173	173	358
Managers, except farm	3	8	23	19	8	1	0	1	144	63	39
Clerical, sales, and kindred	27	114	128	45	11	0	0	1	104	326	220
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred	2	6	12	10	3	1	1	1	141	36	45
Operatives and kindred	10	40	29	9	4	0	1	1	91	94	150
Domestic service workers	54	37	13	3	2	0	0	0	46	109	53
Other service workers	15	61	33	6	3	1	0	0	81	119	100
Farm and nursery laborers	8	28	9	2	1	0	0	0	74	48	100
Laborers, except farm	9	17	23	17	11	1	3	2	132	83	314

Sources: 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 26

<sup>a</sup> Omitted from table 576 unpaid family workers and 13 proprietors or managers with income not reported. Therefore these data are not comparable with table 15.

<sup>b</sup> Reported annual income for 165 workers reduced to monthly income for inclusion. Of these, 124 were farm operators or proprietors.

<sup>c</sup> Including workers for whom income was not reported, and workers reporting only hourly or seasonal pay. A large part of the number not reporting income were part-time and irregular or seasonal workers.

the group. The amount of mobility in the several occupations will be discussed in the appropriate chapters.

A summary of occupational changes in the 20 per cent sample between April, 1940, and November, 1941, is presented in table 10. In the 19-month period there was a net increase of 231 workers in the sample, due mainly to 271 Nisei under 25 years of age entering the labor force.

TABLE 10  
CHANGES IN JAPANESE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE, LOS ANGELES COUNTY,  
BETWEEN APRIL, 1940, AND NOVEMBER, 1941

Major occupational group	Changes in 20 per cent sample <sup>a</sup>					Estimated net changes in total labor force <sup>b</sup>
	Entered labor force	Left labor force	Changed occup.		Net change	
			1941 occup.	1940 occup.		
Total . . . . .	351	120	420	420	+231	+1,155±306
Professional and semi-professional workers	15	4	19	12	+18	+90±63
Farm and nursery operators and managers	7	4	15	16	+2	"
Proprietors, except farm	16	9	58	38	+27	+135±98
Managers, except farm	7	4	10	19	-6	"
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	130	31	106	115	+90	+450±172
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers . . .	6	2	13	13	+4	"
Operatives and kindred workers	47	23	49	44	+29	+145±114
Domestic service workers	31	9	16	20	+18	+90±78
Service workers, except domestic	23	10	50	42	+21	+105±99
Farm and nursery laborers	51	16	25	69	-9	"
Laborers, fishermen	7	6	3	6	-2	"
Laborers, gardeners	3	1	31	17	+16	+80±64
Other laborers, except farm	7	1	3	5	+4	"
Unemployed	1	0	22	4	+19	+95±46

<sup>a</sup> 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 26

<sup>b</sup> Five times net change in sample  $\pm 2\sigma$ . The standard error of the difference (net change) is  $\sigma = 5\sqrt{8(\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 + \sigma_3^2 + \sigma_4^2)}$ , in which the subscripts refer to the number of the column above

" Net change smaller than twice its standard error.

Males and females were about equally numerous. Almost half of the new Nisei workers entered as clerical and sales workers, especially as retail produce clerks. Many of the females in this group entered as bookkeepers, stenographers, and office clerks. Other significant entering categories were, in order of importance, farm and nursery labor, operatives and the like, and domestic work. Of 120 persons in the sample who left the labor force between April, 1940, and November, 1941, half were females, almost all of childbearing age (under 45 years). Of males who left the labor force, many were more than 60 years old, and some young Nisei quit part-time work for full-time school.

Examination of occupational shifts (for persons already in the labor force in April, 1940) for the same 19-month interval shows the greatest turnover among Nisei in the entry categories, namely, clerical and sales workers, operatives, and farm and nursery labor. There was an increase in the number of nonfarm proprietors and of gardeners, and a decrease in farm and nursery laborers chiefly due to the movement of Nisei males. In spite of high turnover, the numbers of clerical and sales workers and operatives remained about the same.

Estimates of net changes in the major occupational categories for Los Angeles County are shown in the right-hand column of table 10. It would appear that Nisei were entering the labor market as sales clerks, farm laborers, operatives, and domestics. Farm and nursery laborers probably shifted to gardening and clerical and operative positions, and sales clerks and operatives tended to become managers and proprietors. Since half of the new workers were entering the labor market as clerical and sales workers, and Nisei farm laborers were shifting to this category also, it is clear that clerical and sales work was becoming progressively more important as an occupation for Nisei.



The prewar ecological concentration of Japanese Americans in Los Angeles County may be seen in figure 1 (facing p. x). There is a corresponding occupational concentration so that the areas are, in fact, functional nuclei of economic specialization. For convenience in referring to the locations, we have assigned geographical designations: Boyle Heights, Central area—Little Tokio, West Jefferson—Westside, Olympic, Sawtelle, the Western area of Los Angeles, Wilmington and San Pedro, the Harbor area, the remainder of the county to the south and west of the city, and the remainder of the county to the north and east of the city.

The area conventionally referred to as Little Tokio is the small triangle of highest concentration within Central area—Little Tokio. Within a few blocks of the intersection of East First and San Pedro streets were to be found cultural, religious, and professional services for the Japanese American population of Southern California. On holidays and Saturdays, Japanese Americans congregated in Little Tokio from all over the region, much as rural dwellers visit the county seat. Hotels and restaurants for Japanese Americans without families were in Little Tokio, and just outside were numerous eating and lodging places run by Japanese Americans for transients and the residents of a deteriorated area.

Boyle Heights, an area of great ethnic diversity, had a large number of Japanese Americans in trade, especially produce trade. It had the advantage of providing a place of residence not actually in Little Tokio but readily accessible to it. Sawtelle had a large population of contract gardeners who served the middle- and upper-class homes of Beverly Hills, Santa Monica, and West Los Angeles. In the Wilmington and San Pedro area, the population worked in fishing and the fish canneries. West Jefferson and the Olympic area were compact communities of tradespeople, particularly produce, and many contract gardeners serving middle-class homes near by. The other four areas were not communities in the same sense as the foregoing, but the smaller points of concentration within each had retail shops and service establishments for the ethnic community. Hollywood in the Western area most nearly resembled West Jefferson and Olympic in occupational characteristics, but was less compact. The Harbor area and the large area south and west of the main city were the most important sections for truck farming. Finally, the area north and east of the main city contained truck and flower farmers in the San Fernando Valley and concentrations of gardeners and domestics serving upper-class residences along the foothills to the east.



Having made this broad survey of the history and prewar position of Japanese Americans in the Los Angeles labor market, we must now establish the basis for postwar comparisons and the groundwork for a detailed analysis of the more important occupations.

As indicated in table 4 (p. 13), there were about 500 professional and semiprofessional workers in Los Angeles County in 1940. Teachers and clergymen are interesting to us because of their large number and their culturally conservative influence. The 121 teachers reported by the

Census<sup>9</sup> taught in either Japanese language schools or sewing schools; the former were augmented by individuals, chiefly clergymen, who gave a day or two each week to teaching. The sewing schools, even when they called themselves Parisienne or French American, catered to Kibei and girls from rural areas. In addition to the 43 art and music teachers separately enumerated by the Census, there were a number of teachers of Japanese art forms. There were 33 Japanese music and dance teachers, and more than 20 teachers of the Tea Ceremony and Japanese flower arrangement.<sup>10</sup> The Census enumerated 79 clergymen in 1940. A larger number were listed in the *Rafu Shimpo Directory*, but some of them were only part-time ministers. Of the ministers, 44 were identified in the *Directory* as Christians; with few exceptions these were affiliated with established Protestant denominations. There were 27 Buddhist and 15 Shinto priests. Adherents of Catholicism were served by a mission conducted by Caucasian priests. The number of Christian clergymen represents a measure of acculturation, but almost all the religious leaders were Issei.

The Japanese American population was better supplied with health services by professionals of their own ethnic groups than were other racial minorities in the Los Angeles area. There were 38 physicians and 35 dentists, nearly one of each per 1,000 persons of Japanese ancestry.<sup>11</sup> There were also 6 chiropractors,<sup>12</sup> a rather small number considering the numerous chiropractors (576) in the area<sup>13</sup> and the general dependence of minority groups on marginal medical practitioners. The medical personnel were augmented by<sup>14</sup> 9 midwives who represented a conservative Japanese tradition. Some Japanese American professionals, especially dentists, served members of other ethnic groups; but for the most part they depended on the in-group population. There was an extraordinary concentration of health services in Little Tokio. Semiprofessionals such as optometrists and minor professionals such as pharmacists, 26 in number, were also well represented in the Japanese American population and concentrated in Little Tokio.

There were only 13 lawyers in the Japanese community, roughly one for every 3,000 of the Japanese American population and a far smaller proportion than were to be found in the general population. The few attorneys were augmented by semiprofessional legal advisers, a common occupational development among ethnic groups with a large foreign-born component. The shortage of Japanese American lawyers was due to the ineligibility of Issei for admission to the Bar, the general feeling among Japanese Americans that the court gives a more friendly hearing



when an Oriental is represented by a Caucasian, and a reluctance on the part of the Issei to entrust their affairs to young Nisei lawyers. Quite as important as these considerations was the fact that intra-ethnic problems were managed by social controls that did not require recourse to the courts, and Japanese Americans were involved in relatively few criminal actions. The principle of collective responsibility was encouraged by the law-enforcement agencies, which accepted the low crime statistics of Japanese Americans, not as an artifact of police policy but as justification for the policy. There is no doubt, however, that the intra-group controls were effective in the sense that they protected the ethnic group against general criticism and loss of face, and from that point of view the police policy was justified.

The remainder of the professional and semiprofessional workers were scattered throughout a wide variety of occupations.



From our occupational data it was not possible to provide an estimate of the number of business establishments. We therefore drew upon the *Rafu Shimpo Yearbook and Directory*, which appears to have been fairly complete for businesses dependent on Japanese patronage. Persons referring to this source should carefully compare listings for the Central area of Los Angeles City and the outlying areas. There was no uniform scheme for assembling the listings. Excepting the wholesale and retail produce businesses, which will be discussed in detail later, we estimate from the listings in the *Rafu Shimpo Yearbook and Directory*, 1940-1941, that there were in Los Angeles City, excluding the outlying areas, more than 350 hotels, apartments, and rooming houses; about 240 restaurants, cafés, and bars; 200 flower shops and nurseries; 150 cleaning and dyeing establishments; 80 barber shops and beauty parlors, 50 insurance offices; and smaller numbers of a wide variety of businesses and services. Although there were only 18 import-export firms and 15 Oriental art-goods stores, some were rather substantial enterprises. Most of the hotels, insurance agents, import-export and Oriental art businesses were in the city proper, but of such businesses as restaurants, cleaning and dyeing shops, barber shops, and nurseries there was an additional 30-50 per cent in the subcenters of the county. These figures are not intended to be compared with our data on occupations, except where specific interpretations rationalizing business and occupational data are made in the text.

There were between 300 and 350 retail grocers,<sup>14</sup> almost all males, about two-thirds of whom were Issei. Their establishments were for the most part small and stable family enterprises. Other retail trade establishments were also predominantly family enterprises run by Issei and showed high stability. The only important exception seems to be retail produce stores, in which Nisei were somewhat more highly represented. These, as we shall note in chapter iii, were less often family enterprises. By reference to table 7 we note that in groceries there were fewer clerical workers than proprietors, and that the same held for other retail trade. Even though, as we pointed out in analyzing the discrepancies of the sample, some clerks may have reported themselves as proprietors, the limited dimensions of the enterprises are clear. Almost half of the clerical personnel in retail trade other than produce were unpaid family workers, and the majority of these were females distributed through the age range. Male family workers were either rather young or quite old. Of the paid clerical workers, less than half were females, whose age characteristics were like those of the family workers, about two-thirds of the male paid workers were Nisei.

There are 310 restaurants, cafés, and bars listed in the *Rafu Shimpō Yearbook and Directory* for Los Angeles County. Because this is probably not a complete listing, it is disconcerting to find that the 1940 U. S. Census reports only 251 proprietors and managers of eating and drinking establishments.<sup>15</sup> This is clearly an undercount and, because this occupational group is included in the summary category of "Proprietors, etc." in table 5, it accounts for part of the difference of 7.4σ. Our own estimate of the number of proprietors and managers of restaurants and the like, based on our 20 per cent sample, is between 420 and 600.<sup>16</sup> Included in this are an indeterminate number of partners, so that the number of proprietors would be greater than the number of establishments. Moreover, there may be some inflation due to misreporting. Of the restaurant proprietors in our sample, 40 per cent were from the Little Tokio area, and smaller concentrations of about 10 per cent each were found on Terminal Island and in Boyle Heights, where small establishments served a working-class population.

We estimate that there were 240-380 hotel proprietors in 1941, which agrees closely with the approximately 360 hotels listed by the *Rafu Shimpō Yearbook and Directory*. Almost all of these were in the Little Tokio area.

Because proprietors of a wide variety of retail establishments had similar characteristics and the simple business establishments resembled

one another, we have combined them under the category of "Other retail trade." There were 400-550 proprietors, about one-third of whom ran cleaning and dyeing shops, and one-fourth florist shops; the rest sold clothing, shoes, candy, furniture, household appliances, motor accessories, drugs, hardware, jewelry, liquor, and so on. The Little Tokio and Boyle Heights areas accounted for about one-third of the total, and the rest were widely scattered.

Other proprietors, managers, and officials, estimated at 310-470 from our sample, included proprietors of employment agencies, automobile service stations, shoe and other repair services, theaters, billiard and pool parlors, buyers and department heads in other than produce trade, and association officials who had no other occupation.

The proprietors and managers of restaurants, hotels, and the miscellaneous trade and service categories were predominantly Issei males, although one-fourth of the hotel proprietors were Issei females. Income from these enterprises was modest, as shown in table 9. The small cluster of nonfarm proprietors reporting incomes above \$300 per month were in wholesale produce, banking, and import-export trade. As we would expect from the high proportion of Issei, there was a concentration of individuals in the higher ages, and about one-fifth of them were more than 60 years of age. In general, the businesses were stable, as measured by the number of years in which proprietors had been continuously in the occupation. About two-fifths had a tenure of ten years or more. An interesting pattern of adjustment to age appeared upon close analysis of tenure statistics. Several elderly Issei had recently entered restaurant or hotel businesses as a kind of limited retirement, and widows had acquired small hotels with the family savings.

As we have noted above in this chapter, the characteristics of clerical workers in miscellaneous retail trade were similar to those in retail groceries. Unpaid family workers in restaurants, hotels, cleaning and dyeing shops, laundries, and so on were mainly young Nisei and Issei females.

The ethnic characteristics of employers were not reported for paid employees in operative and service categories; so we were unable to compare the characteristics of workers in Japanese American enterprises with those employed by Caucasian firms. Most operatives in laundries and cleaning and dyeing establishments and truck and tractor drivers were employed by Japanese Americans. The majority of the operatives employed by Caucasians were females in food canning and packing and clothing manufacture. Very few Japanese Americans, either Issei or Nisei, were engaged in other forms of semiskilled work

in manufacturing, and even fewer were craftsmen or foremen in manufacturing industry. In reading table 7, note that we used the Census classification and therefore operators of single-worker hand laundries and so on were included with operatives, and barbers and beauticians with their own shops were included with service workers. By comparing the occupational categories of table 7 with the class of worker breakdown in table 8, the classification of own-account workers will be made clear. Among paid service workers, barbers and beauticians were almost all Nisei females. Cooks who were not domestics were mostly Issei males, employed in the larger Japanese American restaurants and in eating places run by Caucasians. Waiters and a large number of waitresses were employed mainly in Japanese American establishments. Except for male cooks and male and female domestics, Japanese American service workers hired by Caucasians were mostly Issei male janitors and porters in apartment houses and department stores.

Employment of Japanese Americans as domestic workers was more extensive in the San Francisco Bay area than in Los Angeles County. There were in the latter area, however, according to the 1940 Census, 291 males, more than half of whom were Issei, and 573 females, less than a third of whom were Issei.<sup>17</sup> The Issei males worked as resident cooks, butlers, and valets. Most Issei domestics were bachelors, but sometimes Issei couples were hired. Day workers were predominantly Nisei females, many of whom worked only part time to augment the family income. A considerable number of them were "schoolgirls" who did domestic work for room, board, and a small wage. Most of the Nisei male domestics had similar jobs.

The income data for domestics reported in table 9 are so heavily weighted with part-time workers that we shall depend on Nishimoto's interpretation. He indicates that resident domestics employed for general housework had a money wage between \$40 and \$60 a month in 1940. Cooks earned between \$75 and \$100, and married couples between \$125 and \$175 a month. Day workers earned 50-75 cents an hour, or by the day from \$4.50 to \$5.50. "Schoolboys" and "schoolgirls" worked three or four hours a day for board, lodging, and a nominal wage, which in 1940 was \$15 to \$35 for males and \$10 to \$25 a month for females.<sup>18</sup>



In summary, we take the following view of the prewar situation. The Issei appeared to have achieved a ceiling and were undergoing a process of retrenchment. Although the economic achievement of this recent im-

migrant population had been rapid and substantial, very few men had acquired more than a petty bourgeois or small farmer status. These few were powerful in the wholesale produce business, import-export trade, or finance. Most Issei males in business operated small enterprises with a low capital investment that survived because of the unpaid labor of the whole family. The reserves of the business lay in the working power of the family and the operation of the enterprise was a way of life for the whole family. The physical juxtaposition of residence and business was only one sign of this. The Issei proprietor thought of his business almost as an extension of himself.

Under these conditions, Nisei sons of men in substantial enterprises were being prepared to continue their fathers' businesses, as were sons of men in fishing and agriculture. The code of primogeniture was in effective operation. There is some doubt, however, whether Nisei would have taken over small shops when their fathers died or retired. Some Nisei recognized that many of the stores, especially the general merchandise shops in the ghetto areas, had a declining patronage of Issei and were therefore economically unsound. It is possible that when they inherited the businesses they would have settled down in the shops. The few who had the financial resources to do so might have moved the businesses outside the ghetto.

Before the war, the Nisei were moving into clerical work. In distinction to the Issei, who strove for the security and prestige of an independent enterprise, the Nisei aspired to white-collar work and had come to overvalue the importance of a "clean" job. The Nisei population was highly educated even by the standards of California, and in college they tended to specialize in practical lines such as the physical sciences, business administration, and preprofessional training, and relatively little in teaching, the humanities, or the social sciences. One of the most serious frustrations of the Nisei was their inability to find work that would use this training. The vernacular press in the years before the war was burdened with self-reproach about this aspect of the "Nisei problem."

The Evacuation shattered the securities and ambiguities of the situation we have described. The meager savings of small entrepreneurs and farmers were wiped out and the Nisei were relieved of the possible alternative of taking over the parental business. Only in the few cases in which the Issei would be able to recoup some of their losses and re-establish themselves after the war would there be any reserves to inherit. The effect of the Evacuation was to demand a new approach, if not a new solution, to the "Nisei problem."

## CHAPTER II

### OCCUPATIONAL CHANGES

THE DISCUSSION of the impact of the Evacuation on Japanese Americans, which occupies a large part of this monograph, may be viewed in a somewhat wider framework, which we wish here merely to point out. The Evacuation was undoubtedly the most serious and dramatic governmental manipulation to which an American population has been subjected in recent times. The group was almost an ideal target for attack. It was small in numbers, localized, racially "visible," and identified with the enemy. Discrimination against the group had often taken the form of legislative action and bureaucratic harassment. Recent immigration and rather high occupational mobility had brought the group into competition with established interests.

Despite the fairly rapid acquisition of an economic status somewhat higher than casual labor, Japanese Americans did not achieve in the years before the war a large measure of power in the social structure, owing in part to the fact that the aliens were not enfranchised. What power they did have was localized, and derived from the accommodative adjustments of the group itself, in which persons of high status assumed the responsibilities within the ethnic microcosm. The Japanese American leaders dealt chiefly with petty officials, although on ceremonial occasions concessions of recognition were made by officials of higher status.

In a sense, the assessment of occupational and economic dislocation presented here is a measure of the extent to which ethnic hostility, when mediated by the peculiar circumstances of war and the conditions described above, could be translated into an assault on the status of a group. We are inclined to infer that very drastic changes would need to take place in the American social structure before other ethnic groups could be manipulated to the same extent.



Upon the outbreak of war the Japanese American community was thrown out of balance and a period of occupational and economic readjustment ensued. Of the 47,800 prewar foreign-born Japanese Americans in the United States, 6,000, or 12.5 per cent, were apprehended under the alien enemy control program,<sup>1</sup> the majority of them in the period immediately after the outbreak of war. If the apprehension rate in Los Angeles County had been the same as for the whole United States,

about 1,600 would have been detained, but because of the concentration of financial and commercial enterprise and fishing in this area, the figure was probably somewhat higher. Since almost all of those apprehended were males, at least one out of five Issei males was detained. Almost a third were released after preliminary examination, but in most cases this did not take place until the Evacuation procedures had begun.

The conditions of detention were such that it was impossible for a businessman to assume a responsible part in the direction of his enterprise. Included in those detained were a disproportionate number of proprietors, managers, and other persons with responsible economic positions. Other alien enemy control measures had the effect of impairing the economic functions of the entire Japanese American population. Alien funds and the assets of branches of enemy commercial institutions were frozen. The fishing activities of enemy aliens were terminated. Some Japanese Americans in the employ of Caucasians were dismissed, and there were other discriminatory acts, such as the refusal of service and patronage, although very little of this was of an organized character.

Many businesses closed at the outbreak of war. Most of them reopened within a few days, a number under the management of less experienced Nisei. In February, 1942, business operations were further hampered by the imposition of travel restrictions and a curfew on both aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry. The month of February was a period of great confusion for Japanese Americans, for it was then that the organized pressures that led to the Evacuation began to take shape.<sup>a</sup> As Japanese Americans began to realize that some sort of mass removal was imminent, a series of emergency adjustments occurred. Some persons, under official encouragement, moved away from the California coast. Nisei children who were away from home quit their jobs in order to join their parents. Businesses were liquidated and crop planting was disrupted.

One measure of the occupational aspects of these events is given in table 11. Of Japanese Americans who lived in Los Angeles County in November, 1941, approximately 1,500 left the labor force, 1,000 changed their occupations, and 300 new workers entered the labor force between December, 1941, and the Evacuation. We estimate that the number of Japanese American workers who were permanent residents of Los Angeles County declined by at least 1,200 in this period. As indicated in chapter i, our 20 per cent sample undercounts fishermen who were interned and never reached WRA centers and farm laborers who failed to give Los Angeles County as their prewar residence after voluntarily

migrating inland. The number of unemployed also increased so that the net decline of employed persons was greater than 1,200.

The most important declines were in the categories of clerical workers, nonfarm proprietors and managers, nonfarm laborers, service workers, and operatives. The figure for unemployment, which amounts to about 1 per cent of the November, 1941, labor force, accounts only for those who reported that they were actively seeking work, and the estimate for the net decline in the labor force in table 11 undoubtedly masks a number of persons who would be counted as unemployed if the facts were fully known.



In the interim period when the assembly centers were in operation, the pool of evacuee labor was not fully utilized and there was little development of vocational skills. Evacuee workers were used for maintenance purposes, in large part in menial capacities, and were paid at rates ranging from \$8 to \$16 a month. The estimate of man-hours of work in the final report of WCCA<sup>3</sup> is ambiguous, but it probably means that the 27,000 evacuees who were employed averaged 48 hours a month.

The WRA program provided for a greater utilization of evacuee manpower, for more diversification of jobs, and for some vocational training both in schools and on the job. The rates of \$12, \$16, and \$19 a month, however, provided an inadequate incentive, so that many skills were lost to the communities. Highly trained evacuees resented working side by side with *hakujins* of the same or inferior competence who were being paid according to Federal Civil Service standards. Nisei females with stenographic training obtained experience in clerical and secretarial jobs that increased their employability. The maintenance work of the camps utilized some manual skills, but probably contributed little to the development of new skills. In the operation of the schools and hospitals, qualified evacuees were able to get on-the-job experience and, especially in the hospitals, developed new competences. English language classes for the Issei somewhat improved their employability, and formal vocational training, mostly in specific crafts, increased the number of job alternatives for a small part of the population.

Educational leaves were permitted for evacuees of college age beginning in the fall of 1942, and by December, 1943, the National Japanese American Student Relocation Council reported 2,263 Japanese American students in colleges outside the area of the Western Defense Command. This includes 200 girls who began nurse's training.<sup>4</sup>

In the summer of 1942 seasonal leaves from WCCA assembly centers for agricultural harvest work were granted to approximately 1,700



evacuees, of whom 750 never entered WRA centers.<sup>5</sup> In the peak periods of October, 1942, and 1943 more than 8,000 persons were on seasonal leave from WRA centers, but when agricultural labor was not in demand

TABLE 11  
CHANGES IN JAPANESE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE, LOS ANGELES COUNTY,  
BETWEEN DECEMBER, 1941, AND EVACUATION

Major occupational group	Changes in 20 per cent sample <sup>a</sup>					Estimated net changes in total labor force <sup>b</sup>
	Entered labor force	Left labor force	Changed occup		Net change	
			New occup.	1941 occup		
Total	63	300	190	190	-237	-1,185±236
Professional and semi-professional workers	1	18	6	10	-21	-105±45
Farm and nursery operators and managers	1	8	1	12	-18	-90±42
Proprietors and managers, except farm	2	51	11	18	-56	-280±81
Clerical, sales, and kindred workers	30	76	35	49	-60	-300±122
Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers	0	5	3	4	-6	°
Operatives and kindred workers	8	44	21	24	-39	-195±84
Domestic service workers	6	13	5	5	-7	°
Service workers, except domestic	5	34	12	23	-40	-200±77
Farm and nursery laborers	9	12	46	27	+16	°
Laborers, except farm	1	39	8	13	-43	-215±70
Unemployed	.	.	42	5	+37	+185±61

<sup>a</sup> 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 26

<sup>b</sup> Five times net change in sample  $\pm 2\sigma$ . The standard error of the difference (net change)  
 $\sigma = 5\sqrt{\frac{8(\sigma_1^2 + \sigma_2^2 + \sigma_3^2 + \sigma_4^2)}{n}}$ , in which the subscripts refer to the number of the column above.

° Net change smaller than twice its standard error

the number on seasonal leave fell to about 2,000. Agricultural laborers therefore were utilized as migratory unskilled labor; some individuals without agricultural experience also went out on seasonal leaves.<sup>6</sup> Except as it affected morale and ameliorated the prisonizing effects of life in the center, the program had little influence on the vocational adjustment of the evacuees.

The WRA procedure for permanent relocation was formulated in a general way in the fall of 1942, but it was not implemented on a mass basis until after the combined Leave Clearance and Army Registration program in February, 1943. By the end of December, 1944, after which relocation to the West Coast was first permitted, 37 per cent of the

TABLE 12  
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUEES 16 YEARS AND  
OLDER WHO HAD RELOCATED BY DECEMBER 31, 1944: EVACUEES  
IN EACH CATEGORY, BY SEX AND NATIVITY  
(Percentage)

Occupational classification <sup>a</sup>	Males			Females		
	Total	Native-born	Foreign-born	Total	Native-born	Foreign-born
Total	39 1	59 3	16 5	33 5	45 4	14 6
No occupational classification	49 1	51 2	18 5	26 1	35 2	13 9
Entry classification <sup>b</sup>	69 4	70 2	28 6	39 9	46 6	17 8
Fully qualified classification	36 9	61 2	16 5	39 0	53 3	14 9
Professional and managerial	41 6	71 1	23 3	41 7	63 7	21 1
Clerical and sales	59 2	71 4	22 6	56 9	62 9	22 8
Service	30 8	58 0	20 4	42 9	55 1	16 8
Agricultural, fishery, and forestry	29 5	53 6	12 4	20 8	34 7	9 4
Skilled	40 7	64 7	19 4	33 8	45 5	17 3
Semiskilled	51 6	64 6	17 1	32 2	44 9	18 8
Unskilled	44 0	67 1	16 6	18 8	33 4	7 5

SOURCE WRA, Forms 26, 177, 178, and 222 Tabulation published in WRA, *The Evacuated People*, p 51

<sup>a</sup> United States Employment Service classifications assigned by WRA in 1942 on basis of employment histories before Evacuation. Note that this classification is different from the U S Census classification used in other tables. USES classification is for job placement, hence by the qualifications of the potential employee. U S Census classification is according to the actual job held on the Census date

<sup>b</sup> Refers to those with training in a particular field, but with inadequate or no significant work experience to justify referral to a particular occupation

evacuees 16 years of age or older had left the centers on what was called indefinite leave. More than four-fifths of these were Nisei. The relocation rate for males had been somewhat higher than that for females, and this was due in part to the Nisei entering military service.

In table 12 we present the proportion of persons in each occupational category who had relocated by the end of 1944. Both males and females who had been classified in professional-managerial and clerical-sales occupations had relocated at the highest rates. Seventy-one per cent of the Nisei males, 63 per cent of the Nisei females, and 23 per cent of the

Issei males, and 22 per cent of the Issei females in these classifications were on indefinite leave in December, 1944. Doctors and dentists were not under pressure from the administration to relocate, and the residents of the centers, of course, wanted them to remain. It is our impression that the relocation rate of such professionals was not so high as for the professional-managerial category as a whole, even though during war-time it was relatively easy for doctors and dentists to build remunerative practices. It was generally felt by the community that professionals should be paid more than the \$19 a month rate, but the administration did not choose or was too rigid to provide for higher payments to doctors and dentists. Although we have no reliable information about the extent to which gifts were made to professionals and others, the practice was probably rather common because of the sense of injustice that we have mentioned and the Japanese custom of making gifts (*orei*). Agriculture and fishing, which included 43 per cent of adult males, showed the lowest over-all indefinite leave rate for both Nisei and Issei up to the end of 1944. This occupational difference may have been conditioned by the administrative provision for seasonal leaves. Relocation of Issei females was not determined by their own occupational opportunities, but primarily by familial considerations. Although relocation of Nisei females was also affected by family matters, occupational opportunities for professional-managerial, clerical-sales, and to some extent service jobs were important.

Beginning in the summer of 1945, vocational and other individual considerations ceased to determine relocation rates, and the evacuees relocated according to a scheduled quota of departures for each camp.

Apart from agricultural workers who secured jobs as laborers in the intermountain states, there is evidence of much occupational instability and experimentation among those who relocated to the Middle West and East. Professionals, such as dentists, found jobs as technicians or assistants, although some entered regular professional practice. Keeping a job in industry or commerce sometimes depended more on the availability of housing than on the conditions of work or the rate of pay, and many Japanese Americans who had never done domestic work accepted such jobs in order to secure housing. In distinction to the prewar occupational pattern, opportunities in war industry induced Nisei to take semiskilled jobs of a sort to which they were unaccustomed, and employers regarded them as especially suitable in precision work requiring manual dexterity, for which they were often paid at fairly high piece-work rates. On the other hand, Issei were hired in large numbers

for such low-paying jobs as service work in hotels and as domestics. Some persons whose prewar experience had been as entrepreneurs stayed in such work only until they were able to secure a rooming house, a restaurant, or a small store in which they could once more engage in independent enterprise. As the population of Japanese American colonies developed, especially in the Chicago Near-North Side, the clusters of shops and restaurants took on the characteristics of Los Angeles' Little

TABLE 13  
FIRST DESTINATION OF PERSONS RELOCATING ON INDEFINITE OR  
TERMINAL LEAVE FROM RELOCATION CENTERS<sup>a</sup>

Period	Total	Three Western states		Other United States <sup>b</sup>	
		Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total 1942-1946	106,925		.	.	
Total with destination known	104,570	51,710	49 5	52,860	50 5
1942-Dec , 1944	29,817	1,570	5 3	28,247	94 7
Jan., 1945-June, 1945	15,907	5,649	35 4	10,258	64 6
July, 1945-Nov , 1945	49,826	37,020	74 3	12,806	25 7
Dec., 1945-1946	9,020	7,471	82 8	1,549	17 2

SOURCE: Compiled from WRA, *The Evacuated People*, table 12, and WRA, "Terminal Departures from Centers," Cumulative Summary, *Monthly Reports* (mimeographed releases)

<sup>a</sup> Excludes persons who went to internment camps, institutions, or the Armed Forces, repatriated to Japan, died, or who converted their short-term or seasonal leaves to indefinite or terminal leaves after leaving the centers

<sup>b</sup> Including Hawaii and Alaska.

Tokio Persons with special skills that qualified them to do technically advanced industrial and mechanical repair work or to hold responsible secretarial jobs probably had more opportunity to utilize their training and to develop skills on the job than had been the case on the West Coast. It was commonly assumed that successful persons would not return to the Coast, and around their success was built the legend that Little Tokios would dissolve and that Japanese Americans would become randomly distributed through the labor force.

From the beginning of the relocation program until the West Coast was opened for resettlement, Chicago had by far the largest and most rapidly growing Japanese American population in the United States. According to the records of the WRA (summarized in table 13), more than a fifth of the persons who relocated before the end of 1944 indicated Chicago as their destination.

About 5 per cent went to the three Western states, but almost exclusively to the unrestricted parts of Washington and Oregon, and most of the remainder dispersed through the interior. The West Coast was opened for relocation in the beginning of 1945, and in the first six months more than a third of the persons relocating went to the three Western states.

In July, 1945, dates were announced for the closing of the several centers, and the WRA began its concerted campaign to liquidate the camps. The schedule for each camp involved planned evictions during the six weeks preceding the closing date. Persons who remained in the center without approved relocation plans at the beginning of the six-week interval were assigned dates of departure and were sent to the areas from which they had been evacuated in 1942. Between July and the end of November about three-fourths of those relocating went to the West Coast. After November, the only center which remained open was the Tule Lake segregation center, which closed early in 1946. About four-fifths of the persons who left Tule Lake after the beginning of December, 1945, relocated in the three Western states.

As soon as the West Coast was opened to resettlement, persons who had relocated to other parts of the United States began to return to the West Coast, and especially to Los Angeles County. The dimensions of this movement have not been adequately recorded, but may be suggested by the number of travel grants made by the WRA between January, 1945, and February, 1946, to enable persons to return to the areas from which they had been evacuated. A total of 5,541 such grants were made, a number in excess of 10 per cent of the population that had previously resettled outside the West Coast. More than a third of those receiving grants went to Los Angeles County.<sup>7</sup> Many other persons returning to the West Coast either did not know of the availability of the grants or did not choose to apply for them, and migration to the Coast continued, of course, after the travel grants were no longer available.

The selective aspects of the migrations out of the centers after 1944, both to the West Coast and to the rest of the United States, and the secondary movements after relocation were intervening variables for which we had no controls, and we were compelled to limit our analyses to those points in time for which specific research had been done.



We could discuss the factors involved in the differential relocation of various age and occupational groups to Chicago if we knew the char-

TABLE 14  
JAPANESE AMERICAN LABOR FORCE: COMPARISON OF CHICAGO, 1947, AND LOS ANGELES COUNTY, 1941

Characteristics	All workers in Los Angeles County, Nov., 1941 <sup>a</sup>		Prewar workers living in Chicago in 1947, prewar occupations <sup>b</sup>		All workers in Chicago, 1947 occupations <sup>c</sup>			
	I		II A		From West Coast, except L.A. County IIB		From L.A. County IIA	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Number of persons 14 years of age and older in sample	2,486	2,486	177	176	230	210	188	185
Percentage in labor force <sup>d</sup>	4	4	75.7	49.4	71.3	45.7	82.5	61.6
Number of persons in labor force <sup>e</sup> 1947 age of persons in labor force, percentage	990	990	134	88	164	97	155	114
20 years and younger	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
30-49 years	20.9	36.0	27.6	48.9	36.0	46.4	40.0	56.2
50-64 years	38.1	41.7	36.6	35.2	32.9	22.7	32.3	38.0
65 years and older	26.3	21.0	26.9	13.6	21.3	7.9	21.3	7.9
Major occupational group, percentage	14.7	1.3	9.0	2.3	9.8	2.1	6.4	0.0
Farmers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Own business	13.4	0.8	11.9	2.3	15.9	1.0	0.0	0.0
Wage and salary workers and unpaid family workers	33.1	9.3	35.8	7.9	27.5	12.4	8.4	5.3
Professional and semiprofessional	1.7	2.9	0.7	0.0	4.3	5.2	8.4	3.5
Managers	4.2	0.2	4.5	0.0	2.4	0.0	1.3	0.0
Clerical and sales workers	14.9	31.8	26.9	34.1	12.2	25.8	12.9	30.7
Craftsmen and foremen	1.8	0.5	0.7	2.3	0.7	1.0	25.2	0.0
Operatives	5.0	14.0	6.0	10.2	9.1	11.3	25.2	47.4
Service workers	8.0	22.0	4.5	20.4	3.7	13.4	12.3	11.4
Farm laborers	11.1	17.2	8.2	22.7	16.5	29.9	1.9	0.0
Other laborers	3.8	0.0	0.7	0.0	1.8	0.0	1.9	0.0
Not classified	2.2	0.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unemployed	0.8	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.8
Percentage of prewar workers who were not in 1947 labor force			8.2	23.8	6.1	25.8	20.6	41.2
Percentage of 1947 workers who were not in prewar labor force								
							22.6	50.7

<sup>a</sup> 20 per cent sample of WRA Form 26.

<sup>b</sup> Nishi-Caudill Study.

<sup>c</sup> "Usual occupation" has been interpreted as prewar occupation.

<sup>d</sup> Not available from 20 per cent sample. The U. S. Census for 1940 showed that of Japanese Americans in Los Angeles County 76 per cent of males and 89.5 per cent of females 14 years and older were in the labor force (WCCA Staff Bull. 12, p. 26).

<sup>e</sup> In Chicago samples, persons for whom employment status was not reported are excluded from the labor force. They were mostly females and very young persons.

<sup>f</sup> Note that cols. I and II are 1947 ages for prewar labor force, col. III reports 1947 ages for 1947 labor force.

acteristics of the Japanese American labor force in Chicago in early 1945. Lacking this, we can generalize only from the sample to be discussed below, which applies to late 1947 after substantial migration from Chicago to the West Coast and from outlying areas in the Midwest to Chicago had altered the demographic situation that obtained during the war.<sup>8</sup>

Through the courtesy of Mrs. Setsuko Nishi and Mr. William Caudill we had access to the schedules<sup>9</sup> of their interviews of a sample of the Japanese American population of Chicago. The interviews were conducted from the late fall of 1947 through the spring of 1948. We have tabulated from their records data for the Chicago labor force and we have analyzed separately prewar residents from Los Angeles County and from the rest of the Pacific Coast, because Los Angeles County was occupationally differentiated from the rest of the Coast, as discussed in chapter i.

By 1947, prewar residents of Los Angeles County made up 46 per cent of the Chicago Japanese American labor force, although before the war Los Angeles County had only 36 per cent of the labor force in the three Western states. This is associated with the higher proportion of prewar clerical and sales workers in Los Angeles County, and the residue of workers remaining in Chicago in 1947 is the product of a migration in which occupational history was a major determinant.

Table 14 summarizes the 1947 Chicago labor force classified as prewar workers<sup>10</sup> and all workers. These categories in turn are broken down into groups deriving from Los Angeles County and other parts of the West Coast and these populations are juxtaposed to the Los Angeles County labor force of 1941. By comparing the prewar Los Angeles County labor force (col. i) with the prewar workers in the 1947 Chicago labor force who came from Los Angeles County (col. II A), the reader will observe that the Chicago residue was selective from the younger age group and the clerical and sales workers, who, of course, were preponderantly Nisei. Data for other parts of the West Coast in 1941 in a form like column i were unavailable. We could not, therefore, make as direct comparisons for prewar workers from other parts of the West Coast (col. II B). Analogous data from the 1940 Census, however, indicated that the same selective factors operated as far as occupations were concerned. Column III gives the characteristics of the Chicago labor force of 1947, and may be compared with the Los Angeles County labor force of 1941 (col. i). Note the small proportion of proprietors in Chicago. These were chiefly operators of boarding houses for Japanese

Americans. Although more than a fourth of the prewar workers living in Chicago in 1947 had been unpaid family workers, only 1 per cent of the 1947 labor force were unpaid family workers. Differences between columns II and III are due not only to changes in occupations, but also to changes in the composition of the labor force. Persons who left the labor force were mostly older men who had been farmers or independent businessmen before the war, females of all ages who had been prewar unpaid family workers, and younger females who started families. New workers were young Nisei of both sexes who had been in school before the war, and some middle-aged and older females.

The more important occupational changes, underlying the comparison of columns II and III, involved the following shifts from prewar job to 1947 job. The generalizations apply both to persons from Los Angeles County and to those from other areas of the West Coast. Males under 30 years of age who had not been in the labor force or had been unpaid farm laborers became craftsmen, operatives, and clerical workers, in that order. Prewar clerical and sales workers in the same age group either remained in the same occupational category or became craftsmen or semiprofessional workers. Females under 30 years of age became clerical and sales workers or operatives, and less frequently became service or semiprofessional workers. A considerable number left the labor force. Males between 30 and 49 years of age who had operated their own farms or businesses became craftsmen, operatives, or rooming- and boarding-house proprietors. Professional workers remained in professional occupations, and former clerical and sales workers in this age-sex group became craftsmen, operatives, or clerical and sales workers. Females between 30 and 49 years of age from all occupational classes and some who had not been previously employed became operatives, except that former clerical workers remained in the same category. Males 50 years of age and older who had been operators of farms or businesses were working in 1947 as operatives or service workers, had their own businesses, or had left the labor force. Service workers remained in the same occupation. Almost all the employed females in this age group had become operatives. Note the absence of farm labor and the sharp reduction in business operators and unpaid family workers. On the other hand, larger numbers of persons were to be found in professional and semiprofessional work and employed as craftsmen and operatives.

For the most part, operatives were employed in manufacturing, particularly clothing, publishing, and subassembly work. Clerical and sales workers, principally sales clerks in trade on the West Coast, were mainly



in secretarial-stenographic and bookkeeping occupations in Chicago. An acculturational factor is pointed up in the difference between the occupations of those younger and those older than 30 years. Nisei workers tended to maintain a clerical status or move into it, or become craftsmen or operatives in mechanical industry; Issei workers tended to become operatives or handicraftsmen.

Some individuals who returned to Los Angeles after a period of occupational experience in the Midwest brought with them skills acquired or developed in industry, although others had acquired proficiency only at that kind of semiskilled work involved in subassembly which has little transfer value to different jobs. In any event, it is our impression that even if jobs in industry became generally available to Nisei on the West Coast, they would not seek such work in large numbers. Just as the aspiration of Issei is to operate an independent business, the developing aspiration of the Nisei seems to be, first, "clean work," and second, independent enterprise. The wartime and postwar experience in the Middle West has not resulted in a proletarianization of the Japanese American population, and we doubt that this is likely to take place either in Los Angeles or among the Nisei who have remained in Chicago. The continuing movement from the Midwest to the West Coast may be as much an attempt to elude industrial labor as it is the result of extrinsic factors such as the reassertion of familial controls and meteorological chauvinism.<sup>11</sup>



Unfortunately we did not have the resources to obtain a representative sample of the 1947 Los Angeles labor force with which to compare the Chicago findings, and a thoroughgoing comparison would have to wait for the 1950 Census. However, we have drawn on the changes in the occupational status of prewar workers of our Loss Survey sample (see table 15 and figs. 5-7). The data should be read with the caution that the 1946 occupations may not have been stable and that this population was experiencing extreme difficulties in securing housing. Although we have determined that the population is a satisfactory sample for the analysis of losses,<sup>12</sup> we have no way of demonstrating that it is representative of postwar occupations. It is suggestive, however, of the kinds of changes that were experienced, and our interview material leads us to believe that the experiences represented are not atypical.

At the outset we should note from table 15 that family enterprises have not been reestablished. In 1941 almost 30 per cent of the workers were operating (or were partners in operating) family enterprises, and

TABLE 15  
PREWAR AND POSTWAR OCCUPATIONAL AND INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL WORKERS  
(Loss Survey)

[illegible]<sup>a</sup> Income from family enterprise prorated equally among family workers


over 40 per cent were unpaid family workers. In 1946, 15 per cent of the workers were reported as operating their own enterprises, but almost four-fifths of these were contract gardeners, who need a small capital outlay and make the least use of other family members. The absence of family enterprise was expressed in the very small number of unpaid family workers in 1946, almost all of whom were on farms. Of all prewar workers in this sample, 72.0 per cent were in family enterprise, whereas of these same persons only 17.5 per cent were in family enterprise in 1946. If we limit our analysis to persons who were in the labor force and whose occupations were known both for 1941 and 1946, the proportion of family workers in 1946 was 29.1 per cent.

Conversely, the proportion of wage and salary workers increased from 28.0 per cent to 40.5 per cent, or 69.8 per cent if limited to persons who were in the labor force in both years and whose 1946 occupation was known. Wage and salary workers decreased in the category of clerical and sales. All other categories except professional and managerial and fishing showed an increase, the increase being greatest for craftsmen, foremen, and operatives. Fish canneries in the Long Beach area, from which the sample was obtained, provide seasonal jobs for many unskilled workers; this may account in part for the increase in operatives. But in Los Angeles City there is evidence of a similar increase of operatives in clothing factories, dress shops, record pressing, and so on.

Of the 1941 workers, 30 per cent were not in the 1946 labor force. Of these, 28 were in the Army and a few were in school or were women with small children, but the greatest number were older persons who had retired or become ill. (See figs. 5-7) Many of them would have remained in the labor force if the Evacuation had not terminated their family enterprises, but because of handicaps of age and language they could not reenter the labor market as wage workers when they returned, and they lacked the capital to reestablish family enterprises. We were unable to get information on the 1946 status of 43 individuals, or 9 per cent of the total.

New members of the postwar labor force, who are not represented in the table and figures, are predominantly young people and are augmented by a number of middle-aged women who have gone into factory work in the urban area.<sup>28</sup>

Figures 5-7 show the individual shifts in occupational status and permit us to make comparisons by age and sex. The group of workers under 24 years of age in 1942 was heavily weighted with persons who had just entered the labor market, often in classifications they regarded







Fig. 5. Changes in occupational status, prewar workers in family enterprise: Farms and nurseries, by sex and age, 1942. (Loss Survey)






Fig. 6. Changes in occupational status, prewar workers in family enterprise: Business, by sex and age, 1942. (Loss Survey)





Fig. 7. Changes in occupational status, prewar wage and salary workers, by sex and age, 1942. (Loss Survey)



as temporary, and with part-time workers going to school. Under normal conditions, individuals in this group would have anticipated an increase in status between 1941 and 1946 as they increased their skill and experience and entered permanent full-time jobs. The figures show that many of them left the labor market to enter the Army, to return to school, or in the case of females to get married, and that relatively few improved their status. It may be noted in passing that Nisei were less able than other enlisted men to profit from Army service by acquiring skills with civilian occupational value. With the exception of some intelligence work, they were limited to combat training for the 100th Battalion and 442d Regimental Combat Team.

Males in the group aged 25-44 years in 1942 were older Nisei and younger Issei who had become established in their occupations. Had there been no Evacuation, this group would have been expected to show predominantly an upward trend and many could have expected to achieve independent proprietor status. In fact, own-account workers who were able to reestablish their independent status did so primarily by becoming contract gardeners (See table 15.) Many sales clerks from prewar produce establishments and a scattering of other wage workers also became gardeners. Farmers and the rest of the businessmen turned to wage and salary work mostly in the unskilled (labor) and semiskilled (operative) categories. Females in this age group were predominantly unpaid family workers; almost half retired from the labor market and the rest went to work as farm and nursery labor, as operatives in fish canneries or other factories, or as domestics and waitresses.

Workers aged 45-59 years in 1942, along with those 60 years of age and older, occupied the positions of highest status in this population, i.e., the incidence of independent enterprise was greatest among males, and women seldom worked outside the family enterprises. Retirement of the oldest age group from the labor market in the five years after 1941 was to have been expected, but the group 45-59 years was most severely affected by the Evacuation. Occupational shifts among the latter show the same pattern as among those aged 25-44 years, but in a more extreme form because there were fewer prewar wage workers and unpaid family workers in relation to own-account workers. An even smaller proportion of proprietors in the older group were able to reestablish their independent status by becoming gardeners, and many became laborers or retired. Females, for the most part, left the labor market. If the wish to reduce economic competition from independent Japanese American farmers and businessmen motivated some of the proponents

Table 15 compares 1941 and 1946 income distributions for prewar workers in the Loss Survey sample. Note the tendency toward a smaller range, as well as a rise in the median. The 1946 distribution must be regarded as representative, not of the whole Japanese American labor force of that date, but only of those who had also been in the labor market in 1941. The exclusion of new workers who would be expected to enter the market at the lower levels and the retirement of old workers may account at least in part for the tendencies noted.

Table 15, of course, does not take account of the general rise in income and price levels during the war. We were unable to secure any data with which to construct indices of increased money income for various occupation groups in the general population that would be analogous to Japanese American occupational groups. However, we can compare the per capita annual income of all California civilians with the per worker income for each of the occupational groups in our sample. Our data were not adequate to compute per capita income for 1946. (See fig. 8.) Using 1941 as a base of 100, we see that the per capita income of all California civilians rose from 1941 to a peak index of 157 in 1944 and then fell somewhat to an estimated index of 144 in 1946. Indices for Japanese American workers are shown only for 1941 and 1946. Note that for no occupational group did the 1946 index equal that for all California civilians, and only prewar farm and nursery workers and wage and salary workers exceeded their respective 1941 per worker income.

Table 16 presents a closer view of the situation. If we regard the index for all California civilians in 1946 as 100 per cent, i.e., as the index number that Japanese American workers had to have in 1946 in order to have the same position with regard to individual income as when they were removed, the ratio of the 1946 indices for Japanese American workers to the index for all California civilians is then a more exact measure of the deterioration of their position. These percentages are reported in the last column of table 16; they range from 45 per cent for prewar workers in Terminal Island businesses to 85 per cent for prewar and wage and salary workers and workers on family farms and nurseries. The Terminal Island population will be discussed in chapter vi.

We have limited the discussion so far to per worker income. A more accurate picture would be gained if we counted as having no income those "retired" old and middle-aged people who would have continued to work and enjoy incomes had they not been evacuated, but who in




Fig. 8. Inflation index, per capita annual income for all California civilian population, and per worker income for Japanese American workers.

SOURCE: All California civilians, per capita annual income computed from population estimate for July each year by the Bureau of the Census, and total cash income of civilian residents from Department of Commerce, National Income Unit. Figures published by California State Chamber of Commerce, Economic Survey Series, 1945-1946, *Reports* Nos. 28-32; 1946-1947, *Reports* Nos. 1, 41, and 7 (rev.); 1947-1948, *Report* No. 10.

Japanese American workers. Loss Survey and Terminal Island Survey, annual per worker income, 1941 and 1946. Income from family enterprise allocated equally to all family workers.


TABLE 16  
INDEX OF 1946 INCOME

Occupational group	1941				1946			
	No of workers reporting income	Per worker income <sup>a</sup>	Index no.		No. of workers reporting income	Per worker income <sup>a</sup>	Index no	Ratio <sup>b</sup>
Loss Survey.								
Prewar workers on family farms and nurseries	448	\$1,398	100		258	\$1,523	109	76
Prewar workers in family business	220	1,066	100		113	1,316	123	85
Prewar wage and salary workers	104	2,216	100		63	1,786	81	56
	124	1,302	100		82	1,607	123	85
Terminal Island Survey <sup>a</sup>	170	1,506	100		121	1,302	86	60
Prewar workers in family business .	26	1,415	100		15	922	65	45
Prewar fishermen with own boat or net and family helpers	25	2,165	100		23	1,473	68	47
Prewar wage and salary workers and fishermen crew members on share basis . . . . .	118	1,399	100		83	1,324	95	66

**Income from family enterprise prorated equally among all family workers**

a Income from family enterprise prorated equally among all family workers  
b Ratio of index for Japanese American workers to index for all California civilians (144). See fig. 8, above, for source.  
c Workers whose prewar residence was Terminal Island Excluded from other survey.

<sup>a</sup> Workers whose prewar residence was Terminal Island Excluded from other survey.








Fig. 9. Changes in annual income, prewar workers in family enterprise: Farms and nurseries, by sex and age, 1942. (Loss Survey)






**Note: Income from family enterprise prorated equally among family workers.**

Fig 10. Changes in annual income, prewar workers in family business, by sex and age, 1942. (Loss Survey)








Fig. 11. Changes in annual income, prewar wage and salary workers, by sex and age, 1942 (Loss Survey)

1946 were more or less involuntary nonworkers, dependent upon the earnings of relatives. Although we cannot demonstrate it statistically, the dependency rate among Japanese Americans has risen, so that indices of per capita income would be even lower than these indices, which are based on per worker income. Even in 1941, when the relative position of these Japanese Americans in the individual income distribution was better than in 1946, and when there were relatively fewer dependent nonworkers, the per capita income for all occupational groups was below that of the general population. (See fig. 4, p 21.) In 1941 the per capita income of Japanese Americans was about two-thirds that of all California civilians. In 1946, given the 1941 dependency rate, the per capita income of Japanese Americans would have been about half that of all California civilians; since dependency increased, the per capita income was less than half.

Figures 9-11 show changes in income of individuals classified by sex and by age in 1942. Workers with income higher in 1946 than in 1941 were at least twice as numerous as workers whose 1946 income was lower than their 1941 income among the following categories: prewar family farm and nursery workers, 13-24 years of age in 1942, both male and female; prewar wage and salary workers, females 16-24 years and males 25-44 years old in 1942. In all other categories, the ratio of workers with higher incomes to workers with lower incomes was about one or less than one. In general, if we omit consideration of prewar workers who were not in the labor market in 1946, the prewar wage and salary workers and the younger age groups of all occupational categories seem to have had the greatest incidence of individual incomes higher in 1946 than in 1941. No group as a whole and few individuals improved their relative income status. In order to maintain the same relative position they would have required incomes almost 50 per cent higher in 1946 than in 1941 because of the general rise in income level.

Among the factors contributing to relatively low income for 1946 was the frequency and duration of unemployment. In table 17 we have counted as unemployed only those persons who stated that they were willing and able to work but unable to secure suitable employment; persons who were ill, too old to work, in school, or for whom our information does not indicate definite unemployment are omitted. Of 287 persons from the Loss Survey in the labor market in 1946, 133, or 46.4 per cent, were unemployed for some part of 1946. In our Sawtelle census (see chap. iv) we found that 42 per cent had been unemployed for some part of 1946, although by December only 1.8 per cent were unemployed.

TABLE 17  
UNEMPLOYMENT IN 1946

	Loss Survey	Terminal Island Survey <sup>a</sup>
Total number of workers <sup>b</sup>	287	141
Workers unemployed for		
1-4 weeks	5	8
5-8 .	18	4
9-12	17	5
13-16	11	3
17-20	10	3
21-24	1	1
25-28	18	9
29-32	5	3
33-36	2	4
37-40	4	4
41-44	3	1
45-48	1	3
49-52 .	6	0
Total with period of unemployment specified	101	48
Mean period of unemployment	19.35 weeks	24 71 weeks
Number of workers unemployed, but period of unemployment not specified <sup>c</sup>	32	40
Total number unemployed	133	88
Percentage	46 4	62 4
Number of workers with no unemployment in 1946 .	154	53
Percentage	53 6	37 6

<sup>a</sup> Separate survey. Includes only workers whose prewar residence was Terminal Island

<sup>b</sup> Persons in the labor force in both 1941 and 1946 Unemployed means able to work and seeking work.

<sup>c</sup> Many of these were seasonally unemployed or part-time workers

This is evidence that the findings of the Loss Survey are not an artifact of its sample.

As would have been expected, the period of resettlement made great demands on public assistance facilities in Los Angeles County. Until the end of June, 1946, the Federal Enemy Alien Program provided funds for resettlement assistance administered by the county. Before the war the Los Angeles County Bureau of Public Assistance had less than 100 persons of Japanese ancestry in its case load; but in January, 1946, the number was many times greater, and nine-tenths of these were under

the Federal Program. The number of persons aided sharply declined until July, 1946, when the Federal Program was terminated, and continued to decline more slowly until in 1947 an apparent plateau had been reached, but at a level several times higher than before the war.<sup>14</sup>



After the centers closed, Japanese Americans did not regain their prewar occupational status in Los Angeles County. Some progress was made in agriculture and produce, but, as will be seen in chapter iii, the neatly articulated system of production and distribution had not been reestablished by 1948. Japanese American farmers had been able to establish claims on a relatively small proportion of prewar holdings; wholesale produce dealers, with a smaller source of supply and fewer outlets, were less numerous, and retail produce dealers had not been able to assert themselves in successful competition with chain stores.

A considerable part of the displaced agricultural, produce, and other retail workers went into contract gardening, which served as an entering occupation as the evacuees returned to the Los Angeles area. As will be pointed out in chapter iv, contract gardening appears to be stabilizing with a larger part of the labor force than before the war.

Opportunities for domestic work also increased, and because it afforded housing, domestic service was often used as an entering occupation for individuals relocating to the Los Angeles area. The increased demand for domestic workers was accompanied by an increase in earnings and an improvement in the terms of domestic service. A relationship that before the war was often exploitative became fairly remunerative. Moreover, duties and hours of work were specified and concessions as to the housing of children were often made. Just as all Japanese Americans were regarded as having some special genius for gardening, the stereotype about their suitability for domestic work facilitated their securing such jobs, and because of the high demand persons who were quite inexperienced entered domestic work. For a time during the resettlement program the WRA field office in Los Angeles refused listings for domestic jobs because they could not be filled. Many persons left domestic work as soon as other occupations or housing became available, but it is probable that the number of Japanese Americans working as domestics in the Los Angeles area was larger in 1947 than it was before the war. This is certainly true if we include the large number of Nisei girls who were regularly employed and also worked as part-time domestics for their lodging.

With the tragically difficult housing situation that Japanese Americans encountered on their return to Los Angeles, a number of individuals seized the opportunity to establish boarding or rooming houses or hotels. The hotels were most numerous in the former Little Tokio area. Some operators kept such establishments before the war or while relocated in the Middle West, but others entered the field because they owned or were able to secure buildings. Many persons who had single-family residences arranged to rent a room or two. The returns from such subrental activities were exceedingly, indeed often exorbitantly, high, and OPA regulations were honored in the breach.<sup>35</sup> There is little doubt that the most aggressive and serious exploitation of the Japanese American population during resettlement was by Japanese Americans themselves. As was true before the war, the operation of boarding houses was often a secondary occupation, with the proprietor's wife in charge of the establishment. Unlike the prewar situation, not only Issei bachelors but couples and complete families were dependent upon such housing.

About forty restaurants and a number of grocery stores, barber shops, and other personal services for the ethnic group were reestablished by 1947.<sup>36</sup> Little Tokio soon took on much of its prewar character. Negroes were rapidly displaced from the stores and shops they had acquired during the war, and less rapidly from their living quarters. The *Rafu Shimpō*, one of the important prewar newspapers, resumed daily publication in English and Japanese at the end of 1945, and the facilities for maintaining the distinctive features of an ethnic enclave became well established. Because of the limitations on commercial and financial relations with Japan, prewar banking establishments and the numerous Oriental and art-goods stores had not yet been reestablished by 1948. In the subcenters, such as Boyle Heights, West Jefferson, and Sawtelle, shopping districts grew up again.

Such professionals as lawyers, doctors, and dentists returned in considerable numbers, and especially the dentists resumed their old place in the community. Of the prewar Japanese American dentists, about half remained in the relocation centers during most of the war, one-third engaged in dental practice outside the centers, principally in the Middle West and the intermountain states, and a few worked as dental technicians or assistants. The Issei who had established stable practices and strong ties in the prewar ethnic community tended to remain in the camps, but Nisei dentists and Nisei professionals in general had a high relocation rate. The Nisei dentists relocated early even when they had to take jobs at a semiprofessional level.

We were able to obtain data for thirty Japanese American dentists—twenty of them Issei and ten Nisei—who had had offices in Los Angeles before the war. Thirteen of the Issei and nine of the Nisei had returned, with few exceptions to Little Tokio, often to the same office buildings. Three recent Nisei dental graduates had entered practice in the outlying areas, but the concentration of professional services in Little Tokio was about as great as before the war. Two of the Issei dentists and one Nisei were practicing in the Middle West; the only specialist was included in this group. Four of the Issei had died and one had been in Hiroshima since the spring of 1941. He had been discreet enough, incidentally, to take the advice of the leaflet bombardment and left the city with his family before August, 1945. The doctors did not return to Los Angeles in as large numbers as did the dentists. Early in 1947 there were hardly more than half of the prewar number. About half of the prewar midwives, chiropractors, and optometrists returned to regular practice. Almost all the lawyers returned and several new optometrists and lawyers established practices.

Although professional workers may establish offices in areas of concentration other than Little Tokio, it is not likely that any major ecological shift from the Central area will occur in the immediate future. The pattern of a service center independent of districts of residence is likely to persist. Japanese American dentists will continue to depend on their own ethnic group, but by 1947 several offices served a sprinkling of other ethnic groups, mostly working-class people. The one dentist with a heavy Mexican and Negro patronage had very few Japanese patients. The great interest in Japanese Americans aroused by the Evacuation led some middle-class Caucasians to patronize Japanese American professionals. At least one dentist had a fifth of his practice made up of such *hakujins*. But the presence in his office of strangers did not reduce his popularity with *nihonjins* as did the Mexican and Negro patronage of his colleague.

Because the number of Japanese American proprietors was much smaller in 1947 than before the war and very few were in a position to hire workers, Japanese Americans were dependent for employment on non-Japanese firms. Nishimoto says that of Japanese Americans employed before the war in trade and nondomestic personal service in Los Angeles, less than 7 per cent worked for Caucasians, and two-thirds of these were Issei.<sup>17</sup> In the light of our knowledge of Japanese American employment, we estimate from table 8 that over half of all prewar wage and salary workers were employed by Japanese Americans, and that

at most 20 per cent of the prewar labor force were wage and salary workers employed by non-Japanese. Perhaps 70 per cent or more of the 1948 labor force were employed for wage or salary by Caucasians. More males than before the war were employed in skilled occupations as mechanics, foremen in factories, appliance repairmen, and so on, but they were few in number. A number of males were semiskilled workers or laborers in factories, working on parts assembly and phonograph record pressing, or were service workers in restaurants, cafés, and hotels. In general, males seemed to experience greater difficulty in securing satisfactory employment than did females. Both males and females worked as domestics, but Nisei especially tended to leave this occupation as soon as possible. During 1945 and 1946 a higher proportion of females were employed in Los Angeles than before the war. Issei women were in demand as power-machine operatives in clothing factories and to a lesser extent as packing operatives in food manufacturing. Nisei girls were desired as secretaries, stenographers, and office clerks, and as dress-makers in the custom shops as well as power-machine operatives in factories.<sup>18</sup>



In the two years after the close of the relocation centers, Japanese Americans with great determination made substantial progress toward again making a stable place for themselves in the metropolitan area. The first steps in occupational readjustment were facilitated by the inflation and the labor shortage. Even though the buying power of the dollar was far less than before the war, Japanese Americans had a partially fictitious sense of accomplishment when their nominal earnings approached or exceeded prewar earnings and this sense of accomplishment supported morale. A concomitant of the inflation was a heavy demand for services, and opportunities for contract gardening especially influenced resettlement. The extreme inflation in housing costs affected the Japanese Americans more than any other group and a disproportionate part of their earnings was expended for makeshift accommodations in jerry-built or deteriorated dwellings under conditions that frequently violated building codes, health laws, and the regulations of the OPA.

Their actual share in the income of the region was far smaller than before the war and the number of instances in which they occupied positions of power and responsibility was greatly reduced. Their weakened position in the economic power structure was even more striking than their losses in income status. In a sense they have lost nearly a



generation in their striving for economic security, but they have not returned in large numbers to the forms of manual labor in which they began a generation ago, and it seems improbable that they will.

Two occupations stand out as symbolic of their present position, just as the system of truck farming and produce distribution stood out before the war. One is contract gardening, a kind of service work in which, however, the worker is engaged in individual enterprise and in which the authoritarian role of the master in relation to his servant is ameliorated by the contract relationship, a number of contracts, and the vastly superior knowledge of the gardener. Although, superficially, gardening may resemble agricultural labor, the conditions and circumstances of work are very different, and it therefore has a higher status value for a status-conscious people. The other occupation that characterizes the postwar period is clerical work. Here, the independent aspect is lacking and the work is not highly remunerative, but it is a respectable and clean occupation in which highly acculturated Nisei girls can work side by side with respectable middle-class Caucasians in orderly surroundings. We must not lose sight of small businessmen who have managed to reopen their stores or who will be able to do so when Oriental goods and curios can again be supplied. Nor should we forget those whose jobs are menial and manual. The important point is, however, that clear tendencies are emergent in the occupational structure, and these patterns will become of greater importance within the next fifteen years as the Issei retire and die.

## CHAPTER III

### AGRICULTURE AND PRODUCE TRADE

THE ROLE of Japanese Americans in Western agriculture evolved from migratory labor on mass-produced crops to the independent operation of small specialty farms.<sup>1</sup> Japanese entered the agricultural labor market before the turn of the century, replacing the Chinese. After 1902, when displaced from the railroads by Mexican laborers, additional Japanese turned to agriculture. One distinctive feature of organization was leadership by Japanese bosses who contracted for the work of gangs of laborers that they recruited through Japanese operators of hotels and labor camps. At first the Japanese were paid less than average, but it was also their general youthful vigor and willingness to work diligently for long periods that brought them into demand. Payment was usually on a piece basis and their earnings soon compared very favorably with those of the groups with whom they competed. The first crops that they worked were sugar beets and hops in Central and Northern California and the Northwest, and as they spread over the Coast they entered the citrus and grape culture of Southern California. By 1910 Japanese laborers in California comprised almost 90 per cent of the total laborers in berries, two-thirds in sugar beets, roughly half in nursery products, grapes, and vegetables, and more than one-third in citrus and deciduous fruits.<sup>2</sup>

As will also be noted in the discussions of other occupations, Japanese moved rapidly out of the status of laborer and toward individualistic economic activity. In agriculture there was a progressive movement through the categories of cropping toward direct control of the land.

By 1910 about 13 per cent of the 1,816 Japanese farm operators enumerated by the Census were farm owners and almost all of them fully owned their land. The great majority (85 per cent) of operators were tenants and there was a negligible number of farm managers. Even at this early date three-fourths of the tenants paid cash rental. In Los Angeles County at this time, 96 per cent of 531 operators were tenants, and almost all of them were cash tenants. Only 12 Los Angeles operators were owners, a mere 2 per cent of the total,<sup>3</sup> in part owing to the later entry of Japanese agricultural workers into Southern California.

By 1940 the number of farms operated by Japanese Americans in California was reported by the Census as 5,135. The proportion of farms operated by managers had increased to about 5 per cent. Owners in 1940

comprised one-fourth of the operators, a doubling of the 1910 percentage, but tenants remained by far the most important category, 70 per cent of the total.<sup>4</sup> Although we do not have tenancy broken down into share and cash categories, we may safely assume that the great majority were cash tenants.

The relatively low proportion of ownership noted for Los Angeles County in 1910 was true also in 1940, by which time 7.4 per cent of the 1,523 operators were owners. Tenancy comprised almost 90 per cent of the total.<sup>5</sup> This seems to have been due in great part to the unwillingness of land speculators, who were holding Los Angeles tracts in expectation of urban expansion, to sell land for agricultural purposes. We must bear in mind also the persistent effects of the Alien Land Law.


It is difficult to establish the actual amount of land held, and estimates based on Japanese Association Reports<sup>6</sup> differ drastically from those based on the 1920 and earlier Census reports.<sup>7</sup> Very probably the Census figures are an undercount, and this defect in Census reporting may persist in a less serious form in the later censuses. In the decade between 1910 and 1920 the acreage of Japanese-operated farms in California more than doubled, according to both sources. Although there was a legislative attack on the improving status of Japanese farmers as early as 1913, effectively drawn legislation did not appear until 1920, so that the figures reported for 1920 represent a peak for the state.<sup>8</sup>

The reported subsequent decline in all forms of landholding is in part real, but also probably conceals attempts to evade the effects of the legislation by connivance with persons eligible to hold the land. We are not in a position to estimate what part of the reported decline represents evasion of the law. Mears reports a decline of over 40 per cent in the acreage owned between 1920 and 1925.<sup>9</sup> This was not merely the effect of the land law, but also a consequence of the agricultural depression after World War I. In 1930 the Census reported less than 4,000 farms operated by Japanese Americans in California, with a total of 191,000 acres. By 1940 the number of farms once more approached the 1920 Census figure, although the acreage was far less than in 1920.<sup>10</sup> The increase between 1930 and 1940 was disproportionately in the Southern California area.

The importance of Japanese farm laborers has declined ever since 1907, when immigration of laborers was halted by the Gentlemen's Agreement. Although absolute figures are not available, principally because of changes in Census definitions of gainfully occupied workers and changes in occupational classification in successive censuses, the

trend is clear. In 1909 the California State Bureau of Labor Statistics found that 22,992 Japanese were employed on 2,369 farms operated by whites, constituting 36.4 per cent of their farm laborers.<sup>21</sup> On 1,733 Japanese-operated farms, 96 per cent of the farm laborers were Japanese.<sup>22</sup> Estimates in 1913, based on Japanese Association figures, were 4,500 Japanese farmers and 20,000 farm hands in California.<sup>23</sup> As the number of Japanese farm operators increased, Japanese laborers were employed by them, and white operators had to rely increasingly on other groups such as Mexicans and Filipinos for labor. In 1920 the State Board of Control found that "the Oriental is of no appreciable value as a farm laborer to the American farmer . . . The Oriental farm laboring class is valuable principally to land speculators or developers who do not farm their own lands but lease them upon some crop basis to Orientals. As a matter of fact there are probably more white laborers working for Oriental farmers than there are Oriental laborers working for American farmers."<sup>24</sup> In 1920 the Census listed 25,657 Japanese in agriculture for the whole United States, and 6,892 Japanese-operated farms; so the number of Japanese farm laborers and foremen in 1920 may be estimated at 18,800 for the United States and somewhat less for California.<sup>25</sup> In 1930 there were 3,956 farms operated by Japanese Americans in California and approximately 13,700 farm foremen and laborers. In 1940 there were 5,135 farms, and 11,999 farm laborers and foremen.<sup>26</sup> Thus we see a steady decline in the number of Japanese American farm laborers and by 1940 there were about two laborers for each farm operator.

In 1940 there were 1,523 farms and nurseries in Los Angeles County operated by Japanese Americans, and these comprised one-fourth of the total for this group on the West Coast.<sup>27</sup> The distribution by judicial townships is presented in figure 12. If we group the data presented there, we find the following characteristics of farm location: 22 per cent (34 farms, including nurseries) were located in the Harbor area; 16.6 per cent (253) were in townships east and north of Los Angeles City; 61.7 per cent (940) were south and west of Los Angeles City; and 19.5 per cent (296) were in Los Angeles proper. Although the Census does not make available to us the distribution of the specialized forms of farming, such as flower farms and nurseries, we can estimate it from our 20 per cent sample. Flower farms, which were somewhat more than 10 per cent of the total, were distributed like vegetable farms, and almost 60 per cent of them were located south and west of Los Angeles City. Nurseries, which were about 20 per cent of the total, were more widely



distributed. Less than one-third were located in the area south and west of Los Angeles City, and more than 40 per cent were in Los Angeles City proper. Wholesale nurseries, which raised bedding plants for farmers and some of the stock for retail nurserymen, were located mostly in outlying areas, especially in the Venice and Gardena districts. Retail nurseries, which supplied contract gardeners and the general public with shrubs and flowers for landscaping, potted plants for gifts, and some cut flowers, were scattered throughout the urban area, but small clusters were to be found along South Western Avenue, South Vermont Avenue, West Pico Boulevard, Slauson Avenue, and Florence Avenue.

Farms in Los Angeles County were much smaller than in the rest of California. For the state in 1940 the average size of all farms was 230.1 acres and of farms operated by Japanese Americans 44.0 acres. For Los Angeles County the average size of all farms was 47.8 acres and of farms operated by Japanese Americans 18.8 acres.<sup>28</sup>

Table 18 gives a detailed comparison of Japanese-operated farms with all farms in Los Angeles County. The 1,523 farms operated by Japanese Americans were 12.2 per cent of all farms, but occupied only 4.8 per cent of the total acreage in farms. In part this extremely small average acreage for Japanese American farms in Los Angeles County is attributable to the small acreage of nurseries, which the Census counts as farms. The average Japanese American operator in 1939 harvested 85.4 per cent of his land; the average for all Los Angeles farmers was 57.3 per cent. The value of land and buildings per acre of farms operated by Japanese Americans was 66 per cent higher than the value per acre of all farms. These figures indicate the extent to which Japanese Americans were engaged in very intensive farming on small tracts of land.

Although 71 per cent of all farms in the county were owner-operated, less than 8 per cent of the Japanese American operators owned the land. Almost 90 per cent of the Japanese American farm operators were tenants, and almost all of these were cash tenants. The reasons for this tenure situation were noted earlier (p. 70).

The tenancy pattern and the small farms were affected by, and in turn influenced, tendencies toward crop specialization. In general, truck vegetables, berries, flowers, and nursery stock were suitable for intensive cultivation in a small space. In all California there were only 28 dairy farms and 34 animal and livestock farms operated in 1940 by Japanese Americans, and this in part may be attributed to Japanese dietary and religious practices. Japan depends on fish for a supply of protein, and Buddhism, the religion of a majority of Japanese American farmers, discourages the killing of animals.

With limited personal resources the population exploited a knowledge of gardening techniques and depended on family workers rather than hired labor. In the early days the lack of capital was ameliorated by Japanese making contracts with commission merchants and Eastern distributors. Seed, fertilizer, packing materials, and cash were advanced

TABLE 18  
ALL FARMS, AND FARMS OPERATED BY JAPANESE AMERICANS, LOS ANGELES  
COUNTY, 1940

Characteristics	All farms	Farms operated by Japanese Americans	Japanese American, percentage of all farms
Total acreage . . . . .	596,552	28,670 <sup>a</sup>	4.8
Average acres per farm . . . . .	47.8	18.8 <sup>b</sup>	
Cropland harvested, average acres per farm . . . . .	27.4 <sup>b</sup>	15.9 <sup>b</sup>	
Percentage of total acres per farm. . . . .	57.3 <sup>b</sup>	85.4 <sup>b</sup>	
Value of land and buildings per acre . . . . .	\$371.20	\$636.00 <sup>c</sup>	
Tenure, number of farms . . . . .	12,475	1,523 <sup>d</sup>	12.2
Full owners . . . . .	8,318	73 <sup>d</sup>	0.9
Part owners . . . . .	558	40 <sup>d</sup>	7.2
Managers : . . . .	534	46 <sup>d</sup>	8.6
Tenants . . . . .	3,065	1,364 <sup>d</sup>	44.5
Cash tenants . . . . .	2,555	1,315 <sup>a</sup>	51.4
Tenure, percentage. . . . .	100.0 <sup>b</sup>	100.0 <sup>b</sup>	
Full owners . . . . .	66.6	4.8	
Part owners . . . . .	4.5	2.6	
Managers . . . . .	4.3	3.0	
Tenants . . . . .	24.6	89.6	
Cash tenants . . . . .	20.4	86.3	

SOURCE: U. S. Census of Agriculture, 1940.

<sup>a</sup> Unpublished data supplied by the Bureau of the Census.

<sup>b</sup> Calculated from Census data.

<sup>c</sup> Estimate calculated from value of all farms operated by nonwhites, of which 96 per cent were Japanese.

<sup>d</sup> Census data published in WCCA Stat. Bull. 9.

to the Japanese grower, and he was under obligation to sell his entire crop to the distributor making the advance, at a price set by the distributor.<sup>19</sup> American branches of Japanese banks also participated in the financing of ventures of Japanese farmers. As Japanese American produce commission merchants found their place in the produce markets, especially in the Los Angeles area, a pattern of financing developed that characterized the enterprise until the outbreak of war, when ar-

rangements with Eastern distributors became less frequent. We shall return to this problem later in this chapter in discussing the operations of wholesale produce merchants.

Although the farms were small and leases were usually for short periods, the amount of capital investment was not so low as might be assumed. Most of the land was under irrigation, requiring investment in flumes, subterranean pipes, and the like. Some of the specialty crops, such as celery, required hothouses and heating equipment. Farm operations, therefore, were not on a year-to-year basis, and it is impressive that Japanese Americans under such circumstances were able to move out of laboring and cropping status to cash tenancy and ownership as rapidly as they did.



Before discussing the characteristics of agricultural workers, we should comment on the discrepancies between the Census and our 20 per cent sample. (See table 5.) The deficiency in the sample of females in agricultural occupations is attributable to the general circumstances of the WRA registration discussed in chapter i. The excess of native-born farmers and farm managers may be due in part to Nisei who took over the operation of farms upon the internment of their Issei fathers in 1941 or 1942, but who reported themselves as having been operators in 1940. It may also be due in part to a shift in responsibility from Issei female operators to their sons, an inference that we make from the shortage of Issei female farm operators in the 20 per cent sample.

We find shortages of unpaid female farm laborers and both male and female paid farm laborers in our sample. The shortage of unpaid female laborers probably represents failure to report this occupation to WRA, particularly when the females were only part-time workers or were also employed part-time in cannery or clerical work and preferred to report the latter occupations. The shortage of paid farm laborers is probably due to population movements in the period between the outbreak of war and the stopping of voluntary migration. Some of these persons moved out of California and never entered WRA centers. Others moved to Zone 2 of the Western Defense Command in California and when registered by WRA failed to report their Los Angeles address as permanent residence. The latter situation would have been especially common among the more migratory farm labor population. Lacking detailed information on the selectivity of such migration, we cannot speak with assurance of its effect on our sample. The fact that our shortage of paid farm



laborers is distributed through all sex and nativity categories leads us to suggest that the migrants were not peculiarly selected.



The management and operation of Japanese American farms in 1940 was still in the hands of Issei males. More than three-quarters of the 1,691 operators and managers enumerated by the Census were in this category. Nisei males comprised less than 18 per cent of the total, and the remaining 6 per cent were almost entirely Issei females. In our sample, more than a quarter of the operators were 60 years of age or older, and about 60 per cent were 45 years of age or older, so that a great increase could have been anticipated in the proportion of native-born operators in subsequent years. The estimate made by the Los Angeles County Agricultural Commissioner that about half of the farm operators in February, 1942, were Nisei<sup>20</sup> is subject to misinterpretation. There had been some shifts in managerial responsibility after December, 1941, but the shift was often only nominal. Although our data on shifts in occupational status between 1941 and 1946 (see chap. ii) are suggestive, we shall be unable to assess with precision the long-term character of these trends until the 1950 Census findings are available. We venture to predict, however, that the Nisei, hampered by the drastic evacuation losses and displaced from family leaseholds, will be unable to achieve the prewar position of the Issei.

According to our sample, nearly three-quarters of the farm operators and managers were married. Almost all the 18.5 per cent of farm operators who were single were Nisei, and many of them had inherited the operation of the family farm from their fathers. Almost half of the single farm operators who were Nisei were under 25 years of age. Some of the Issei mothers who had survived their husbands were the farm operators; their managerial function was a family trust.

Examination of the length of time farm operators had been continuously in their occupation indicates the tenacity with which this status was maintained. Fully three-fourths of the operators and managers had held such positions for five or more years, and 55 per cent had a tenure of ten or more years. Vegetable and flower farmers were more stable than nursery operators, with a median tenure of 13.1 years for the former and 8.5 years for the latter. The median for all operators and managers was 11.8 years.

As noted in reference to table 9, data on income are scanty and of questionable reliability, and our information about the farm operator-

manager group is especially slim. Only 21.3 per cent of the 352 cases in our sample reported income. The median annual income reported by 54 vegetable and flower farmers was \$1,906 and by 23 nursery operators, \$2,200.

Certain minor attributes of the operators and managers may be worth recording. Except for a slight excess from Hiroshima ken, the geographic origins of Issei farmers were like those of all immigrants in the sample. A high proportion, 62.5 per cent, of the native-born farmers were born in Los Angeles County, as compared with 48.5 per cent of all native-born workers in the sample. This indicates, as one would expect, a greater degree of geographic stability for the agricultural population as compared with trade and service workers.

Most of the foreign-born farm operators, 88.4 per cent, reported no education in the United States, but the great preponderance had at least a grammar-school education in Japan. Nine years or more of education in Japan was reported by 17.9 per cent, and only 3.7 per cent reported no education in either country. Native-born farm operators reported more schooling. 11.7 per cent had attended college in this country, although only one had graduated; an additional 62.8 per cent had some American high-school education and most of them had graduated from high school. One-third of the native-born farm operators had at least three years of education in Japan (and could be designated as Kibei), a manifestation of the relatively strong ties with Japan of the agricultural group. There was a negative relationship between amount of education in Japan and amount in the United States, and a disproportionate number of those who reported eighth grade or less education in the United States had at least three years of education in Japan.



It is generally assumed by farmers and agricultural agents that Japanese American farm laborers were employed almost exclusively on farms operated by Japanese Americans, either as paid workers or as unpaid family workers. Although we are unable to document this to our satisfaction, the opinion is probably correct. A number of sociological factors contribute to this. The character of Japanese family solidarity tended to integrate within the family other small related family units or single individuals, particularly Issei bachelors. Factors of cultural and linguistic solidarity were also involved, and some of the practices of the early labor camps tended to persist, especially because of the reluctance of Japanese Americans to use the ordinary channels for finding jobs.<sup>21</sup>

Considerable numbers of non-Japanese laborers, particularly Mexicans and Filipinos, augmented the supply of labor on farms operated by Japanese Americans, although the non-Japanese tended to be temporary and migratory workers employed during peak seasons.

It is very difficult to estimate the number of Japanese American farm laborers. For the week of March 24-30, 1940, the Census of Agriculture reported for California 12,426 unpaid family workers on farms operated by nonwhites, an average of 2.34 per farm reporting family labor. Three-quarters of the nonwhite-operated farms were operated by Japanese Americans, and we may be certain that at least a similar proportion of the family laborers were Japanese Americans, i.e., that there were at least 9,500 Japanese American unpaid family farm laborers.<sup>22</sup> The Census of Population, however, reported only 8,036 Japanese American unpaid family farm laborers for California,<sup>23</sup> which was undoubtedly an undercount. The latter figure was derived from an enumeration of individuals, and the agricultural Census information was obtained from farm operators. It would be inappropriate to make an extended analysis of the relative validity of these reports. The only direct evidence derives from our Loss Survey (see chap. v), in which the sample of 68 farms and nurseries—a very small number for this purpose, and predominantly from Los Angeles County—reported 236 unpaid family farm laborers, or 3.5 per farm. If these figures are representative, even the findings of the Census of Agriculture were an undercount. Since the Census of Agriculture did not report by counties labor on farms operated by nonwhites, the foregoing procedure cannot be followed for Los Angeles County. We have no reason to believe, however, that the Census of Population did not similarly undercount unpaid family farm laborers on farms operated by Japanese Americans. Even so, Japanese American unpaid family farm laborers enumerated in the Census of Population in Los Angeles County in 1940 constituted 64.3 per cent of all males and 78.1 per cent of all females in the unpaid farm labor categories in the county.

Of farms operated by nonwhites in California in 1940, less than a third (2,070) reported a total of 11,039 paid farm laborers. If we may assume that farms operated by Japanese Americans were like those of other nonwhites (excepting Indians) in their utilization of paid labor,<sup>24</sup> approximately 9,450 paid laborers were employed on 1,170 farms operated by Japanese Americans.<sup>25</sup> The Census of Population enumerated 3,963 Japanese American paid farm laborers,<sup>26</sup> almost all of whom worked on farms operated by Japanese Americans. The difference is

offered as an estimate that, in 1940, Japanese American farmers in California hired more than 5,000 non-Japanese farm laborers.<sup>27</sup> In the absence of Census reports by counties for farms operated by nonwhites, we can only estimate that about 30 per cent of the state total was employed in Los Angeles County.

Rough estimates of the labor on farms operated by Japanese Americans in California were: one-half unpaid family labor, one-fourth or less Japanese paid labor, and one-fourth or more non-Japanese paid labor. That these rough estimates may be applied also to farms operated by Japanese Americans in Los Angeles County is indicated by the findings of a special survey made by the Los Angeles County Agricultural Commission in February, 1942,<sup>28</sup> covering more than three-fourths of the farms operated by Japanese Americans. The survey found that the average farm size was 21.6 acres and required an average of 61 man-months of labor, or the labor of five full-time workers. Operators and their family members supplied 60 per cent of the total man-months. Thus farm labor requirements, in addition to the full-time work of operators, averaged 48 man-months per farm, of which half was supplied by unpaid family labor and half by paid labor from outside.

Farm labor in Los Angeles County differed somewhat from that of the rest of the West Coast. The working conditions and kinds of tasks in nurseries and greenhouses were peculiarly suited to the utilization of female labor. Such work as transplanting seedlings and cutting flowers was commonly regarded as woman's work; hence the proportion of female laborers, especially unpaid family workers, was larger.

The utilization of male agricultural laborers in Los Angeles County also differed from that in the three Western states; table 19 indicates the effects of the differences in farm operations. The miscellaneous category, excluding farmers, farm managers, and laborers, and including such workers as truck and tractor drivers and chick sexers, was compiled by deducting the total of farm operators and laborers reported in the occupational tabulation from the total number in agriculture reported in the industry tabulation of the Census of Population. Note that in Los Angeles County the proportion of workers in the miscellaneous category was more than twice as great for both native and foreign-born males as in the three Western states, and the proportion of paid farm laborers in Los Angeles was relatively small. If we combine the paid farm labor and miscellaneous categories, however, we find that together they comprised almost identical proportions of the total for both foreign-born (53.9 and 52.0 per cent) and native-born (46.5 and

TABLE 19  
JAPANESE AMERICAN MALES IN AGRICULTURE, LOS ANGELES COUNTY AND THREE WESTERN STATES, 1940

Industry and occupation	Los Angeles County			Three Western states		
	Foreign-born		Native-born		Foreign-born	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total in agriculture <sup>a</sup>	2,807	100 0	1,685	100 0	10,795	100 0
Farmers and farm managers <sup>b</sup>	1,287	45 8	298	17 7	4,715	43 7
Unpaid family farm laborers <sup>b</sup>	62	2 2	605	35 9	256	2 4
Paid farm laborers <sup>b</sup>	684	24 4	435	25 8	4,719	43 7
Miscellaneous workers in agriculture <sup>c</sup>	774	27 6	347	20 6	1,105	10 2
					608	8 7

SOURCE: Data for three Western states published in WCCA *Final Report*, p. 416, for Los Angeles County from unpublished tabulations.

<sup>a</sup> From U. S. Census of Population, 1940, employed workers by industries.

<sup>b</sup> From U. S. Census of Population, 1940, employed workers by occupations.

<sup>c</sup> Obtained by subtracting specified occupations from total in industry. This category includes truck and tractor drivers, mechanics, chuck seers, etc., who are employed in agriculture.

46.4 per cent) workers. Japanese American agriculture in Los Angeles was closely bound to the local produce market. It was usual for some of the farm laborers to truck produce to commission merchants or to sell produce directly from rented stalls in the wholesale market once or more each week, and the workers who drove the trucks or sold produce evidently were not reported as farm laborers.

The most distinctive feature of the age characteristics of the farm labor population according to our sample was the proportion of unpaid males who were under 25 years of age. More than three-quarters of the unpaid males were in this age group and they comprised almost a quarter of all farm laborers. Of the male paid workers, about a third were under 25 years of age and less than a quarter were over 60 years, the latter group being composed principally of Issei bachelors or men otherwise lacking home ties. Two-thirds of the paid and four-fifths of the unpaid male farm laborers were unmarried. Most female laborers were between 25 and 60 years of age and two-thirds were married.

In educational attributes the foreign-born farm laborers did not differ substantially from farm operators. More native-born paid workers reported some education in Japan than did unpaid family workers, probably a function of the age distribution. Of native-born paid workers, 40 per cent had at least three years of schooling in Japan, compared with 12 per cent of native-born unpaid family laborers. In these groups, education in Japan was negatively correlated with education in the United States. More than one-third of the forty laborers, paid and unpaid, who reported at least three years of education in Japan, had no education in the United States and an equal proportion had less than a grammar-school education in this country.

The foreign-born laborers showed a distribution of birthplace distinguishable in no important respect from the total 20 per cent sample. There was a small excess of persons from Hiroshima ken, as was also the case with farm operators. Native-born farm laborers reported Los Angeles County as their birthplace far more often than the whole 20 per cent sample. Nearly 50 per cent of the native-born in the whole 20 per cent sample had been born in Los Angeles County, but 60 per cent of native-born paid farm laborers and 82 per cent of native-born unpaid farm laborers had been born in the county. In the case of the paid workers, the indication of geographic stability was a reflection of the youthfulness of the native-born group and of the fact that farm labor was an entering occupation for them. The geographic stability of the unpaid family laborers is interesting as a measure of the stability, at

least within the geographic area of the county, of the Issei parents who operated the family farms, a stability which existed in the face of impediments to Japanese American farm ownership.

About a third (48 out of 148) of the paid workers reported their income, but the reporting of perquisites was not sufficiently consistent to enable us to interpret real income. The median cash income reported was \$74 a month.



As we noted above (see table 10), there was no appreciable change in the number of farm operators or farm laborers in the 19-month period between April, 1940, and November, 1941. Of the 363 farm and nursery operators in the 20 per cent sample for November, 1941, 22 (6 per cent) had entered this occupation after April, 1940, and half of these were 24 years or younger. Seven of the 20 operators who left this occupation in the same period were 60 years or older. This is consistent with the gradual shift in the nativity-age structure of the population.

The function of farm labor as an entering occupation for Nisei workers is also clear. There was no statistically significant change in the total number of laborers over the 19-month period, but 17 per cent of the 455 laborers in the sample for November, 1941, had entered this occupation after April, 1940, and two-thirds of these new workers were 24 years or younger. Of the 85 laborers in the sample who left agricultural labor for other occupations between 1940 and 1941, 45 per cent were Nisei 24 years or younger and another 25 per cent were 25-44 years old.

Shifts in the labor force between the outbreak of war and the Evacuation are summarized in table 11. Twenty farm operators in the sample (about 6 per cent) either left the labor force or changed to some other occupation and only 2 persons became farm operators. Although 39 workers in the sample left agricultural labor, 55 persons entered this occupation. A part of the movement expressed in these figures was the voluntary migration of Los Angeles County farm operators and their families to the Central Valley of California, in Zone 2 of the Western Defense Command, where they worked as farm laborers until they were evacuated.



The Japanese very early in their history tended to specialize in truck crops, and in California in 1940 Japanese Americans held a virtual monopoly of such crops as snap beans for market, spring and summer celery, peppers, and strawberries; they produced at least half of the artichokes, cauliflower, fall and winter celery, cucumbers, spinach, to-

matatoes, and garlic.<sup>20</sup> In Los Angeles County the crop specialization resulted in effective control over an even larger number of crops. Besides the crops in which Japanese Americans had a monopoly in the state, they had at least 90 per cent of the acreage of the following crops in Los Angeles County: cauliflower, peas, spinach, lettuce, green onions, green lima beans, beets, broccoli, eggplant, mustard greens, radishes, romaine, turnips, and summer squash. They also predominated in the production of cucumbers, melons, cabbage, carrots, parsnips, endive, bush berries, tomatoes, and parsley. The only Southern California truck crops of which Japanese produced an unimportant part (10 per cent or less) were early white potatoes, winter squash, and watermelons.<sup>20</sup>

In the system of truck produce distribution the key functions are in the hands of the wholesaler, and this is the best point of vantage from which to view the position of Japanese Americans in the Southern California produce industry. We shall restrict our discussion to the markets in Los Angeles City. There are minor wholesale activities in Long Beach and other outlying places in the county, but they do not comprise a sufficiently large part of produce trade to be worth our attention.

As early as 1901, at least one Japanese produce jobber or wholesaler was operating at the City Plaza, where there was a kind of farmers' market. With the establishment of the Los Angeles City Market in 1909 by a private corporation capitalized at \$200,000, the Japanese assumed a substantial but not predominating role. Ninety-four Japanese held 36,250 shares, or 18 per cent of the stock, an average holding of 386 per Japanese shareholder. The remaining shares were evenly divided between Caucasians and Chinese. Forty-five Caucasians held an average of 1,820 shares each, and 373 Chinese held an average of 220 shares each.<sup>21</sup> Of the individuals doing business at the City Market at the time of its opening, the Japanese were the most numerous ethnic group, although almost all of them were growers selling their own produce from stalls. Of 180 growers, 120 were Japanese, 40 Chinese, and 20 Caucasians. Of 44 commission merchants, only 4 were Japanese, 20 were Chinese, and 20 were Caucasians.<sup>22</sup> In 1924 the area of this market was extended and \$100,000 additional stock was issued, almost all of which was taken by Caucasians. There has been little turnover among stockholders, and Japanese Americans in the City Market, with few exceptions, held their stock throughout the Evacuation period. In 1948, Japanese Americans held approximately 30,000 shares, Chinese Americans approximately 73,000 shares, and Caucasians something over 180,000 shares.<sup>23</sup>



The dimensions of Japanese American operations in the City Market may be indicated by the following estimates. In 1926 more than 500 vegetable growers did a business of \$6,000,000 with the market; in 1930 the Japanese American business totaled \$16,000,000, and in 1934 \$25,000,000—in each instance roughly half of the total business of the City Market.<sup>4</sup>

Japanese Americans were less important in the development of the Wholesale Terminal Market, which has been operated since 1918 by the Southern Pacific Railway. In 1934 Japanese Americans did \$10,000,000 of the total \$70,000,000 business in the market. Between 1936 and 1941,

TABLE 20  
ETHNIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP OF WHOLESALE PRODUCE MERCHANTS AND  
DEALERS, THREE LOS ANGELES MARKETS, 1941

Ethnic group	Commission merchants		Permanent stall operators		Total	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total . . .	167	100 0	232	100 0	399	100 0
Japanese . . .	29	17.4	134	57 8	163	40 8
"American" . . .	94	56 3	81	34 9	175	43 9
Chinese and Korean .	44	26 3	17	7.3	61	15 3

SOURCE Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles. Exhibit in Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, pp 11006-11008

however, the number of Japanese American companies in the Wholesale Terminal Market increased from 33 to 61.<sup>5</sup> In the Central Wholesale Market, which was established for small merchants in 1927 and which dealt mostly in citrus fruits, Japanese Americans were not important.

In 1941 Japanese Americans occupied a substantial and distinctive position in the wholesale produce industry. They were chiefly represented among the dealers<sup>6</sup> in the City Market and the Wholesale Terminal Market. According to the *Rafu Shimpō Yearbook and Directory* for 1940-1941, there were 124 dealers, 22 commission merchants, and 3 shippers and brokers. Sixty-six of the dealers and 14 of the commission merchants operated at the City Market and, except for a broker and 7 dealers in other locations, the remainder operated at the Wholesale Terminal Market. Slightly different figures were reported for December 6, 1941, by the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles (see table 20). These figures enable us to compare the status of Japanese Americans relative to other ethnic groups. It will be noted

TABLE 21  
IMPORTANCE ON LOS ANGELES WHOLESALE MARKET OF SELECTED CROPS  
GROWN LOCALLY BY JAPANESE AMERICAN FARMERS, 1941  
(Percentage)

Crop	Acreage in Los Angeles County grown by Japanese Americans <sup>a</sup>	Total Los Angeles market unloads from local area <sup>b</sup>
Celery	99	85 0
Peas	99	8 5
Spinach	99	91 0
Beets	99	99 8
Broccoli	99	67 5
Radishes	99	99 8
Peppers	98	11 0
Snap beans	95	62 0
Strawberries	95	77 0
Turnips.	95	99 3
Cauliflower.	90	90 0
Lettuce .	90	15 0
Green onions	90	99 1
Green lima beans	90	74 0
Eggplant	90	28 0
Romaine	90	100 0
Summer squash.	90	41 0
Cucumbers	85	61 0
Cabbage	75	95 0
Carrots	75	90 0
Parsnips	75	100.0
Endive .	75	99.5
Potatoes ..	10	14 0
Winter squash	10	79 0

<sup>a</sup> Survey by Los Angeles County Commissioner of Agriculture, February, 1942. Data presented in Tolan Committee Report, p. 130.

<sup>b</sup> Including Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside (except Coachella Valley), and San Bernardino counties. In general, Japanese American farmers were important in production of truck crops in all five counties, although their proportion of the total acreage in each crop may not have been as high as in Los Angeles County. Computed from data published in 1941 Annual Unload Summary, Los Angeles, Federal-State Market News Service, Los Angeles.

that 58 per cent of the permanent stall operators (dealers), but only 17 per cent of the commission merchants, were Japanese Americans. Both the "Americans" (Caucasians) and the combined Chinese Americans and Korean Americans exceeded Japanese Americans in the category of merchants. Note also that the "Americans" and the Chinese Americans and Korean Americans were predominantly merchants, and hardly more than a quarter of the latter were stall operators.

Although it is difficult to estimate the proportion of produce which was handled by Japanese Americans, an estimate for 1941 is available from a report by Sam Minami.<sup>87</sup> He estimated the receipts by Japanese American produce wholesalers in the two major markets at \$26,500,000 for 1941. This was 39 per cent of the total dollar volume in the Los Angeles wholesale markets.<sup>88</sup> On closer inspection we find specialization in the same products as was observed in agriculture. It was estimated<sup>89</sup> that 75 per cent of green vegetables, but only 10 per cent of staple fruits and vegetables consumed in the Los Angeles area, were handled by Japanese American wholesalers. Non-Japanese houses handled most of the potatoes, onions, apples, and citrus and other fruits.

About half of all produce handled in the Los Angeles markets was locally grown. The extent to which both the production and distribution of certain truck crops were in the hands of Japanese Americans is indicated in table 21. Local production of 22 truck crops was dominated by Japanese Americans and 75 per cent or more of the wholesale supply of 13 of these was from local production. Actually, the "local" area for wholesale market figures includes Los Angeles, Orange, Ventura, Riverside (except Coachella Valley), and San Bernardino counties, so that the proportion of the acreage devoted to any particular crop operated by Japanese Americans in the five counties taken together may be somewhat lower than for Los Angeles County alone. In general, however, Japanese farmers were very important in all truck-farming areas in Southern California. In the rest of California Japanese Americans were also important producers of such crops as peas and lettuce, the major supply of which came from outside the local area.



Before proceeding to an examination of the vertical structure of produce operations, we must review the organizational details. In addition to a license, certain legal requirements and limitations upon the operations of wholesalers are imposed by state law for the purpose of protecting farmers. "Commission merchants" are defined as persons who

contract for or receive farm products from a producer for sale on commission; they are required to post a surety bond of \$5,000 and a complete list of commissions and fees charged for the services they render. "Dealers" are defined as persons who buy farm products from a producer and resell such products at wholesale, making deferred payment to the farmer, usually by means of commercial paper; they are required to post a surety bond of \$1,000. These are supposed to be the only classifications of produce wholesalers permitted actually to handle farm produce before paying for it. Complaints by farmers against either commission merchants or dealers are handled by the State Bureau of Market Enforcement. "Brokers" merely arrange transactions between interested parties and are not permitted to handle money or farm products. "Cash buyers" are like dealers in that they buy farm products from the producer to resell at wholesale, but they differ from dealers in that they are not bonded and are supposed to pay in full with cash (not checks or other commercial paper) at the time they take possession of the produce. Although a person or firm can hold licenses as commission merchant, broker, and dealer simultaneously, cash buyers are limited to one license. No license is required for nonprofit coöperative associations that secure produce only from their own members, nor, of course, for farmers selling their own produce in the wholesale market.

Japanese American wholesalers, whom we call commission merchants, were licensed and bonded in accordance with the state laws, and all were licensed also as dealers. The firms or "houses" had permanent locations in the "inside" of the markets, i.e., they operated from the market buildings. What we refer to variously as "yard men," "dealers," or "hauling men" were smaller outfits, most of them licensed and bonded as dealers, but some were technically cash buyers. They operated permanently from stalls in the open center of the market court. There was also an indeterminate number of farmers holding no licenses who came in weekly or more often to sell their produce from truck stalls which they rented by the day. Our informants agree that persons in all these latter classifications engaged to some extent in activities for which they were not licensed. Because of their technically illegal nature it has been impossible to get an accurate measure of the extent of these activities, or to discover whether they were equally common to members of other ethnic groups in the markets. Specifically, some licensed dealers and cash buyers actually operated as commission merchants, i.e., they solicited and accepted produce to be sold on a commission basis instead of paying the farmer a set price. Farmers, who presumably were selling

only produce from their own fields, sometimes agreed to sell their neighbors' produce also, again usually on a commission basis. So long as there were no complaints from the farmers, the State Enforcement Bureau was not interested in these technical violations of the law, and very few complaints were filed. Apparently the relationships were nonexploitative, and when problems did arise they were handled within the organizational structure of the Japanese associations.

An indication of the dimensions of Japanese American wholesale produce companies was given by a member of the Junior Produce Club. For each of the six largest produce houses, employing an average of 30 persons, he estimated a gross business of \$1,000,000 or more for 1940. Each of eight houses, with an average of 20 employees, had a gross business between \$500,000 and \$750,000 in 1940. A third group of six commission houses, with an average of 10 employees, did an estimated gross business of less than \$500,000 each. In addition, 30 of the largest yard dealers, about a fifth of the total number, hired between 5 and 10 workers and had annual operations between \$150,000 and \$400,000 each.

Our interview data for a sample of thirteen prewar Japanese American houses<sup>40</sup> give further details on the organization of the houses. Only one was the private holding of a single individual. Five were partnerships, and seven were incorporated for amounts ranging from \$16,000 to \$100,000. Although some of the firms had been reorganized, there was a fair continuity of organization and one had been established in 1910. No firm, however, had maintained its organization unmodified for longer than sixteen years. Nine of the thirteen commission houses were entirely or almost completely owned by Issei. Four had Nisei partners or important stockholders, but it is likely that the real control was still in the hands of the Issei. These commission houses employed between 7 and 37 persons, with an average of 19 employees. Space in the markets was secured by the purchase of leaseholds; in our sample the claimed value of leaseholds ranged from \$1,000 to \$3,000 per "door," the unit of frontage by which market space is leased. Actual rental costs were relatively small and were calculated by the floor area covered. Commission houses had trucks, office machines and equipment, scales, refrigerator units, and freight-handling equipment, with values estimated for our sample between \$8,000 and \$21,000, and averaging \$13,000 per house. Since the actual delivery of produce to commission houses was made by the growers themselves or by truckers whom they hired, the commission houses maintained relatively small trucking facilities, which

were available to their customers for a service charge in addition to the regular commission. The volume of operations varied with the season, for the commission houses in our sample it ranged from \$3,600 to \$25,000 a week in the slow season and from \$9,000 to \$85,000 a week in the busy season. The average volume was \$11,000 a week in the slow season and \$35,000 a week in the busy season. According to law, commission houses paid their growers within 10 days after sale of the consignment. Retail buyers, however, had 30-90-day accounts, and as a consequence commission merchants usually had large accounts receivable. It was also the practice for commission merchants to make advances to growers. For servicing accounts with retailers, the merchants used collection agencies, which hired Japanese American agents for those customers.

Some distributive functions were undertaken by the three Japanese brokerage houses. Since they did not actually handle produce, however, they merely maintained offices. One house specialized in imports from Florida and Hawaii, and another in produce from the Northwest. Their services were directly to the commission houses, and their charge was usually one-fifth of the 15 per cent commission taken by the merchant, which in turn was based on the gross wholesale selling price.

The dealers had smaller organizations and differed from commission merchants in several important particulars. They operated from stalls in the yard, which they rented for \$15-\$25 a month per stall. Their main equipment was a fleet of three or more trucks with which they picked up produce from the farms each evening. For this reason Nishimoto calls them "hauling men."<sup>a</sup> Ordinarily they were limited to local produce, i.e., to growers within a radius of about fifty miles, and their method of handling was supposed to be direct purchase rather than consignment. They were not so highly capitalized as commission merchants and rarely made advances to growers. Our intensive analysis indicates a larger proportion of Nisei participation in the control of yard outfits, and a simpler type of organization, with almost all the companies either individually owned or partnerships.



Our 20 per cent sample indicates that there were more than 1,000 Japanese Americans working in wholesale produce in 1941, about one-third of them Issei. About a fifth of the workers were proprietors or managers, about a quarter were salesmen, and the remainder were swampers and drivers, receivers, office workers, and field men. Of the few non-Japanese employed by Japanese American wholesalers, most

were Mexican swampers and drivers. Almost half of the Issei were proprietors or managers, and they comprised two-thirds of that job category. A fifth of the Issei were salesmen, and they comprised about a fourth of all salesmen. Field men and receivers were mostly Issei, but the heavy work of swamping and driving was done almost entirely by Nisei. Office workers made up about 15 per cent of the total labor force and were mostly employed by commission houses. All the females in the labor force were in this category, some of them part-time workers and (or) related to the proprietors. Women made up perhaps 10 per cent of all workers in the wholesale produce industry.

TABLE 22  
MEDIAN MONTHLY EARNINGS OF WHOLESALE PRODUCE WORKERS, 1941

Position	Number in sample	Median monthly earnings
Proprietors and managers	22	\$286
Salesmen	78	174
Drivers and swampers	106	135
Bookkeepers and cashiers	51	131
Other employees, including field solicitors, receivers, etc.	19	152

SOURCE: Ito Interviews

The proprietor and manager category included many owners of small yard outfits who were engaged in the full range of occupational tasks. Similarly, the smaller firms hired very few employees, each of whom performed several tasks. Only in the commission houses was there sharp job specialization, and even here the regulations of the union contract distinguished only between salesmen and employees of lower status. Because selling was a higher-paid job, the union contract provided for very limited sales work for employees below that job classification. The effect of the contract with the Teamsters' Union was weakened by the large number of partnerships and family enterprises, since owners, part-owners, and their sons were exempt from the provisions of the union shop contract.

The union contract in 1941 set minimum wages of \$40 a week for salesmen, \$30 a week for other store employees, and 75 cents an hour for temporary help. Our interview data indicate that the union wages were met and occasionally exceeded. The median salaries for each job classification in our interview series is shown in table 22. The earnings for proprietors and managers is not a satisfactory expression of actual

income, since many of the persons in this category had additional income from profits. In addition to salaries, hired managers and salesmen often received commissions that may not be fully reported here, and most employees received annual bonuses.

The degree of occupational stability is indicated by the following findings from our 20 per cent sample. In 1941, proprietors and managers had a median tenure of 10.2 years, which approximates the median of 11.8 that we found for farm and nursery operators and managers. Salesmen in wholesale produce had a median of 6.8 years. In this instance there were concentrations of 37 per cent who had been in the occupation 8-14 years and 20 per cent who had entered the occupation within the two years preceding the outbreak of war. All other workers in wholesale produce had a median tenure of 3.0 years.

To round out our description of this segment of the labor force we may indicate some nonoccupational characteristics based on our 20 per cent sample. We have noted that 35 per cent were foreign-born, and of these there seems to have been a slight excess from Kumamoto ken as compared with the proportions from this province in the total sample. Similarly, there was an excess of native-born persons from Hawaii. Of the wholesale produce workers, 60 per cent lived in the Boyle Heights and Little Tokio areas, with a secondary concentration of 12 per cent in the West Jefferson area. Despite the fact that two-thirds of the proprietors and managers in wholesale produce were Issei, only one-third of the proprietors and managers were 45 years or older, as compared with 60 per cent of farm operators and managers in this age group. The relative youthfulness of the Issei produce proprietors and managers underlines the stability noted above. A quarter of the Nisei had some college education. Some 30 per cent had not completed high school in the United States, but half of these had substantial amounts of schooling in Japan. This suggests that there was a reservoir of fairly highly trained persons in the working force capable of assuming managerial positions.



Apart from administrative controls of governmental agencies, wholesale produce operations are regulated through the Los Angeles Market Arbitration Association. This organization includes almost all the dealers and merchants in the Los Angeles markets. It regulates the relations between dealers in the determination of opening and closing hours and the formulation and execution of arbitration agreements; it acts as the collective bargaining agent in negotiating closed-shop contracts with



the union, and is responsible for the adherence of the signatories to the terms of the contract. Association dues are assessed according to the size of the operations of each member as measured by the number of doors or stalls. Members are fined for violations of fair-trade practices regulations. Japanese American dealers and merchants were members of the Association and signatories to the contracts, although they had little or no part in the formulation of Association policies.

The Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles, of which the Arbitration Association was the instrumental offshoot, had about 265 members in 1946, including produce brokers in addition to members of the Arbitration Association, but no retailers or shippers. Besides the functions performed by the Arbitration Association, it acts as a legislative lobby, supplies credit information to its members, and makes credit investigations of prospective market tenants. The organization is administered by a hired secretary-manager and a board of directors, on which one Japanese American served for a number of years. His son, who was subsequently elected to the board, was reported never to have attended meetings. Japanese Americans were dues-paying members, but only passive participants, and they did not share in the use of club facilities provided for members of the Association.

As an agency of direct activity, the Nisei organized in 1938 or 1939 the Junior Produce Club, composed mainly of Nisei employees of commission houses. It fulfilled some of the functions of a service organization, such as insurance and income-tax advice, as well as recreational activities, and provided a means of liaison with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and similar organizations. The substitute character of part of its functions is suggested by the fact that it sponsored exchange golf matches between Japanese American and *hakujin* commission houses, looked forward to the end of segregative practices of the Association, and indeed attempted to counteract discriminatory practices of the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers.<sup>42</sup>

The most important functioning organization for Japanese American commission merchants was the Japanese Produce Merchants Association (*Nihonjin Nosansho Kumiai*), which will be discussed below in the description of the vertical structure of Japanese American control in agriculture-produce trade.



The most striking feature of the prewar system of produce distribution was the ethnic continuity of the channels of production and market-

ing. Japanese American wholesalers specialized in crops that were virtually controlled by growers of the same ethnic group. In our field research on the produce trade, we found that only two of eighteen pre-war Japanese American commission houses listed growers other than Japanese Americans among their main sources of supply. Six houses listed growers whose ethnic identity could not be determined, but most of them were marketing associations that were characteristically Japanese American.

According to our findings, the field representatives of the commission houses, that is, the agents who visited growers and negotiated contracts with them, were predominantly Issei. A few houses also had Mexican or Caucasian field agents, but it is clear that the houses were organized to do their main business with Japanese American growers. One of the two commission houses that listed non-Japanese among its principal growers had the following consignments for 1940

From Japanese American growers . . .	\$600,000 (71.5 per cent)
From non-Japanese growers. . . .	170,000 (20.2 per cent)
From unidentified growers. . . .	70,000 ( 8.3 per cent)

Since most of the unidentified growers are marketing associations, probably Japanese American, at least three-fourths of the value of produce handled by this house came from Japanese American growers. Such an estimate would be an exceedingly conservative indication of the integration of most Japanese American commission merchants with Japanese American growers. It is probable that the figures exceeded 80 per cent.

In the financing of their operations, Japanese American growers rarely had recourse to the usual banking facilities, but depended upon their own resources or the facilities of wholesale produce dealers. Ordinarily, several members of the Japanese Produce Merchants Association worked out financing arrangements with a grower so that a portion of his crop large enough to liquidate the loan was assigned to each financing house. These firms, however, had no claim on the remainder of the crop, which was handled on the open market. Short-term loans were usually small, and the great majority of them were made to Japanese American growers by Japanese American commission houses. For example, in 1941 one of the larger commission houses made seventy-eight separate loans totaling nearly \$50,000. At least four-fifths of these and more than 90 per cent of the total amount were to Japanese American growers. The average loan to Japanese Americans was \$730. Besides money loans, both Japanese American and other wholesale houses pur-

chased fertilizer, seed, and equipment at wholesale rates and made them available to growers on a nonprofit basis. Loans of money or materials and advance payment on crops were made as a means of insuring the sources of supply and reducing the costs of solicitation. There was no evidence that the merchants had many losses from these practices, except as a result of the Evacuation.

The Japanese Produce Merchants Association also negotiated agreements with various associations of growers by which a part of the total produce of an association of growers was prorated to the several commission houses so that each was assured of a minimum supply. Such arrangements were facilitated by the practice of Japanese American growers' setting up local organizations and federations with others specializing in the same crop. for example, the Coyote Pass Flower and Vegetable Association (*Coyote Pass Kaki Yasai Kumiai*), Cucumber Growers' Association (*Cucumber Kosakusha Kumiai*), Federation of Japanese Berry Growers' Association (*Ichigo Kosakusha Renmei*).

Japanese American participation in flower raising and distribution was similar to that in the produce industry in the structure of control from planting to retail sale. It was even more tightly knit, however, in that the functions of flower raising and distribution were handled by the same individuals, who owned the largest wholesale flower market on the Pacific Coast. In 1912 they organized the Southern California Flower Market Association with a limited membership, which had increased only slightly by 1936, although the acreage that the members cultivated had increased fourfold in the same period.<sup>48</sup>

We have made no intensive analysis of the floral industry, but Japanese Americans have reestablished their organization quite rapidly. The Association had acquired control of its Market by mid-1946; by 1947 80 per cent of the wholesalers in the Market were Japanese Americans.<sup>49</sup> In view of the speed of recuperation, an intensive analysis would be interesting and would afford the opportunity to make comparisons with the produce industry.



The main retail outlets for Japanese American produce wholesalers in the prewar period were members of the same ethnic group. Even in the Wholesale Terminal Market only one Japanese American commission house depended mainly upon non-Japanese retailers. In the City Market, in all but a few transactions, Japanese American wholesalers had their main dealings with Japanese American retailers. From our interview sample of commission houses and dealers, the following seems to

have been a typical example of the retail outlets for Japanese American wholesalers: 20 per cent of the volume went out of the area, mostly to Caucasian buyers; 25-30 per cent went to local chain stores run by Caucasians; and 50 per cent or more went to local retailers, most of whom were Japanese Americans. Although there was some variation in the proportions, very few houses sold as much as 50 per cent outside the area, and equally few distributed as much as 50 per cent of their volume to local chains.

There is general agreement that Japanese Americans operated most of the retail produce stores other than the produce sections in the national grocery chains, but estimates of the number of their retail produce stores vary widely. Minami estimated for 1941 that Japanese Americans ran a total of 1,000 retail produce outlets in Los Angeles County and that these comprised 75 per cent of all such outlets.<sup>45</sup> It appears that his estimate of the total number is too high, unless it includes roadside stands operated by farmers. Nishimoto, on the basis of listings in the *Rafu Shimpō Yearbook and Directory* for 1939-1940, estimated that there were 309 retail produce outlets in Los Angeles City.<sup>46</sup> On a county-wide basis this would give a total of only about 450, which seems to be too small a number; the *Directory* listing was probably incomplete. Our own estimate, which is based on tabulations from our 20 per cent sample, falls between the Minami and the Nishimoto estimates. There were 155 proprietors and managers of retail produce stores in our 1941 sample. (See table 7.) We estimate, therefore, 670-880 proprietors and managers.<sup>47</sup> Although some individuals may have reported themselves as managers when their actual status was assistant manager or clerk, thus inflating our estimates, comparison of our 1940 sample with the appropriate 1940 Census categories indicates that this misreporting could not have amounted to more than 10 per cent. The number of retail outlets was approximately the same as the total number of proprietors and managers; since managers were usually employed only by the few proprietors who had two or more stores. A considerable amount of produce was sold also from roadside stands operated by farmers, and these are not included in our estimates.

Japanese Americans seem to have entered retail produce activity with the establishment of roadside stands from which they sold produce from their own farms. Specialty markets in outlying districts also provided direct outlets for Japanese American farmers. Japanese American grocery stores tended very early to specialize in produce displays, and with the development of the "super market" in the 1920's Japanese American

participation in retail produce distribution increased sharply. These establishments lent themselves to a highly segmentalized organization, the produce department was usually an independent concession let by the market owner or sublet by the grocery operator. The produce department, with its pattern of merchandise display, came to be the most attractive and conspicuous part of the market, occupying the entire store frontage. This type of display was peculiarly suited to the climate of the region, which permits markets to open the entire store front during the business day.

The stores were not highly capitalized. The investment varied with the value of the leasehold and the size of the operation.<sup>45</sup> The equipment was limited to display stands, scales, cash register, and one or two trucks. Although the produce was supplied by the wholesaler on credit, sales by the retailer were almost entirely cash transactions and the turnover, of course, was very rapid. Success in the enterprise hinged upon accurate estimation of volume for each day and careful handling and trimming of the produce so as to keep wastage at a minimum.

By 1930 the number of retail outlets controlled by Japanese Americans had reached a plateau.<sup>46</sup> During the 1930's there was a tendency toward the concentration of control of several produce outlets in the hands of a single operator and some increase in the scale of operations. National and local chain stores were an increasing source of competition and were chiefly responsible for retarding the expansion of the activities of Japanese Americans, although no displacement was yet apparent.



From our 20 per cent sample we estimate that there were between 2,100 and 2,500 Japanese Americans working in retail produce in Los Angeles County in 1941. Comparison with 1940 Census figures for workers in the retail food industry supports our estimate. The minor discrepancies in nativity-sex data are probably due to variations in the reporting of part-time occupations. Minami<sup>47</sup> estimated a total of 5,000 workers for the county, which is patently erroneous and derives from an exaggeration of the number of establishments as well as the number of workers per store.

We estimate an average of about three workers per store, although there was great variability, depending upon the type of market. Some family-operated grocery stores had no paid employees, whereas a large concession in a super market sometimes had a staff consisting of manager, assistant manager, eight to ten sales clerks, cashier, buyer, and

helpers for washing and trimming the produce. One-third of the labor force, according to our sample, consisted of proprietors and managers, about 63 per cent were sales clerks, and the remaining 3 or 4 per cent were miscellaneous workers, chiefly in the super markets. Nearly three-quarters of all workers were Nisei. They comprised half of the proprietors and managers and, including part-time workers, approximately 85 per cent of the clerks. The Thomas-Nishimoto samples enabled Nishimoto to distinguish between proprietors and managers. He found that a large number of proprietors were Issei, but there was a higher proportion of native-born proprietors in retail produce than in any other trade.<sup>51</sup> It is interesting to note that Nishimoto found almost as many Kibei as Nisei among retail produce proprietors. Of forty-seven retail produce managers in the sample, 32 per cent were Issei, 45 per cent Nisei, and 23 per cent Kibei.

Among proprietors and managers there was a smaller proportion of older Issei and a concentration between 25 and 44 years of age. Retail produce was a newer field than farming, fishing, and wholesale produce for Japanese Americans, and the younger native-born population was better equipped to deal with customers because of relative fluency in English. Proprietors and managers were predominantly male, and more than two-thirds of them were married. One-fourth of the sales clerks were unpaid family workers: the wives of proprietors and managers and their children, both male and female. Paid workers, two-thirds of whom were male, were predominantly single Nisei. Two-thirds of both males and females were unmarried, and 55 per cent were under 25 years of age. This indicates that retail produce selling was one of the most important entering occupations for urban Nisei and was an important source of part-time employment. With the increase of Nisei in the labor force, job competition in this field became increasingly severe and there was a sense of pressure that was often interpreted by the Nisei as deriving from the competition of other ethnic groups. The Thomas-Nishimoto case material illustrates this point convincingly.<sup>52</sup>

Considering the large number of part-time workers who had not completed their education and who were not discriminated in our sample, the educational level of retail produce workers was rather high. Fifteen per cent of the native-born clerks and 17 per cent of native-born proprietors and managers had some college education in the United States. Thirty-six per cent of the native-born proprietors and managers and 24 per cent of the native-born clerks had at least three years of education in Japan, i.e., were Kibei.

In regard to place of birth, foreign-born retail produce workers were not distinguishable from the rest of the foreign-born labor force. Native-born workers, however, showed some differences that are worth noting. Of the Nisei proprietors and managers, 30 per cent were born in Los Angeles County, as compared with 48.5 per cent of all Nisei in the labor force. An additional 30 per cent came from other parts of California, as compared with 25 per cent of all Nisei workers; the very impressive proportion of 25 per cent were born in Hawaii, as compared with 12 per cent for the total Nisei labor force. The clerks, however, were not notably different from the general Nisei labor force in regard to place of birth. The differences noted were an expression of the migration to the Los Angeles metropolitan area and the age structure of the proprietor-manager group.

Nishimoto found that 162 of 254 retail produce workers in his samples reported their income in 1940. Managers had salaries ranging from \$29–\$50 a week, most of them between \$30 and \$35. Full-time clerks received \$15–\$33.50 a week, and two-thirds of them received between \$18 and \$26.<sup>53</sup> These reported earnings correspond rather closely with our data on 1941 income by major occupational groups. (See table 9.) In our sample, nonfarm proprietors reported a median income of \$173 a month, nonfarm managers \$144 a month, and all paid clerical, sales, and kindred workers \$104 a month.

A measure of the stability of retail produce is the length of time which proprietors and managers had spent continuously in that occupation. In November, 1941, 26 per cent of our sample had been in the occupation for ten years or more, but 34 per cent had been proprietors or managers for less than three years, and two-thirds of these for less than two years. This indicates that a core of at least one-quarter of the retail outlets were enterprises of long standing. Since 20 per cent of the unpaid clerks also show a period of ten years or more in that occupation, we may infer that a disproportionate number of the stable enterprises were of the family type. The large proportion of proprietors and managers who had spent less than three years continuously in the occupation suggests a high rate of turnover, since the increase after 1930 in the number of enterprises was rather small. This interpretation coincides with Nishimoto's description of retail produce as a risky enterprise.<sup>54</sup>

About half of the paid clerks had been in retail produce for less than two years, another indication of the importance of this job category as an entering occupation for Nisei. It will be noted in table 10 that clerical and sales work in general was an occupational category undergoing

expansion in the prewar period, and there was undoubtedly a good deal of shifting between various clerical occupations.

There are several indications that retail produce was not so frequently a family enterprise as farming or urban enterprises such as grocery stores, florist shops, and cleaning and dyeing shops. Retail produce had a relatively low proportion of unpaid family workers, less than one-fourth of the clerks, whereas unpaid family farm laborers were more numerous than paid farm laborers, and almost half of the sales clerks in shops other than retail produce were unpaid family workers. This generalization is also borne out by the age and nativity of proprietors.



Losses incurred by farmers are discussed in detail in chapter v. We shall comment here only upon the losses of wholesale and retail produce dealers. Upon the outbreak of war the activities of wholesale produce houses owned by aliens were drastically curtailed. There ensued a large amount of company reorganization, especially in regard to the symbols of control and ownership. For Issei who were put in detention camps, the produce house was either closed or Nisei took over actual control. When the Issei were not detained, they continued in control of the businesses, although legally the ownership was transferred to Nisei. Of nine commission houses for which we have details, two were closed by security agencies upon the outbreak of war, and two others closed a little later. In four firms Issei interests were transferred, ostensibly by purchase, to Nisei, and in one the controlling stock was sold to non-Japanese. This firm actually survived the Evacuation with some continuation of Japanese American interest. The other produce houses were liquidated; equipment was sold piecemeal by the owners or, after the Evacuation, by the Market or a bank acting as agent. The Alien Property Custodian took part in the disposition of some of the equipment or leaseholds, although the role of this office has not been clearly established. Some leaseholds were sold by Japanese Americans before Evacuation was announced, but after the announcement Japanese Americans surrendered them to the Market. Complete liquidation of some Japanese American firms, involving such details as the return of bonds, was not completed until 1946.

Losses due to the Evacuation fell under three main headings: (1) equipment, (2) leasehold and goodwill, and (3) accounts receivable and advances to growers. In reporting our findings on losses of wholesale produce firms, it should be made clear that the internal controls we



claim for our Loss Survey data were not so rigorously followed, and that the number of cases is so small that generalizations are difficult. Furthermore, detailed reporting of cases from such a small universe would make it possible to identify some companies and we do not wish to intrude on the anonymity of our cases. Ten produce firms reported losses ranging from \$8,800 to \$160,000, with a median of \$70,000. The heaviest losses were taken in accounts receivable and advances to growers. Eleven firms reported losses in this category ranging from \$2,000 to \$150,000, with a median of \$4,500. Only eight firms reported separately losses on leaseholds and goodwill, and for these the range was \$3,000–\$50,000, with a median of \$11,000. Finally, nine firms reported separately their equipment losses, ranging from \$2,000 to \$16,000, with a median of \$12,500.

The peculiarities of the vertical organization of the produce business, in which the wholesaler occupied the key position, was responsible for a substantial part of his losses. The customers of Japanese American wholesalers had 30–90 days credit. Most of them were Japanese American retailers who were in very difficult financial circumstances. The weak power position of Japanese Americans at this time made it difficult for them to exert pressure on their *hakujin* retailers, some of whom were not above deliberately exploiting the situation. The practice of making advances to growers also increased the vulnerability of wholesalers, because most of the growers were Japanese Americans, and Caucasian growers could exploit the situation in the same way as *hakujin* retailers. One firm, which had made loans to sixty-three Japanese American growers in 1941, lost on thirty crop loans nearly 40 per cent of the total amount loaned. The same firm made loans to twelve non-Japanese growers and reported losses on six loans, or 55 per cent of the amount advanced. Commission houses were forced by the legal structure of the business to meet their obligations, and had posted bond with the state enforcement agency to insure payment to growers.

Much less can be said regarding the direct impact of the war on produce retailers. Our findings in this respect are limited and are included in the analysis of entrepreneurial losses in chapter v. Sources of supply were somewhat disrupted on the outbreak of war, with the temporary closing of some wholesale houses, and undoubtedly ethnic resentment reduced the patronage of some Japanese American retailers. It is improbable, however, that the latter effect was sufficiently great to have caused the liquidation of many Japanese American retailers had the Evacuation not intervened. We have already noted that produce

retailers were not highly capitalized. Owing to the high turnover, inventory losses were negligible, so that the main losses were derived from sacrifice sales of equipment and the surrender of leaseholds.



In order to estimate the effect of the Evacuation on the retail market, we attempted to secure measures of variation in price and amount of produce reaching the market for the years before and after the outbreak of war. An analysis of fluctuations in a series of crops in which Japanese Americans dominated local production is suggestive in a number of instances, but taken as a whole it is by no means conclusive. In order to evaluate the yearly variations it would be necessary to make a complete analysis of the variables affecting production and price, such as weather and labor. Measures would also be needed of the effects of the impact of war apart from the Evacuation and including price control and manipulations of the market. Time could not be spared to explore this matter fully, because its relationship to the whole study, though interesting, is tangential. We suggest, however, that the topic is worthy of research and should include a detailed analysis of specific crops, with especially intensive study of fluctuations in price and marketing at the time of the Evacuation. We present here some indicative findings that provide at least one step in the kind of analysis that ought to be carried out.

In the following analysis, we shall consider 1941 as the base year because, except for December, Japanese Americans played their full and normal part in the agriculture and produce industries, and by that year production and prices had recovered completely from the depression.

In the early months of 1942 Japanese Americans planted some crops and harvested and marketed many others, so that annual figures for production, marketing, and prices for 1942 do not show the full effect of the Evacuation. Shifts in crops could not be made by the new farm operators until after harvesting the crops already planted, and average prices for the year were reduced somewhat by the hurried marketing of immature crops by Japanese Americans before Evacuation. Nevertheless, total unloads in the Los Angeles wholesale produce markets in 1942 were 10,491 carlots, or 12.3 per cent less than in 1941; unloads from the local market area, which normally supplied most of the truck produce, were 7,751 carlots, or 19.2 per cent under the 1941 amount. At the same time, total gross receipts of the market (wholesale prices)

TABLE 23  
CHANGES IN VOLUME AND PRICES OF IMPORTANT COMMODITIES, LOS ANGELES  
WHOLESALE PRODUCE MARKETS, 1941-1942

Commodities in order of importance of total unloads, 1941 <sup>a</sup>	Volume in 1942, percentage of 1941 volume	Per carlot value in 1942, percentage of 1941 value
Potatoes	94	196
Tomatoes	83	123
<i>Celery</i> <sup>b</sup>	62	200
<i>Lettuce</i>	61 <sup>c</sup>	192
Oranges	102	130
Bananas	65	107
Apples	99	139
<i>Carrots</i>	77 <sup>c</sup>	212
<i>Cabbage</i>	72 <sup>c</sup>	133
Peaches	113	151
Cantaloupes	62	200
Grapefruit	102	129
Watermelons	83	179
<i>Cauliflower</i>	79 <sup>c</sup>	147
Dry onions	105	87
Grapes	75	200
Corn	83	131
<i>Snap beans</i>	85	143
<i>Spinach</i>	81	177
<i>Peas</i>	58 <sup>c</sup>	141
<i>Strawberries</i>	53	157
<i>Soft squash</i>	97 <sup>c</sup>	133
Lemons	108	127
Asparagus	81	127
Sweet potatoes	102	149
<i>Beets</i>	78 <sup>c</sup>	142
<i>Turnips</i>	93 <sup>c</sup>	Not available
Avocados	111	100
Pears	118	137
<i>Romaine</i>	61 <sup>c</sup>	Not available
<i>Peppers</i>	93	162
<i>Cucumbers</i>	50 <sup>c</sup>	150

Source: Computed from Federal-State Market News, *Annual Unload Summary, Los Angeles, 1941 and 1942*, and *Los Angeles Wholesale Market Prices, Fruits and Vegetables, 1942*.

<sup>a</sup> All commodities having total unloads in Los Angeles markets of more than 500 carlots.


<sup>b</sup> Italics indicate crops of which 75 per cent or more of California production was by Japanese Americans in 1941, or of which 75 per cent or more of Los Angeles County production was by Japanese Americans in 1941. Percentage of production by Japanese Americans based on estimates by U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and Los Angeles County Agricultural Commission. See Tolan Committee Report, pp. 127-129.

<sup>c</sup> Volume derived from five Southern California counties only. The relative importance of local products in the total volume for these commodities in 1941 is as follows: lettuce 15 per cent, carrots 80 per cent, cabbage 95 per cent, cauliflower 90 per cent, peas 9 per cent, soft squash 41 per cent, beets 100 per cent, turnips 99 per cent, romaine 100 per cent, cucumbers 61 per cent.

were \$20,000,000 greater in 1942 than in 1941, a rise of 29.2 per cent; and the average carlot value of all produce handled rose by 47.5 per cent.<sup>55</sup> Truck crops in 1942 gained 43 per cent in value over 1941, and rose again by 51 per cent in 1943, these gains being the greatest for any type of agriculture in the county.<sup>56</sup>

Table 23 lists the important commodities in the Los Angeles wholesale produce market and shows the volume and price changes between 1941 and 1942. Of the 32 commodities, 15 were grown principally by Japanese Americans, at least in the local area. In 3 items—summer squash, turnips, and peppers—there was relatively little change in the supply, but supplies of the other 12 commodities dropped by 15–47 per cent. Of the 17 commodities for which Japanese Americans were less important in production, supplies of 7 dropped 15 per cent or more, but in no instance by more than 38 per cent. Seven of 13 commodities that had increases of 50 per cent or more in their prices per carlot had been produced primarily by Japanese Americans.

Figure 13 shows annual changes in production, distribution, and price of selected commodities for 1940–1943, with 1941 as the base year for each. Some 75 per cent or more of local production of these commodities was by Japanese Americans, except for potatoes and winter squash. The latter are included for comparison and were among the few truck crops of which Japanese Americans produced 10 per cent or less. Acreage bearing declined in several commodities in 1942, but recovered at least partially by 1943. Of the crops grown previously by Japanese Americans, snap-bean acreage remained fairly constant; increased acreages were planted to spinach and cucumbers for processing. Other increases were presumably due to shifting to crops that required less hand labor. Comparison on figure 13 of the lines for acreage bearing and for production indicates that with most crops the yield per acre fell, though we cannot say to what extent this was due to weather or other factors that would have affected any farmers, and to what extent it was due to the lesser skill of new operators and a more serious labor shortage after the evacuation of Japanese Americans. Exceptions to the lower yield per acre in 1942 and 1943 were spinach (for processing), lettuce, cauliflower, and carrots. Not only did local production fall below 1941 levels, but a smaller proportion of it was distributed through the wholesale produce markets. This can be noted by comparing the lines for production and unloads. For spinach and cucumbers this is clearly due to growing for processors, but in other crops it must be attributed to a combination of circumstances: higher prices available for shipment to



The five counties in Los Angeles local produce market area are: Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside (except Coachella Valley), San Bernardino, Ventura. See Table 21 for the estimated proportion of total production by Japanese American farmers and for the proportion of total market unloads from the local area.




Fig. 13. Changes in production and distribution of selected commodities, 1940-1943, five counties in Los Angeles local produce market area.

SOURCE: Acreage bearing and production from *Southern California Crops*, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1940-1943. Unloads and per carlot value from Federal-State Market News Service, *Annual Unload Summary*, Los Angeles and *Wholesale Market Prices at Los Angeles, Fruits and Vegetables*, 1940-1943.

more distant markets, and direct sale to processors and chain-store retailers. Finally, note that all prices rose sharply, notwithstanding price control on some commodities. The data on potatoes and winter squash, of which Japanese Americans grew relatively little before the war, suggest that land previously used for other truck crops was shifted to these crops and that their production was relatively efficient, but that the supply going to the local market increased very little and prices rose as much as for other commodities.

In summary, then, the data suggest that as a result of the Evacuation of Japanese Americans: (1) production of truck crops declined somewhat in Southern California, both in acreage and in yield per acre; (2) production tended to shift from crops requiring much hand labor to those requiring less labor; (3) the new operators, who were often shipping and processing companies or were financed by such companies, delivered less of their produce to the local wholesale markets; (4) wholesale prices for truck produce advanced even more than for other commodities.



In 1944 a study by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics predicted that postwar farm holdings by Japanese Americans would approximate one-quarter of prewar holdings and that these would be almost entirely of land owned by Japanese Americans.<sup>57</sup> From this point of vantage, although full documentation is lacking (for which we must wait until the Census of 1950), the prediction seems to have been a shrewd one. An analysis of the sources of supply of one of the largest postwar Japanese American produce houses indicates that the tenure of Japanese American growers is far different from that in the prewar period. A much higher proportion of growers operating in 1947 were working their own land. Of 175 Japanese American growers supplying this house, 60 per cent were owners, compared with 25 per cent of all Japanese American farmers in California in 1940. Of 30 Japanese American growers in Los Angeles County, 30 per cent were owners in 1947, compared with 7.5 per cent in 1940. It is clear that land ownership was the major determinant in enabling farmers to reënter agriculture, and most of these were probably prewar owners who had been able to retain their property.

Relatively few farm families replaced Japanese American truck farm operators. Much of the land was consolidated into larger parcels under the control of marketing and processing agencies that set up corporations for this purpose and turned the actual farming over to managers.<sup>58</sup>

Any attempt of Japanese Americans to reestablish themselves in Los Angeles County was confronted with drastic changes in land use which occurred during the war years and which were anticipated in part by the characteristics of prewar tenure. Much fertile land, formerly leased for intensive cultivation, was subdivided for real-estate developments or became the sites of manufactories. As a consequence of the turning of land to nonagricultural purposes, the proportion of total produce unloads in the Los Angeles wholesale markets derived from the local area decreased from 48.0 per cent in 1940 to 37.7 per cent in 1945 and to 34.1 per cent in 1947.<sup>80</sup> Although the local area includes five counties in Southern California, the greater part of the decrease was in Los Angeles County. The amount of this decline may be somewhat exaggerated, however, in that direct purchases from farmers by retailers, which developed during the war, are not included in market unloads.

Comparison of the Census of Agriculture data for 1940 and 1945<sup>80</sup> for townships in which Japanese American farms were concentrated before the war indicates the extent of the changes in land use. In 1940, 41 per cent of Japanese American farms in Los Angeles County were in Inglewood and Compton townships (see fig. 12), and they comprised about half of the farms in each township. Between 1940 and 1945 the acreage in farms decreased in both townships as a result of subdivision. The number of farms decreased by more than 40 per cent, and average size increased by more than 50 per cent, reflecting consolidation of the smaller farms.

In Downey and El Monte townships, which together had 19 per cent of Japanese American farms in 1940, the effects of residential subdivision were not so important. However, farm consolidation took place. Average size increased 32 per cent in Downey and 10 per cent in El Monte, but in both townships interpretation is obscured by the development of small homesteads and part-time vegetable gardening in connection with the war food program.

Although less than 5 per cent of Japanese American farms were in Venice township in 1940, they made up more than three-quarters of all the farms there, and intensive cultivation and crop specialization made the farms of the township important. Essentially urban land was kept in agricultural use only because its extreme fertility could be exploited in crops with a high monetary return, especially celery. In this township, little change in total farm acreage took place between 1940 and 1945, but the number of farms decreased from 92 to 35, and the average size increased from 32.7 to 88.2 acres.



These changed conditions of land use in townships where Japanese American farms had been concentrated made it impossible for Japanese American farmers returning to the Los Angeles area to secure control of enough land to reconstruct the prewar base for the produce industry.

In a period of high farm profits and inflated land values it has been very difficult for the Japanese Americans to reestablish themselves in agriculture. As in all other forms of enterprise, it would have been impossible for them to reenter at the same level even if their resources had not been impaired by the Evacuation. Their relative status was damaged by the fact that the inflation occurred at a time when it was almost impossible for them to manipulate their financial reserves.

Nisei land holdings were imperiled by the selective enforcement of the California Alien Land Law. By amendment in 1943 and again in 1945,<sup>61</sup> the Legislature increased the vulnerability of Nisei who had acquired their land with the aid of Issei. The revised law was much easier to enforce and increased the scope of possible actions by eliminating the statute of limitations. The new legislation provided punishment for violation as well as the penalty of escheat. The Attorney General was directed by the State Legislature to prosecute escheat cases actively, and a special fund of \$200,000 was appropriated in 1945 for that purpose. Although a few parcels were escheated without appeal, title to the land was quieted in a number of instances by Nisei owners' paying a sum equal to half the assessed valuation of the property. Between July 1, 1945, and April 1, 1947, the state expended more than \$60,000 in enforcing the Alien Land Law. Of sixteen cases initiated in that period, five were abandoned or were not appealed, and eleven were settled by payments totaling more than \$400,000, divided equally between the state and county treasuries. The cases selected for prosecution were characterized by the size and value of the properties.

The indirect effect of the escheat actions may have been nearly as important as the direct effects. Some persons who feared that their holdings were imperiled were intimidated into making sales, and because the titles were clouded by the Alien Land Law, returns were often smaller than land value. Fearing that the courts would find for the defendant in the Oyama case then on appeal, land-law proponents initiated a Constitutional amendment that would have made the Alien Land Law amendments of 1923 and 1943 part of the State Constitution. The California electorate defeated the proposition in November, 1946. In January, 1948, the U. S. Supreme Court effectively nullified the Alien Land Law by its decision in the Oyama case, and as a consequence

escheat actions in California were terminated. The actions under the Alien Land Law are a classic example of the harassment of this ethnic group by legislative and bureaucratic devices. They are to be viewed as part of the fabric involving such disparate techniques as immigration legislation and discrimination against applicants for licenses to sell alcoholic beverages or to engage in commercial fishing.

The Census of Agriculture in 1950 will provide an interesting base for comparison with prewar status. We can do little more here than to offer our impressions of the extent to which Japanese Americans returned to truck farming in the Los Angeles area. From our findings pertaining to occupational shifts (see chap. ii), we estimate that approximately one-quarter of prewar Japanese American farmers returned to that occupation by 1947, and that almost no shifts occurred from other occupations to farming. The farmers were owners who retained their property; a few were leaseholders. The most successful return was in flower farming and nursery stock; both require specialized skills and in both there was a large unsatisfied demand.



The first Japanese American wholesaler to return to the City Market in 1945 did not remain in business. In March, 1946, several stall operators opened in the City Market, their entry being facilitated by the fact that a number of stalls had remained vacant throughout the war. Possible resistance to the reentry of Japanese American dealers was forestalled by the policy of the Market Board, which set aside a block of vacant stalls for them. By December, 1946, 21 stall operators had become established in the markets, and two commission houses fully controlled by Japanese Americans and two others in which Japanese Americans played an important part were in operation.<sup>28</sup>

By June, 1948, Japanese Americans had made additional progress. (See table 24.) There were 8 Japanese American commission merchants as compared with 29 in 1941, and 31 stall operators as compared with 134 in 1941.<sup>29</sup> In 1948, Japanese American houses made up 5 per cent of the total number of commission merchants, and Japanese American stall operators comprised 25 per cent of all stall operators. It should be noted, however, that there was a sharp reduction in the total number of stall operators after 1941. Although operating costs increased and ceiling prices were imposed, with resulting pressure on the wholesaler, it is unlikely that the reduction in number of stall operators would have been so great if there had been no Evacuation. Persons who tried to replace the Japanese Americans were less familiar with the operations

of the market, and were handicapped by the dislocation of local truck farming. According to an official of the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles, wholesale produce merchants "generally operate larger stores than prewar . . . [and] it seems to be very difficult for a small wholesaler to remain in business."<sup>64</sup>

Not only has the number of stall operators been reduced, but wholesale market operations by farmers have greatly diminished. Since farmers who sold their own produce were rarely permanent stall operators, they were not included in tables 20 and 24. Under wartime regulations the late opening hour made it impossible for small farmers to sell their

TABLE 24  
ETHNIC GROUP MEMBERSHIP OF WHOLESALE PRODUCE MERCHANTS AND  
DEALERS, THREE LOS ANGELES MARKETS, JUNE, 1948

Ethnic group	Commission merchants		Permanent stall operators		Total	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total	157	100 0	120	100 0	277	100 0
Japanese	8	5 1	31	25 9	39	14 1
"American"	108	68 8	77	64 1	185	66 8
Chinese and Korean	41	26 1	12	10 0	53	19 1

SOURCE Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles Letter from Homer A. Harris, secretary-manager, June 9, 1948

produce in the market and return to farming the same day, and the late opening hour was continued by the union contract even after the removal of wartime restrictions. Retailers procured an increasing part of their produce directly from farmers. Chain stores became more important in produce marketing after the Evacuation of the independent Japanese American retailers, and they were in a position to deal directly with the grower. This arrangement may have permanently altered the pattern of produce marketing.

We did not have the field staff to survey the reestablishment of Japanese Americans in retail produce. However, very little of the produce handled by the wholesalers in our sample was going to Japanese American retailers. For instance, of 250 retailers having accounts with one Japanese American commission house early in 1948, only 16 per cent were Japanese Americans. Wholesalers were dealing predominantly with chain stores or shippers. This was far different from the prewar situation, when at least 50 per cent of the volume of most Japanese

American wholesalers went to local independent retailers, most of whom were Japanese Americans.

In 1948, union minimum wage rates for wholesale produce employees were \$66 a week for salesmen, \$63 a week for receiving clerks, \$59 a week for drivers, \$55 a week for other store employees, principally swampers, and \$1.375 an hour for temporary help. These rates were 65-85 per cent higher than the 1941 wage scale. Income reported for 84 postwar workers in our interview sample (table 25) indicates that, as before the war, median incomes of Japanese American employees slightly exceed the minimum union scale.

TABLE 25  
MEDIAN MONTHLY EARNINGS OF WHOLESALE PRODUCE WORKERS, 1947

Position	Number in sample	Median monthly earnings
Proprietors and managers	8	\$317
Salesmen	13	308
Drivers and swampers	38	259
Bookkeepers and cashiers	15	178
Other employees, including field solicitors, receivers, etc.	10	275

SOURCE: Ito Interviews

We were able to secure one measure of the return of individual workers to the wholesale produce industry; the findings are presented in figure 14. Of 306 workers for prewar produce firms in our sample, 76 have returned to wholesale produce in some capacity, as summarized in column I of figure 14. Sixty have entered other occupations and industries, as indicated in column III of figure 14. For the remaining 170 prewar workers we have no postwar occupational data, but we can say with assurance that they were not employed in the produce industry in the Los Angeles area in 1947. Our information on the 1947 occupation does not include enough driver-swampers to justify any conclusion about them. Although we have no information on the 1947 occupation of 71 prewar clerical and sales persons, the occupational distribution of the 44 who did not return to the produce industry (see col. III of figure 14) suggests that those for whom we have no data would also have been found in a wide range of occupations. Prewar proprietors who did not return to produce underwent occupational diversification, but tended to become established in entrepreneurial situations. Four became contract gardeners, one a restaurant proprietor, and two retail produce proprietors.



Columns 1 and 11 of figure 14 indicate that of 22 postwar wholesale produce proprietors in our interview sample 13 had been prewar produce proprietors, 6 prewar produce salesmen, 1 a department manager in a produce house, and 1 a driver-swamper. Only 1 postwar proprietor had been occupied in a field other than wholesale produce before the war. Of 47 postwar clerical and sales workers in produce, 31 had the same occupation before the war, 5 had been prewar driver-swampers, 2 wholesale produce proprietors or managers, 2 had been in clerical occupations outside of wholesale produce, 3 had been farm or nursery operators, and 4 had not been in the labor force. Japanese Americans have been in great demand as salesmen and department managers in non-Japanese houses since their return to Los Angeles, but some qualified individuals have refused this opportunity, preferring to wait until changes in the general economic situation make it possible for them to acquire control of a commission house. This is congruent with the entrepreneurial aspirations of Japanese Americans. Of 30 postwar driver-swampers, 10 had been in the same occupation before the war, 3 had been prewar salesmen, and 2 had been managers in wholesale produce, 4 had not been employed before the war, and 11 had worked in some other industry, 6 of them as farm or nursery operators, 3 as clerical or sales workers, and 2 as operatives. Almost all driver-swampers were employed by Japanese American firms both before and after the war.

Column 11, figure 14, shows that most of the postwar produce workers who were not in the industry before the war were young persons who had not been in the 1941 labor force or had been prewar farm and nursery operators. For 31 postwar workers the 1941 occupation was unknown.

Although 76 of the 306 workers for prewar produce firms in our sample had returned to wholesale produce, this should not be interpreted as the rate of return. Our sample is representative of postwar firms and prewar commission houses, but not of the more numerous prewar yard dealers. Hence, workers for prewar yard dealers appear in figure 14 incidental to their postwar occupation in produce. We estimate that the total number of Japanese Americans working in wholesale produce in mid-1948 was between 350 and 400, or slightly more than one-third the number working in the industry in 1941. Our sample of postwar firms shows that about 60 per cent of the postwar workers had been in produce before the war, so that the rate of return may be estimated at about one-fifth. In December, 1946, about 150 Japanese Americans were engaged in wholesale produce,<sup>8</sup> so that our estimate for 1948 indicates a doubling in a period of a year and a half.

In summary, then, it appears that, although Japanese Americans have made some headway in reestablishing themselves in retail and wholesale produce, the tightly knit organization and the continuity of the flow of produce from grower to wholesaler to retailer that characterized prewar marketing has not been reconstructed.

From an ethnic point of view, Japanese American wholesalers seem to be again closely associated with Japanese American farmers, although the dependent prewar relationship of the latter has not persisted. Relatively few independent retail outlets are available to wholesalers, and a larger part of their total business is with shippers and grocery chains. Because of their large buying power, however, both of these are capable of dealing directly with farmers. This organizational change was greatly accelerated by the Evacuation; it is expressed most clearly in the sharp reduction in the number of yard dealers noted above. We may conjecture that wholesalers will be under increasing pressure and that, as a long-term trend, the proportion of business handled by the middleman will decline.

## CHAPTER IV

### CONTRACT GARDENING

CONTRACT GARDENING has been one of the distinctive occupations for Japanese Americans and has utilized a substantial part of the labor force, especially in Southern California. Despite this fact, little or nothing has been written about it, and not even the substantial monographs by Ichihashi and Mears<sup>1</sup> mention the occupation. In the obscure and unpublished literature, casual reference is sometimes made to contract gardening as an aspect of domestic service, but there is no recognition of its importance to the ethnic group.

To the best of our knowledge, the occupation developed rapidly in the 1920's. The effects of the revision of the California Alien Land Law with its consequent displacement of agricultural workers was reinforced by the agricultural depression. Concurrently, the building boom of the 'twenties, especially in the Los Angeles metropolitan area, created an unprecedented demand for landscaping. The recently displaced agricultural laborers became laborers for landscape contractors; because only a small capital was required, they soon undertook contracting for themselves. There was steady immigration of Hawaiian Nisei, some of whom had worked on estates in the Islands and who probably participated in the development of the occupation. Although the gardens and lawns that were laid out had little direct Japanese cultural influence, Japanese horticultural practice undoubtedly had its effect. Moreover, the migrants from southern Japan and Hawaii found in Southern California a climate with which they were familiar, and one peculiarly adapted to gardening. Here vegetation grows rapidly and there is not the latent period to which the Caucasian migrants from the Midwest and East were accustomed. Among the Caucasian migrants were many retired persons too old or unwilling to assume full responsibility for their gardens. These conditions made almost inevitable the development of something like maintenance gardening by contract, in which the skills and reputation of Japanese Americans could be exploited.

Another factor contributing to the development of contract gardening was the earlier entrance of Japanese Americans into greenhouse and nursery operation. We may note in passing that the Japanese rice culture, involving the handling of seedlings, was a suitable background for this type of work. The nurserymen raised bedding plants for truck farmers, and small trees, shrubs, and flower seedlings, which were sold



both wholesale and retail to landscape contractors, gardeners, and householders. Contract gardeners established close relationships with the nurserymen, who often referred prospective jobs to their friends and if necessary supplied them with credit. We may point out that few householders in the area now raise plants from seed, but benefit from the mass production of seedlings and hybrids by nurserymen.

As contract gardening became stabilized, an orderly routine emerged. For a specified monthly fee of \$10 to \$30, the gardener would make three visits a week, watering, cutting lawns and hedges, planting and caring for flowers, and disposing of the trimmings. The purchase of materials, fertilizer, and plants was defrayed by the householder, sometimes with a small commission to the gardener. By arranging their routes so that two or three yards in the same block could be serviced at the same time, the gardeners were able to increase their efficiency and take care of ten to fifteen residences. Their monthly earnings in 1941 ranged from little more than \$100 per month for inexperienced workers, who had not yet built up a clientele, to \$300 for established and skillful workers. Thus small middle-class households were able to enjoy the kind of service thought of as appropriate for large estates, and maintenance gardening on contract developed rapidly into an ethnic monopoly.

Contract gardeners, however, took pains to make it clear to their employers that they were not servants. A gardener felt obliged to accept a certain amount of direction, but too positive or detailed directions were ignored or resulted in the gardener's taking his leave. Persons who were unduly aggressive with their employees might find themselves unable to secure garden maintenance from Japanese Americans. Such conflict between employer and employee was in the clearest sense culture conflict. Each party made a separate definition of the situation, the employer in terms of authority deriving from his hiring of service, the gardener from a superior knowledge and the firm belief that his dignity could be preserved only if the job were responsible. Relevance to the concept of "face" is apparent.

Although a few gardening contractors hired helpers, it was not long before these in turn quit the role of apprentice. The wish for status and independence counted heavily in the development of contract gardening as a highly individualistic kind of enterprise, and there were no technological factors to make groups of workers more efficient.

A contract gardener required rather small financial resources. He needed a pickup truck, which could be bought second hand for a small sum; he also needed lawn mowers, hose, and gardening tools. His total

investment did not have to exceed \$300, and the average was probably around \$400. Established routes had a value in goodwill, and gardeners who did not wish to go through the process of establishing a clientele could sometimes purchase a route for a few hundred dollars.

By 1928 more than 1,300 gardeners in the Los Angeles area were listed in the Japanese *Southern California Telephone and Business Directory*. In 1934 the Japanese Chamber of Commerce estimated 1,500 gardeners,<sup>a</sup> an apparent increase that may be due rather to differences in source and completeness of listing.

The U. S. Census affords a clue to the number of contract gardeners in Los Angeles County. In 1940, 1,708 males were classified as "other specified laborers,"<sup>8</sup> and by inference from the sex and geographical concentration and the notable absence of other workers of Japanese ancestry who might be so classified, we conclude that almost all of them are gardeners. The Census classification of contract gardeners as "laborers" obscures the economic functions of this ethnic group. The Census count, however, coincides closely with our own estimate for 1941 derived from the 20 per cent sample. We estimate that there were more than 1,300 contract gardeners who employed about 200 helpers, more than half of whom were unpaid family workers. In all, we estimate between 1,360 and 1,650 contract gardeners and helpers, with an additional 200 gardeners who worked as caretakers on estates.

Our findings on occupational stability support our opinion that contract gardening is in a real sense a vocation: 40.6 per cent of the sample had been continuously in the occupation for 10 years or more and only 12.3 per cent for less than 2 years. The median length of time in the occupation was 7.9 years, which was about the same as for proprietors, except in produce. The only occupational groups having a longer median tenure were farmers and wholesale produce proprietors. We also found that Nisei who had worked as apprentice helpers for their fathers tended to continue in gardening, and more than one-third of the Nisei gardeners reported their father's occupation in the United States as gardener. From April, 1940, to the outbreak of war, there was an indication that the number of individuals in gardening increased. (See table 10.)

About a fifth of all independent male workers in Los Angeles County in 1941, i.e., those classified as employers or own-account workers, were contract gardeners. Their age distribution was like that of all independent male workers. Less than 30 per cent of the contract gardeners were Nisei and one-fifth were Issei under 45 years of age. Among domestic gardeners, there were relatively few Nisei and one-third were

Issei between 25 and 44 years of age. The younger Issei in domestic gardening probably included a number of persons less highly acculturated or less confident in their use of English and therefore not so well equipped to deal with the general public.

More than half of the Nisei gardeners had at least three years of education in Japan, i.e., could be classified as Kibei. Among other occupational groups the proportion was between one-quarter and one-third, except for paid farm laborers, in which the proportion was 40 per cent. The number of Kibei among gardeners may be attributable to the relatively large number of workers who were Hawaiian-born or of rural origin. In any event, the effect would have been to reinforce the influence of Japanese horticultural practices. We also found that only one-third of the Nisei had graduated from high school in the United States, a proportion somewhat lower than in other occupational groups.

There is evidence of selective migration factors in the nativity of gardeners. More Issei gardeners, compared with all other workers, derived from southwestern Japan and a smaller proportion from the Inland Sea area. The population of gardeners is weighted with migrants, many of whom were born in rural areas and in Hawaii. Only 38 per cent of the Nisei gardeners were born in Los Angeles County, compared with nearly half of all Nisei in the labor force; and 23 per cent of the Nisei gardeners were born in Hawaii, compared with 12 per cent of all Nisei in the labor force.

Although most contract gardeners were in the Los Angeles area, there was also a secondary concentration in the San Francisco Bay area. Locally, there were distinctive ecological concentrations of residences of contract gardeners, of which the most important were Sawtelle, the Olympic area, Hollywood in the Western area, and the Westside. (See fig. 1.) Of the contract gardeners in Los Angeles County, 70 per cent were in these four localities. Almost half of the employed males living in Sawtelle and the Olympic areas, and a quarter of those living in Hollywood and the Westside areas, were contract gardeners. This should be compared with the 10 per cent of all employed males who were contract gardeners. Each of these localities was strategically located near areas of upper middle-class residence.

Centers of residence for gardeners included a number of boarding houses for bachelors. In the 20 per cent sample for 1941, about one-fourth of the Issei and over 40 per cent of the Nisei gardeners were single, widowed, divorced, or separated. The wives of an indeterminate number of the married Issei were in Japan.<sup>4</sup> The boarding houses were

run by Issei and were reminiscent of the agricultural labor camps. In the postwar period there were more boarding houses and they were used by families as well as by single men. In Sawtelle in 1946 there were ten such houses.

One of the clearest and most important trends in the postwar period has been the increased numbers of contract gardeners. Japanese Americans returned to the Los Angeles area to find they had not been replaced by substitute workers in contract gardening. Furthermore, as in the inflation of the 1920's, the economy provided increased opportunities for service work. The Japanese Americans' prewar reputation for horticultural proficiency stereotyped them and made it possible for those who had never done gardening to get contracts. Persons from a wide variety of prewar occupations worked as contract gardeners, and the dollar returns were well above prewar levels. Because many inexperienced Issei and Nisei entered the field, those who had been established in the vocation before the war feared that the reputation of Japanese American gardeners would suffer and that in an attempt to hold their customers, the less skillful workers would cut prices.

The first Japanese Americans to return to the Los Angeles area had the enthusiastic support of the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play, a group of substantial citizens who had concerned themselves during the war with the antidemocratic effects of the Evacuation, particularly as they applied to the personal adjustment of Japanese Americans. Furthermore, many prewar gardeners had corresponded with friendly Caucasians or were able to reestablish a few of their prewar contracts. In the first half of 1945 each gardener thus built his new route around the nucleus of one or two persons who felt a personal responsibility to undo part of the injustice of the Evacuation and therefore actively sought to find employment for gardener friends. In general, however, the gardeners did not systematically attempt to reestablish their prewar contracts, for to do so would have required their working at prewar fees or negotiating a new contract.<sup>5</sup>

As a class exercise in a course in ethnic relations, a complete census was made of the Japanese American population in the Sawtelle area in December, 1946. Full data on population and housing characteristics of 1,061 persons were obtained. Sawtelle was one of the two most important prewar centers of residence for gardeners; our census data therefore provide the basis for a detailed comparison of the postwar situation with prewar conditions. The chief prewar characteristics of Census Tract 143, which contained over three-fourths of the Japanese Ameri-

cans in Sawtelle, is given in another paper.<sup>6</sup> That article also analyzes the attitudes of wartime residents of the area toward the return of the Japanese Americans.

Despite the dense settlement of Sawtelle in 1946, the Japanese American community of 129 residences had some of the ecological characteristics of a semirural area. Vegetables, rabbits, and poultry were raised in the yards, and there were ten nurseries, mostly small and run by part-

TABLE 26  
PREWAR OCCUPATIONS OF GARDENERS LIVING IN SAWTELLE,  
1946

Prewar occupation	Number
Total	294
Farm operators	12
Nursery operators	15
Proprietors, except farm and nursery	29
Clerical and sales workers	17
Craftsmen	3
Operatives	5
Domestic service workers	2
Service workers, except domestic	2
Farm and nursery laborers	9
Gardeners	168
Other laborers	1
Not reported	10
Not in labor force	21

SOURCE Census of Japanese Americans living in Sawtelle, December, 1946

time gardeners and their families. Seven other homes had shops on the same lot, and there was one farm on the edge of the community.

In December, 1946, in Sawtelle there were 388 employed males, of whom 294, or 75.7 per cent, were gardeners. Before the war, according to our 20 per cent sample, approximately 48 per cent of the employed males living in Sawtelle were in gardening. The 294 postwar gardeners are made up of the following classifications: 168 (57.2 per cent) prewar gardeners; 116 (39.4 per cent) other prewar occupations or not working; and 10 (3.4 per cent) prewar occupations unknown. Only 5 persons engaged in other postwar occupations had been gardeners before the war. Workers who entered gardening after the war were drawn from a wide variety of prewar occupations. Of the 95 for whom we have information, as presented in table 26, the largest groups had been pro-

prietors of businesses and farm or nursery operators. Thus 59 per cent of prewar workers entering gardening after the war had operated their own enterprises before the war. The Loss Survey also documents this situation. (See table 15 and figs. 5-7 and the accompanying text.) The displacement of farmers and farm laborers into contract gardening shows a parallel to the movement of the 1920's. In both instances they were uprooted by legalistic devices—the Alien Land Law and the Evacuation. In both instances they were drawn to an area of rapid urban growth, where, however, their agricultural skills were not entirely lost. Of 28 males working in 1946 who had not been in the prewar labor force, 21 were in gardening, 3 were unpaid family workers in shops or on farms, and only 4 had full-time paid nongardening employment. Over half of those new to gardening were Nisei, and more than 40 per cent of all gardeners were Nisei in 1946, as compared with only one-third in 1941.

As expected, persons who had been gardeners before the war and who returned to that occupation derived preponderantly from the Los Angeles area. Indeed, two-thirds of them lived in Sawtelle before the war, and nearly a third lived in the very houses they had occupied in 1941. Postwar gardeners drawn from other prewar occupations were much more widely distributed and only one-quarter of them had lived in Sawtelle in 1941. An additional 40 per cent had resided elsewhere in Los Angeles County, and 30 per cent had lived elsewhere on the West Coast.

The occupational commitment of prewar gardeners to a job distinctive to Southern California may have affected their relocation. A third of the prewar gardeners who returned to Sawtelle came directly from relocation centers. Less than a fifth of persons with other prewar occupations, whether or not they became postwar gardeners, had remained in the relocation centers until coming to Sawtelle. Other conservative factors, such as the proportion of Kibei and young Issei among prewar gardeners, may also have been involved.

Those who entered gardening from other occupations returned to Los Angeles relatively late in the resettlement process. In 1946, 38 per cent came to Los Angeles after they had relocated elsewhere. This suggests that contract gardening was being used as an entering occupation, but there is no evidence of subsequent shifting to other fields. The tendency of the group to pile up in this vocation is indicated by our Sawtelle census, by inference from the Loss Survey, and by observations in West Jefferson. We estimate from these sources that by the end of

1946 there were between 2,100 and 2,900 gardeners in the Los Angeles area, and since that time the number has probably increased.

By December, 1946, unemployment of males in Sawtelle had reached a very low level. Seven persons were completely unemployed and seeking work and fourteen others were working part time as gardeners and seeking additional employment. However, although 58 per cent had experienced no unemployment during 1946, 4 per cent had been unemployed for one to eight weeks and 8 per cent had been unemployed for more than two months. We do not have data on about 30 per cent.

The dollar earnings of gardeners in 1946 were somewhat higher than before the war; but the actual economic situation was far worse, owing to two sets of factors: first, the general inflation, and second, the necessity for Japanese Americans leaving the centers to compete en masse for housing and for household and occupational equipment at a time of extreme scarcity. In 1946 the median income reported by 177 Sawtelle gardeners was \$219 a month. We estimate that this is about \$50 above the prewar median for contract gardeners. Nearly 90 per cent reported incomes between \$150 and \$300 a month, and the distribution was platykurtic. Persons with prewar gardening experience and Nisei, without regard to experience, had higher earnings than Issei newly entering the occupation. The range of earnings for such Issei was \$50 lower—from \$100 to \$250 a month. Nongardeners in Sawtelle reported lower incomes than did the gardeners, and the earnings of Issei nongardeners were substantially below those for Nisei. Only one-third of the 94 nongardeners reported their incomes, however, so that these data are subject to a larger error than for gardeners, 60 per cent of whom reported their incomes.

There may be bias in our income data for gardeners, owing to the fact that we had no reports for 40 per cent of them, but the characteristics of the distribution of incomes reported, with the reliability of which we are satisfied, indicate that the unknown cases would not have drastically modified the range. It was reported in *People in Motion* that incomes of \$400 to \$600 a month were not unusual and that workers were being drawn into gardening because of the exceedingly high returns in gardening at that time.<sup>7</sup> This interpretation seems to us to be too sanguine a view of Japanese American earnings and we find it without foundation. The report may have reflected a myth current at the time of the WRA survey of resettlement in Los Angeles, and the myth may have been effective in conditioning occupational selection. The fact is that except for professionals in health services and persons with suffi-

cient capital to establish substantial enterprises or to exploit the housing shortage, earnings of gardeners compared favorably with those of other workers. Some of the Nisei gardeners could obtain employment in different fields in a period of high demand for labor, but up to 1948 they had not chosen to do so.

At least 30 per cent, and perhaps as many as 50 per cent, of employed Japanese American males in Los Angeles County were engaged in gardening in 1948. This occupational concentration of the ethnic group in a kind of luxury service has the most serious implications. Lacking an accumulation of capital that would allow them to ride out an economic depression, perhaps by the purchase of agricultural land, the population would be highly vulnerable at such a time. Unemployment would be high; they would be ineligible for unemployment insurance because they are "own-account" workers; and the economic base of the Japanese community has become so narrow that it would not be able to assume responsibility for the unemployed. Some of these implications were recognized by members of the Japanese American population,<sup>8</sup> but in a period of inflation the Cassandras were not attended very closely.



## CHAPTER V

### EVACUEE LOSSES

THE TALE of injustices and manipulations to which the evacuees were exposed has been told and the arguments assessed often enough.<sup>1</sup> For our purposes we need only say that a segment of a population was precipitantly taken into custody. As a consequence they suffered damage to their status in the community, their security and self-esteem, their ability to earn, and their economic resources.

The timetable and plan of the Evacuation made large economic losses inevitable. For most of the population only one week elapsed between the notice of their Evacuation date and their actual removal. For some evacuees, particularly at the beginning of the program, as little as 48 hours were allowed for sale, rental, loan, storage, or even gift of real property and possessions. The following illustrates the confusion that hampered the efforts of Japanese Americans to salvage their property.

On Tuesday, February 10, 1942, posters were put up on Terminal Island by Department of Justice order, warning all aliens that the deadline for their departure from the island was the following Monday, February 16. However, on February 11, without warning, a presidential order transferred Terminal Island to the jurisdiction of the Navy, and Secretary Knox instructed Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes, Commandant of the 11th Naval District in San Diego, to notify *all* residents [including citizens] of Terminal Island that their dwellings would be condemned and that they would be evicted within 30 days. This arrangement cancelled the order of the Department of Justice, and on the face of the matter it seemed to constitute a reprieve of eviction sentence. Before a week had passed, the residents of Terminal Island were ordered to be out within 48 hours of notification.<sup>2</sup>

Nearly 2,000 persons had been evacuated from Terminal Island before Assistant Secretary of War McCloy sent Lieutenant General DeWitt a memorandum of recommendations about safeguarding the property of evacuees. The operation was an extemporized one and never provided for the minimal protective facilities. Mr. McCloy wrote, in his memorandum of February 20, 1942, in such generalities as the following:

It will, of course, be necessary that your plans include provision for protection of the property, particularly the physical property, of evacuees. All reasonable measures should be taken through publicity and other means, to encourage evacuees to take steps to protect their own property. Where evacuees are unable to do this prior to the time when it is necessary for them to comply with the exclusion orders, *there is always danger* that unscrupulous persons will take *undue advantage* or that physical property unavoidably left behind will be pillaged by lawless elements. The protection of physical property from theft or other harm is primarily the responsibility of state

and local law-enforcement agencies, and you will doubtless call upon them for the maximum assistance in this connection. Where they are unable to protect physical property left behind in military areas, the responsibility will be yours, to provide reasonable protection, either through the use of troops or through other appropriate measures. The appointment by you of a property custodian and the creation by him of an organization to deal with such property in military areas *may become necessary*.<sup>8</sup>

It was clear by February 19 that the Evacuation would be a mass movement involving all persons of Japanese ancestry, yet General DeWitt's *Final Report* states, "Prior to March 10, the General Staff of the Western Defense Command and Fourth Army had not engaged in any extensive planning or preparation for the program."<sup>9</sup>

Some effects of the lack of coherent planning may be illustrated by reference to a group of thirty Japanese American families<sup>5</sup> who were incorporated as a cooperative, engaged in truck farming on a large tract of leased land near the Southern California coast. Each family operated its share of the land and had its own house, tools, work animals, and trucks. The corporation negotiated the lease on the land and owned a pool of such expensive equipment as tractors. In February, 1942, because of threats by the landowner to evict them and because evacuation of certain spots along the coast had already been ordered, the cooperative decided to move inland. Although voluntary evacuation was officially encouraged, there was at that time no government agency with a program to protect voluntary evacuees in settling their business. The landowner forced each member of the cooperative to sign a waiver of ownership claims on buildings, underground irrigation pipes, and the like, so that all property not readily movable had to be abandoned. About twenty families of the cooperative moved to the Central Valley and leased land in Military Area No. 2, where, according to all indications in early March, they would be permitted to farm throughout the war. Five months later the Army announced that the California portion of Area No. 2 would be evacuated also, and in July the members of the cooperative again lost heavily in liquidating this new investment.

The experience of Masao Hirano was typical of these families. Hirano was a 25-year-old Nisei who operated 55 acres in the coastal site with his elderly father, his mother, and his 15-year-old brother. They employed about twenty-five seasonal workers and had realized a net income of \$2,000 a year over a period of several years. When the cooperative moved, in February, they had to abandon the house, the garage, and the packing shed (estimated at a total value of \$2,300) which they had built on the leased land, their underground pipe and irrigation equip-

ment (valued at \$1,000), a crop of peas they expected to harvest and sell for \$3,000 in a few weeks, less mature crops of tomatoes and beans, and about \$1,300 worth of farm tools and fertilizer which they were unable to sell or to move to the new location. The cooperative sold some of its tractors. The Hiranos took a loss of \$700 in their equity in the equipment and of \$350 in selling their horses. They sold their 1940 pickup and 1936 truck at 25 per cent below Blue Book value, entailing an additional loss of \$300. Household furniture, some tools, and the family passenger car were taken to the new location, the cost of moving was \$300. When Area No. 2 was evacuated in July, the Hiranos were able to store only a part of their household furniture. They lost \$300 on furniture, \$100 on tools, five months of labor, and all their savings (\$500) which they had invested in this new venture. In selling their car they lost \$400. Not including bad debts and insurance losses, their total assets of at least \$10,550 were wiped out. The Hiranos did not have the financial resources to attempt relocation and left the relocation center only when it became mandatory in the fall of 1945. On the basis of noninflated prewar earnings, they would have earned \$6,000 during the time they were in the center.

Thus administrative defects and the general circumstances of the Evacuation made substantial losses inevitable even for persons who were sophisticated in business enterprise. The majority of the population, however, was not equipped to make such adaptations.

Even when voluntary movement was prohibited and the controlled Evacuation was actually under way late in March, 1942, the agencies responsible had inadequate authority and power to provide for the protection of property, and what powers they had were inadequately implemented.

There was a rough division of responsibility between the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco and the Farm Security Agency. The former was charged with problems pertaining to business and domestic and personal property. The latter dealt with farm problems. The FSA had a dual function and a divided responsibility. On March 15, 1942, General DeWitt directed the FSA to administer a program "which will insure continuation of the proper use of agricultural lands voluntarily [*sic*] vacated by enemy aliens and other persons designated by me, and which will insure fair and equitable arrangements between the evacuees and the operators of their property."<sup>8</sup> The operation of the FSA placed continuing production first and the protection of evacuee equity second. Its policies in collections on loans emphasized neither function.<sup>9</sup>

The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco on March 18 was given the power to "freeze" the property of any evacuee in order to "forestall unfair action by unscrupulous creditors . . . and to *minimize* his (the evacuee's) losses in connection with the disposition of his property."<sup>8</sup> The freezing authority was retained in the hands of the Federal Reserve Bank in San Francisco and was never delegated to the field offices; agents were warned not to employ the power as a threat. On no occasion did the Federal Reserve Bank use this instrument in order to prevent panic sales and exploitation.

The FSA was authorized on March 15 to make, service, and collect loans, to attempt to find substitute operators, and to provide necessary farm management and advice. Despite this, the following three weeks were a period of hard bargains and manipulation of the buyer's market. Freezing power was extended to the FSA on April 7, but only once did it use its freezing authority.

Mr. Malcolm E. Pitts, who was associated with the FSA and later was assistant director of WRA, vividly demonstrated that confusion among evacuees had ample precedent in administrative circles. Apparently the Army's operations were handled as military operations, and civilian agencies were not trusted with sufficient information to make plans in advance. His comment was as follows:

These people did not know that they were going, when their community was tied up, until midnight, which was the beginning of a five-day period. They were frozen in that area and could not go out.

Now, between the middle of January [*sic*] and the end of June, when the evacuation was complete they knew their area was going to be frozen sometime, but they didn't know exactly when their particular area would be frozen.

Take, for instance, the case of the little strip of land between Tacoma and Seattle, about 40 miles. That was broken into five different areas. A man who lived in or around Auburn could go neither to Tacoma or Seattle to complete his business affairs. It was just frozen, and he had to be ready to move five days after that with all his business affairs taken care of, and he had to continue to take care of his farm or it was considered an act of sabotage if he didn't.

Finally the plans were all ready to go. Just from my own experience with the Farm Security Administration there, we had crews that we had to bounce back and forth all over that area during the eleven-week period. We did not know from the Army until the night before what area was to be closed that night. Although we were working close in and presumably we were on the inside. We had to run special planes in order to get our crews up there to be within the area ready for interviews with the people to help them.<sup>9</sup>

Both the FSA and the FRB operations were hampered by severe limitations on the agencies' initiative, by the cumbersome machinery for

which there was no precedent, and by concern for the reactions of the antagonistic West Coast press. At all times the evacuees were encouraged to make private arrangements for disposal and storage of property, even though many of them were ill equipped to do so. All business transactions were conducted in an abnormal market. Outright criminal practices, such as fraud, confidence rackets, and the impersonation of police, were rampant. The law-enforcement agencies were regarded with doubt and fear by Japanese Americans. Again, let us quote Mr. Pitts:

There were a lot of people who didn't come to the Government. One particular case had to go down and investigate 200 acres of strawberries the latter part of April. The strawberries were just about ready to pick. The people were coming in from all over the country on a "get rich quick" proposition. This man had been offered \$1,500 for his equity in his strawberries. I didn't know a great deal about strawberries, so I asked for an agronomist to come down to study the thing. He drew a farm plan rather quickly. His estimate was the gross return from those strawberries over that season would be approximately \$67,000. His estimate of the expense was it would be about \$39,000 for the labor, fertilizer and what have you. Well, finally, we settled by the man giving \$15,000 instead of \$1,500.

But I merely cite that one case, one I happened to know about, that came to the attention of the Government, where we feel that an equitable adjustment was made.

No doubt hundreds of them where the people through fright settled at the last moment for a pittance or a song. How much was involved I haven't the slightest idea.<sup>10</sup>

No adequate storage facilities to protect the population from the exploitation of a buyer's market were provided. At the time of registration, which preceded actual removal by one or two days, evacuees were informed that they might take only such hand baggage as they could carry with them to the assembly centers, and were informed of the facilities of government warehouses. If he stored his property in the government warehouse, the evacuee signed a statement that read, " . . . no liability or responsibility shall be assumed by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco for any act or omission in connection with its disposition. It is understood that no insurance will be provided on this property." The only suggestion of responsibility was the statement at the bottom of the personal property inventory list: "If the property herein claimed to have been delivered, and which actually was delivered, is lost, damaged, or destroyed *as the result of negligence* while it is in the possession or custody of the United States, or of any agency acting for it, the Congress of the United States will be *asked* to take appropriate action for the benefit of owners."<sup>11</sup> In regard to motor vehicles, evacuees were informed, "Evacuees will not be permitted to take their motor vehicles to reception

centers. No assurance whatever can be given that evacuees will be enabled at some future time to have the motor vehicles now owned by them returned for their individual use." If unable privately to dispose of the vehicle, the evacuee might ". . . deliver his motor vehicle to Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, as Fiscal Agent of the United States, for storage at owner's risk, without insurance; which storage will, in most instances be in open areas . . . and must of necessity be of a character which will subject motor vehicles to a more or less rapid deterioration."<sup>12</sup>

The testimony of Mr. Dillon Myer, who was director of WRA, conveys the manner and consequences of the handling of evacuee property.

MR. MYER. . . . The Federal Reserve Bank was designated to deal with the urban group and were given authority to provide assistance in the disposition, and assistance and storage and so on. *However, the people generally were urged to take care of their own goods and their own affairs because of the large problem involved.*

About ten per cent—as nearly as we can figure—of the folks did take advantage of the storage facilities for their personal property and the rest of them stored their goods in churches and schoolhouses or in individual homes or left them in storage. A small portion of it was properly guarded and a very great deal of it was vandalized.

MR. GWYNNE. Was what?

MR. MYER. Vandalized. People broke in and opened trunks and tore them apart and stole washing machines and sewing machines and anything they could dispose of quickly.

MR. GWYNNE. Who did that?

MR. MYER. We would like to know.

MR. GWYNNE. Was no attempt made by local authorities to maintain order?

MR. MYER. I think there were some attempts made, but so far as I know no one was ever prosecuted for such actions. I have here three or four pictures which will give you an idea of the type of pattern. This [indicating] is one group where they broke in and this is another group. Here [indicating] they broke in where 800 families had their goods stored. I saw that with my own eyes a short time ago.

MR. GWYNNE. Was that vandalism the result of mob action?

MR. MYER. No, generally speaking, it was not mob action. It was simply action on the part of individuals. In some cases they suspected the individuals who were custodians but were unable to prove it. In another case individuals broke in through skylights, and other ways, in the middle of the night. So far as I know there was no mob action in connection with this type of vandalism. However, there was vandalism of a mob type such as desecrating a cemetery but not any of this type that I know of.<sup>13</sup>

These generalities may be made tangible by reference to our file of case histories. Experiences like that of Hideo Nakamura were not uncommon. Nakamura and his wife and two hired hands farmed 7.5 acres of leased land near Los Angeles. They had lived on this same tract for nine years, and had built a house and a barn. During the week between

receiving notice and their actual removal, they sold their 1934 Chrysler sedan for \$50 and their 1934 GMC one-and-a-half-ton truck for \$40, a loss of \$130 on 1942 wholesale Blue Book values. Unable to sell or to get a substitute operator, they abandoned the half-mature crops. They boarded up the buildings in which they stored household furniture, farm equipment, seeds, and fertilizer. The lease on the land expired, and when they returned after three and a half years in a relocation center, all their possessions, even the buildings, had been removed. They are unable to assign dollar values to these losses, and have no records to substantiate their claims



Evacuee property interests were protected somewhat better under WRA policy, although by the time the agency was activated in the summer of 1942 a great deal of irretrievable damage had already been done. WRA services included legal advice (but not court representation), assistance in the negotiation of leases, and intermediary activities in financial arrangements. The evidence is that the facilities were infrequently used, the evacuees had little confidence in the organization, and the WRA deliberately limited its functions in the interests of economy and public relations.

Mr. Myer's testimony is illuminating on this point.

... in August 1942 the War Relocation Authority took over the responsibility over property from the Farm Security and from the Federal Reserve Board. We established a chain of warehouses extending all the way from Los Angeles to Seattle. I think we had eight or ten of those and because of the vandalism and the problem that was developing, we almost immediately offered the opportunity for storage to everybody who wanted to have their personal property put into government warehouses, and after a trial run we paid for the transportation into the warehouses and many people took advantage of that offer. We maintained those warehouses for personal property throughout the period and they were finally liquidated, the last one, in the first half of 1946.

We also provided a service, peculiarly a service of assisting people in collecting funds, making releases on property, making new releases on property and even sales on property under power of attorney when requested. *We managed no property at all. We refused to provide management service.* We served as agents like for the evacuees who could not return to the coast during this period. I do not remember the exact percentage but a fair percentage of the evacuees did take advantage and we tried to take care of their property during that period, and I think on the whole a good job was done, as good as possible considering that we were rather late in getting under way, and, as I say, a good many losses happened as a result of confusion and the time it took to get organized during the period January, February and March.<sup>14</sup>

From this point of vantage the observer cannot concur in Mr. Myer's evaluation. Because he did not know what percentage of the population needed legal advice and assistance, the proportion of the population served would be meaningless even if he did recall "the exact percentage." It is more to the point that actual management services were needed and these were "refused." Mr. Pitts recounted a case that illustrates the need for more effective techniques of control.

One other instance came within my purview while I was with the War Relocation Authority. It was a nurseryman in Los Angeles who came to us after he had been in the center two and a half years. He said, "I haven't got any money from agent in Los Angeles from my nursery. Is there something your office can do for us?" We tried to find out what the story was and we finally got it back—we found that he had given power of attorney to an agent to handle the business for him. And when we examined the power of attorney, he had literally signed away everything he has loose, somewhere in the neighborhood of \$28,000 or \$30,000 worth of stuff. The fellow had sold it out and had not sent him a dime. There was no recourse under the power of attorney.

There were lots of cases of that kind where he thought he was taking care of himself and he actually was not.<sup>15</sup>

The final report of the WRA gives a superficial and astigmatic view of the operations of the legal property officers.

One of the most difficult and time-consuming problems presented to the project attorneys and the evacuee property officers arose out of the hurried and loose arrangements made by the evacuees for the custody or management of their West Coast property. Personal property unaccountably disappeared; managers failed to account, or mulcted the owners in various ways; tenants failed to pay rent, converted property to their own use, and committed waste. Much correspondence with the legal office in San Francisco and with West Coast property offices was required, and occasionally direct negotiations were undertaken, with varying degrees of success. While in general the evacuees were reluctant to institute legal action, there were a number of suits brought, involving substantial income properties. In these cases, as in cases involving divorces, probate, collections, escheat under alien land laws, and claims against evacuees, the project attorneys assisted the evacuees in obtaining private counsel and thereafter often acted in a liaison capacity between the evacuees and their attorneys.<sup>16</sup>

The reader who depends on this official document might conclude that the evacuees willfully and carelessly failed to protect their interests, that the property that "unaccountably disappeared" did so as acts of God, and that within these limits the interests and property of the evacuees were moderately well protected by an overburdened staff. There is no doubt that the staff was burdened. There is also no doubt that it was wholly inadequate and that the directives under which it worked



frustrated effective activity. The situation, so far as the evacuees were concerned, was desperate; the meliorative facilities and tactics were casual. These facts would be clearly demonstrated if, instead of being given generalities that are in effect misleading, we were told how often "direct negotiations were undertaken," on what kinds of cases, and with what "degrees of success." We could at least be told how many "suits were brought," involving how many "substantial income properties," against whom they were brought, and with what success. We should be told what kind of cases and how many cases were not negotiated or brought to suit and for what reasons. Then we should have an understanding of the slender protection given to evacuee property as well as of the routine operations of an office.

The purpose of this review has been to determine to what extent the agencies responsible for the Evacuation and for the management of the evacuees were prepared to manage evacuee property. One is impressed by the *laissez-faire* notions that conditioned the relationship of the evacuee to his worldly goods, despite the fact that his power to act effectively in the manipulation of those goods was destroyed. The evacuee, of course, could not return to the location of his property in order to negotiate, nor was he free to go to storage places to see what damage had been committed by burglars or vandals.



At a time of high wages and full employment, workers were removed from the labor market and, when permitted to leave the centers, were often employed at levels far below their skills and under such transient conditions that a disproportionate part of their earnings were spent on subsistence. The token payments of \$12-\$19 a month for those working in the centers cannot be rationalized by analogy with military service. No military personnel were paid at such a low rate, and military personnel had pensions, benefits, opportunity for advancement, and many symbolic rewards and satisfactions unavailable to the evacuees. The compensation of evacuee workers was analogous to that in prisons, and no useful purpose is served by obscuring the fact. Center earnings, perquisites, and living facilities cannot be used to cancel out normal civilian earnings, but are to be regarded as an amelioration of the punishment of incarceration and an incentive device for captive labor.

It may be worth pointing out in passing that if Americans of Japanese ancestry suffered great losses in wages, the nation suffered real losses in productivity that reduced its war potential.

Mere release from the camps did not and could not reinstate family enterprises in their prewar form. Not only were there substantial losses in earnings for the period while in camp, but the general earning status of the population was reduced. Not the least important aspect of this lowered economic position was the loss of goodwill and long-established business relationships that are difficult to evaluate in dollar terms

A specific instance may illustrate these facts. The Matsumotos had operated a retail produce store in San Francisco for twenty-one years. In 1941 the widowed mother, her married son, and her daughter worked in the store, and employed two additional persons. The daughter-in-law worked only part-time, since she had three small children. The family net income in 1941 was about \$5,000. In the week before Evacuation, in May, 1942, they sold furniture valued at \$750 for \$250, and a 1939 Chevrolet coupé with Blue Book value of \$645 for \$500. They sold clothing worth at least \$100 for \$20 and spent \$250 for clothing in preparation for Evacuation. They lost \$2,900 in the forced sale of equipment, 75 per cent of the value of their office machines and furniture, safe, and scales. They abandoned, in the rented property, display stands worth \$50. These material losses totaled \$3,925; \$2,000 in accounts receivable became uncollectible. Goodwill for the business was estimated at \$1,000. The daughter left the relocation center early in 1944 and obtained a job in New York as dressmaker. The son went to New York a year later, leaving his wife and children in the camp. After failing to find housing for his family, he returned to the Coast. When the camp was closed in October, 1945, the aged mother joined her daughter in New York, and the son's family joined him in Southern California. The son was unable to secure steady work and had been unemployed for twelve months in the two years after he left the relocation center. Because of evacuation losses he had been unable to reestablish the family business.

The property losses of many families were small relative to the loss of earnings. Tom Tanaka, a thirty-year-old Nisei contract gardener, had a wife and two small children. They rented a house and had managed to acquire about \$500 worth of furniture in three years of marriage. The furniture brought \$50 in a panic sale. Gardening tools, worth \$200, were sold for \$20. Tanaka was unable to collect \$150 owed him by contract customers before being evacuated. Realizing that his knowledge and skills were of little value outside California, and fearful of the difficulties of finding housing and supporting a family, he did not leave the relocation center until it closed. During the three and a half years

in camp, the Tanakas were unable to keep up payments on the endowment insurance they had taken out for the children's education. Their total property losses were about \$850. Tanaka's loss in earnings—not counting the increase in number of customers he could have anticipated as his experience increased—comes to something over \$6,000 (in 1941 dollars uncorrected for inflation). The family was returned to the Los Angeles area. At the time of the interview they had been living in a trailer for eighteen months.



We have discussed the circumstances of the Evacuation so far as they set the stage for economic loss and, indeed, made substantial losses inevitable. The dimensions of the losses suffered can be arrived at only by statistical procedures based on field research. We present here the findings of our Loss Survey. Although it is not a random sample of all evacuees, the sample does approximate the characteristics of a large segment of the population.

When the relocation centers were closed in the fall of 1945, several hundred evacuee families were settled in the Los Cerritos trailer court in Long Beach, an emergency housing project administered by the Federal Public Housing Administration. By invitation of the tenant council of the trailer court, we conducted a survey of evacuee losses during the week ends of March 8-9 and March 15-16, 1947. Several days before the survey began, the tenant council held a meeting to explain our purposes and procedures. Sample schedules were distributed so that the families to be interviewed could gather their evidence and make their calculations. Many of them brought to the interviews whatever documents they had to substantiate losses. Volunteers from among the residents, augmented by members of our own staff, served as interpreter-interviewers and typists. Each schedule was carefully checked by us before the person interviewed left the room, and reliability was increased by correcting discrepancies and obtaining further details.

Schedules for 303 families were usable; 8 were rejected. Three-fourths of the usable schedules (226) were from families resident in the trailer court and the adjoining housing project; 77 were from families living outside the project, who came from the Long Beach-Wilmington area in response to local publicity. Most of the Japanese American residents of the trailer court had been placed there because no other housing could be found for them when they were evicted from the relocation centers. A few families moved in later from less adequate housing. We did not

discover how many of the off-project families were former residents of the trailer court. Since we found no differences between the resident and the off-project families relevant to their losses during Evacuation, we do not present separate analyses. The 226 resident families constituted about three-fourths of the total number of Japanese American families then living in the court and housing project.

Because of the importance of the family as an economic and social unit among Japanese Americans, and because we were interested in losses during Evacuation, the prewar family unit was used as the basis of the survey. Data on personal characteristics of all family members living together at the time of Evacuation and data on household and personal property disposition were recorded on one schedule. Appropriate schedules were used for data on the disposition of occupational property of families with farm or nursery enterprises, business or professional enterprises, or with wage and salary workers only.<sup>17</sup> Information was obtained on the occupations, in 1945 and 1946, of all family members who had been employed in 1941, a check was made on the kind of evidence evacuees could offer to substantiate claims.

The sample consists of 68 prewar farm and nursery families, only one of which had members working elsewhere than on the family farm; 68 prewar business families, of which 11 had some member employed outside the family business; and 70 families all of whose working members were employed for wages or salary. Returns from 97 families resident before the war on Terminal Island are analyzed and reported separately<sup>18</sup> as the Terminal Island Survey, because the circumstances of their evacuation were unique and because we have made additional studies of that community. We did not expect a sample from a trailer population to be representative of the more than 30,000 families who lived on the West Coast before the war. Instead, our intention was to establish an estimate of the minimum sum that poorer families lost. We found, however, that the sample was more generally useful than we had expected.

Of the 206 families in the Loss Survey sample, 80 per cent lived in Los Angeles County before the war; 27 families lived in other Southern California areas, chiefly in Imperial Valley and Orange County, and 15 families lived elsewhere on the West Coast. The fact that these families settled in Los Angeles County instead of returning to prewar localities may be ascribed to several reasons. In part it may be a continuation of the prewar migratory trend of Japanese Americans to Southern California and more particularly to urban centers of the region. In

cases where Japanese Americans thought that strongly unfavorable sentiment existed in communities of prewar residence, the Los Angeles area may have been a second choice. A third circumstance was the relative availability of housing in the trailer court. Examination of loss data

TABLE 27  
PREWAR OCCUPATIONAL GROUP OF FAMILIES  
(Loss Survey)

Occupational group, 1941	Number	Percentage
All families	206	100 0
Family enterprise	136	66 0
Farms.	64	31 0
Nurseries	4	2 0
Business.	68	33 0
Professional and semiprofessional	3	1.5
Trade, produce	12	5.8
Trade, other than produce	21	10 2
Personal service	13	6 3
Manufacturing	2	1 0
Business and repair service	2	1 0
Contract gardening.	15	7 2
Families with employees only, by occupation of head of family	70	34 0
Semiprofessional and managers	6	2 9
Clerical and sales workers	25	12 3
Craftsmen	2	1.0
Operatives	8	3 9
Domestic service workers	5	2 4
Other service workers..	6	2 9
Farm and nursery laborers	13	6.3
Fishermen, crew members on shares	3	1.5
Other laborers	1	0.5
Unemployed.	1	0.5

failed to show any consistent differences between prewar Los Angeles County families and families from other areas; so the groups were combined.

Farms operated before the war by families in the sample were of average size for this area. The median for 56 vegetable farms was 26.1 acres, and for 12 flower farms and nurseries, 8.3 acres. The 1940 Census returns, which include nurseries with farms, gave an average size of 28.5 acres for Japanese American farms in the southern coastal area

of California<sup>19</sup> compared with our sample's average of 29.8 acres. The families had operated their farms and nurseries in the 1941 locations for a median 8.1 years.

All the main types of businesses run by Japanese Americans in Southern California occurred among the 68 prewar business families, but there were not enough cases of any one business type to make detailed analysis possible. (See table 27.) The businesses had been established

TABLE 28  
OCCUPATIONAL GROUP OF FAMILIES<sup>a</sup>

Occupational Group, 1941	Loss Survey		All Japanese American families <sup>b</sup> Percentage
	Number	Percentage	
All families	198	100 0	100 0
Family enterprise			
Farms and nurseries	64	32 3	26 2
Family enterprise			
Business	57	28 8	27 0
Mixed type <sup>c</sup>	12	6 1	15 4
Wage and salary workers only	65	32 8	31 4

<sup>a</sup> One-person families and families with no workers omitted.

<sup>b</sup> Rough tabulation from 10 per cent sample of Social Data Registration Form of Wartime Civil Control Administration, filled out when each Japanese American family evacuated. N = 2,087.

<sup>c</sup> Family enterprise plus one or more members working for wage or salary outside the family enterprise.

in the 1941 location for a median 8.8 years. No census or other figures were available on size, capital value, and so on for prewar Japanese American businesses, so that we could not discover whether the businesses in the sample were representative of the total number with respect to such factors. None of the families belonged to the small number of large-scale operators in produce or Oriental goods.

Seventy families had only wage and salary workers in the labor force. As among the business families, the sample includes the full diversity of occupations but not enough of any one classification for separate analysis. Since the great majority, except farm laborers, were semi-skilled, clerical, or service workers with fairly uniform wage and salary levels,<sup>20</sup> the exact proportion of workers in each occupation is not important for the purposes of the survey. Paid farm laborers had a lower money income and accumulated less property.

Comparison of the distribution of family occupational types in the sample with the total evacuated Japanese American population (table

28) shows that the sample differs mainly in the smaller proportion of families of mixed type, i.e., those engaged in family enterprise but also having one or more members working outside. This may be accounted

TABLE 29  
STRUCTURE OF FAMILIES AS OF EVACUATION DATE<sup>a</sup>  
(Loss Survey)

Family Structure	Loss Survey		All Japanese American families <sup>b</sup> Percentage
	Number	Percentage	
All families	206	100 0	100 0
Single persons	8	3 9	20 4
Issei	6	2 9	13 9
Nisei or Kibei	2	1 0	6 4
Complete couples <sup>c</sup>	18	8 7	11 3
Both Issei	8	3 9	5 1
Both Nisei or Kibei	7	3 4	4 8
Issei and Nisei or Kibei	3	1 5	1.4
Incomplete couples <sup>c</sup>	2	1 0	10 3
Complete primary families <sup>c</sup>	145	70 5	43 6
Both parents Issei	85	41 3	28 9
Both parents Nisei or Kibei	34	16 5	6 4
Parents Issei and Nisei or Kibei	26	12 6	8 2
Incomplete primary families <sup>c</sup>	30	14 6	13 2
Sibling groups <sup>d</sup>	3	1 5	1 3

<sup>a</sup> To make comparable with data for all Japanese American families, families in the Loss Survey were classified as of the Evacuation date. Families where a parent was interned, therefore, were classified as incomplete couples, incomplete primary families, or sibling groups, even though the parent(s) rejoined the family later.

<sup>b</sup> N = 2,170 families, composed of all families in a 10 per cent sample of the WCCA Social Data Registration Forms (filled out when each Japanese American family evacuated) which we were able to follow up through January 1, 1945.

<sup>c</sup> "Complete" means that both spouses were living with the family. "Incomplete" means that one spouse was deceased, interned, or otherwise not living with the family at the time of evacuation.

<sup>d</sup> Both parents absent, though in some cases only temporarily.

for by the larger proportion in this sample of Nisei parents without adult offspring, a matter to be discussed below.

Comparison of the sample with the entire evacuated Japanese American population<sup>21</sup> with respect to 1942 family structure (table 29) shows the differential effects of family structure upon relocation and obtaining housing. There were few unattached persons and couples without chil-

dren in the trailer-court housing project. Small family units were better able to relocate to the East before the relocation centers closed or subsequently to find housing and jobs on the West Coast. The sample therefore was composed mainly (86 per cent) of families who had dependent children in 1942. In the total population the comparable figure was 58 per cent. We have no accurate information about family size in 1946, but we are sure that it was at least as large as in 1942.<sup>22</sup>

This sample contained proportionately more prewar Nisei parents than did the total evacuated population. Families at the height of their reproductive powers and with the largest social responsibilities were the most seriously affected by the Evacuation and by the obstacles to relocation. Such young families had exhausted their small reserves on the incidental expenses of relocation, and the burdens of child care and housing needs reduced their freedom of movement. Occupational experimentation, which was common among Nisei who had few family responsibilities, was far more difficult for the Nisei father.

One further comparison may be made between the Loss Survey sample and the total evacuated population. Just before the West Coast was opened for relocation in January, 1945, the same proportion of families in the sample (45.6 per cent) as in the total evacuated population (45.5 per cent) had at least one family member relocated to a non-Coastal area. This similarity persisted seven months after the Coast was opened for resettlement, and just before "scheduled," i.e., compulsory, relocation began in August, 1945, 54.5 per cent of the sample families and 58.4 per cent of all families had at least one member relocated. But the families in the sample lagged behind the rest of the population in having complete families relocated. By January, 1945, only 7.4 per cent of the sample had all family members relocated, as compared with 19.1 per cent of all families. By July, 1945, only 10.8 per cent of the sample families had all members relocated, compared with 37.6 per cent of all families.<sup>23</sup> This difference is attributable to the effect of heavy family responsibilities. The father or the oldest child of a large family might have relocated as a scout, but often was unable to find facilities adequate for the whole family.

Summarily, the 206 cases may be regarded as representative of families who had children in the prewar period and who returned to Southern California, with some weighting of larger families. Taken as a whole, this sample is representative of all prewar occupational groups except the wealthiest businessmen and the poorest population segment (predominantly single Issei and farm wage laborers). Differential relocation



rates and inability to find housing accounts for the incidence of larger families in our sample. This bias affects both per family and per adult property losses. Nisei parents, being young, had less property to lose. Nisei over 18 years of age who lived in the same household with Issei parents reduce the per adult property loss, which is obtained by dividing the family loss by the number of adults in the family. Losses of income while in relocation centers varied directly with the number of workers, and may be expected to be slightly higher in larger families. However, the Nisei, who comprise a larger proportion of our sample, before the war had lower incomes than Issei, owing to less experience and lower status; since 1941 is the base for our estimates of income loss, this situation may cancel the effects of family size on income data.

The foregoing considerations indicate that the bias in the sample results in lower estimates for both property and income losses than would be obtained from a completely representative sample. Finally, though we maintain representativeness only for the prewar Los Angeles County population, we have no reason to believe that the two-thirds of the Japanese American families who lived elsewhere on the West Coast in 1941 differed substantially as a group from those in Los Angeles County. The range of losses might be somewhat greater, but the medians would remain fairly constant.



A more detailed examination of interdependence of family members will clarify the extent to which the family was an economic unit, in production as well as in consumption. It should be understood that any realistic appraisal of economic losses due to Evacuation must be in terms of families rather than of individuals. Legal ownership or leaseholds on property were usually vested in one family member, but the whole family worked in the enterprise and each member had a recognized share in the returns. When losses occurred, they were property losses in a legal sense to only one or two of the adults, but everyone had a real, if somewhat informal, claim to the property. Interpretation of losses according to conventional Anglo-Saxon legal precepts would give a misleading picture of a relatively few individuals with large losses. The more realistic interpretation that we have followed distributes the losses over the whole family.

Of all Japanese American families on the West Coast, about two-thirds operated family enterprises and one-third had only wage or salary workers in the labor force. (See table 28 ) Our sample shows the same

TABLE 30  
DEPENDENCE UPON FAMILY ENTERPRISE  
(Loss Survey)

Family occupational group	Number of families	Workers in family enterprise	Workers outside family
All families . . . .	206	353	133
Percentage of total workers . . . .	100 0	72 6	27 4
Family enterprise			
Farms and nurseries	67	233	.
Family enterprise			
Business . . . .	57	101	
Mixed <sup>a</sup> . . . .	12	19	19
Wage and salary workers only	70	..	114

<sup>a</sup> Family enterprise plus one or more members working for wage or salary outside the family enterprise

TABLE 31  
INTERDEPENDENCE OF FAMILY MEMBERS  
(Loss Survey)

Kind of family enterprise	Number of enterprises	Total number of workers	Family workers		Nonfamily employees	
			Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total . . . .	136	837	353	42.2	484	57 8
Farms and nurseries	68	634	236	37 1	398	62 9
Business . . . .	68	203	117	57 4	86	42 6
		Mean number of workers	Mean number of family workers		Mean number of nonfamily employees	
Total		6.1	2 6		3.5	
Farms and nurseries		9 3	3 5		5.8	
Business . . . .		3 0	1 7		1 3	

distribution, but with even fewer families of mixed type. Table 30 shows the distribution of individual workers in family enterprise and at work outside the family. Those occupied in family enterprise in 1941 comprised almost three-fourths of the labor force.

Family enterprises may be considered in reference to their dependence upon unpaid family labor or utilization of wage workers from outside the family. It will be seen from table 31 that family enterprises

provided employment for substantial numbers of outside workers. Most of the permanent nonfamily employees of businesses were Japanese Americans, but seasonal laborers in agriculture included some non-Japanese. Whereas the number of unpaid family workers was quite stable in each enterprise, the number of nonfamily employees includes agricultural workers hired only for the harvest season and other part-time or irregular employees. The modest dimensions of the enterprises are indicated by the mean number of workers.



Before proceeding to an analysis of the losses, it is necessary to describe in some detail the criteria for assigning values and the way in which the figures may be interpreted. Property losses were entered either as personal and household property or as occupational property. For each major item upon which loss was claimed, we asked its value as second-hand equipment at the time of Evacuation. For a household economy, a more realistic figure would have been replacement value, and replacement value at enormously inflated prices. If we had permitted the respondents to report values in that fashion, however, the biases of inexpert judgment would have made it impossible to interpret the data consistently. We also felt that legislative and administrative agencies would be likely to require 1942 second-hand market value. Throughout we have attempted to establish an irreducible minimum below which no claims legislation or appropriation could fall without being designated inequitable. We disregarded the irreplaceable nature of some items whose value lay in sentiment, Oriental origin, or disappearance from the market. By insisting on a detailed description of each large item, including condition, age, and original purchase price, we were able to help respondents make estimates of 1942 value. For instance, we would not accept a statement that \$2,000 worth of furniture was sold to a second-hand dealer for \$150, but determined that the furniture included an eight-cubic-foot 1938 model GE refrigerator, a 1936 console radio, a suite of bedroom furniture purchased in 1940, an overstuffed living room suite fifteen years old, a washing machine, and miscellaneous items, with a total value, when itemized, of \$2,125. We disallowed all nonitemized estimates except where they were clearly conservative, e.g., gardening equipment valued at \$150, or furniture for a five-room house at \$500. We compared the estimates given us for automobile values with the March, 1942, Blue Book values in Los Angeles. We found that underestimates of value were as frequent as over-

estimates, and in each case assigned the Blue Book wholesale value for our calculations. All insurance losses were omitted because of the difficulty of separating the various classes of loss, but from the standpoint of the financial security of the population, the reduction in insurance coverage must be taken as a serious damage.

In order for loss on any item to be included, the respondent had to supply not only 1942 value and the amount received for its sale or rent but also data on its disposition (sale, storage, rental, loan, abandonment, etc.), the date of disposal, and the nature of the transaction in which loss was involved. For this information, respondents had little or no documentary evidence and had to draw upon memory, but the information was often the combined effort of all the family members present, and in a number of cases the respondent returned later to amend the information. Hence we feel that our figures are conservative in every respect and that our original objective of establishing a base line for losses was achieved.

Personal and household property includes houses, leases and rent paid in advance and not refunded, furniture, automobiles used primarily for nonbusiness purposes, art objects and books, clothing and jewelry, and uncollected personal loans. Occupational property includes land, buildings, leaseholds, equipment, automobiles and trucks used primarily for business purposes, inventories, crops, farm animals, contracts and orders outstanding, and uncollected accounts. Insurance was omitted. Goodwill was usually omitted because respondents were unable to assign a value to the business apart from the physical equipment. Value of crops was estimated in terms of the actual amount of labor and material that had been invested before Evacuation rather than in terms of the selling price expected at maturity. For purposes of tabulation, where the family had included both household and occupational property in a single sale, the loss was divided between household and occupational property proportionately to the value of the items included. Thus a house worth \$2,000 and a barn worth \$500 sold together for \$500 was expressed as a loss of \$1,600 on the house and \$400 on the barn. Where the family occupied a room behind the family store, the total building value was assigned to the business.

Our estimates of income loss are as conservative as our estimates of property loss. The 1941 total family income was multiplied by the number of family years in the relocation center. Number of years was obtained by dividing the aggregate number of years in the center for all members of the family employed in 1941 by the number of workers in

TABLE 32  
SUMMARY OF EVACUATION LOSSES  
(Loss Survey<sup>a</sup>)

Family occupational group	No of families	Mean no of adults per family	Median per family loss					Median per family per adult loss <sup>a</sup>					
			Household and personal property	Occupational property	Total property	Income, in 1941, dollars	Taxes and expenses	Total	Household and personal property	Occupational property	Total property	Income, in 1941, dollars, per worker	Total
All families	206	3 1	\$ 975	\$3,175 <sup>d</sup>	\$2,970	\$6,925	\$17	\$9,870	\$350	\$ 810 <sup>d</sup>	\$ 955	\$3,736	\$3,750
Family enterprise													
Farms and nurseries	68	3 9	1,147	4,417	5,930	7,500	22	13,960	353	1,325	1,822	2,100	4,214
Family enterprise													
Business	68	3 1	714	2,418	3,555	7,700	23	12,810	263	700	1,214	4,875	4,916
Wage and salary workers only	70	2 4	1,000		1,000	6,182	10	7,350	446		446	3,945	3,147

<sup>a</sup> All property losses are for March, 1942, dollar value. All income losses are based on 1941 income and are in 1941 dollars. For a description of what is included in each category, see text, pp. 142-143.

category, see text, pp 142-143.

Median per family per adult loss is obtained by dividing each family loss by the number of family members, 18 years of age or older, and then taking the median of that distribution. The figures should be read as follows: half of the families with farms or nurseries had total losses per adult of \$4,214 or more, and half had losses per adult of less than \$4,214.

adult of less

<sup>c</sup> Income has been calculated as above, except that the total family income was divided by the number of workers rather than the number of adults. The figures should be read as follows: half of all families had income losses per worker of \$3,736 or more, and half had losses per worker of less.

<sup>d</sup> Number of families = 136

<sup>d</sup> Number of families = 136

• Number of inmates – 100




Fig. 15. Summary of evacuation losses. (Loss Survey.) For explanation of items see text, pp. 142-143, and footnotes to table 32.




Fig. 16. Distribution of per family property losses and per family income losses, by cumulative percentages. (Loss Survey)

1941. This yielded a total income loss per family. It did not take account of rising wages and profits during the war, and the increased income that normally could have been anticipated by Nisei as their experience increased and their skills and status improved. It neglected also to take account of the possible retirement during the war of older persons, probably a small number in the tight labor market, and the entry into the labor force of an even greater number of young persons. The effect of these trends would have been to increase the aggregate family income, so that our estimates are low. It is necessary to consider also the general increase in wage and profit levels between 1942 and 1945. Unfortunately, official statistics on wage levels are not broken down for the occupations in which Japanese Americans were concentrated, so that no refined correction factors are available.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, the removal of Japanese Americans was itself a factor in the changes in wage and profit levels in those occupations in which they had been concentrated.

Some exploration was made of extraordinary costs directly due to Evacuation, but we do not feel that we have adequately investigated this problem. Many families could not recall how much they had expended in purchases of clothing for the special conditions of life in the assembly center and for medical and legal expenses. Our estimates of total losses include the amount reported for such fees and expenses, but we are aware that they are incomplete.



Median losses for the 206 families are summarized in table 32. The figures for loss per family should be read as follows: half of the families operating farms or nurseries in 1941 lost more than \$5,930 worth of property (1942 value) and half lost less than that amount. The corresponding figure for loss per family per adult is read: half of the families with farms or nurseries in 1941 suffered property losses per adult member (18 years or older) of more than \$1,822, and half incurred losses per adult of less than that amount. These findings indicate the relative losses of the several occupational groups. Farm and nursery families had a higher investment in property and equipment, but their money incomes were somewhat lower than those of business families. Because of the greater number of unpaid workers in farm and nursery families, the income per worker was considerably lower. Business families in this sample, because of the frequency of room-behind-the-shop pattern, undoubtedly show some household loss as occupational property loss. More important, because of a better opportunity to dispose of property






Fig. 17. Distribution of per family per adult property losses and per family per worker income losses, by cumulative percentages. (Loss Survey)




Fig. 18. Distribution of per family and per family per adult combined property and income losses, by cumulative percentages. (Loss Survey)

and more experience in such dealings, they had a lower median loss of household and personal property. Families that had only wage and salary workers had no occupational property; hence their median total property loss figure is well below that of the other groups. Note the

TABLE 33  
RELATIVE SIZE OF PROPERTY LOSS AND INCOME LOSS  
(Loss Survey)

	All families	Farm and nursery	Business	Wage and salary workers only
Number of families	184	60	57	67
Percentage	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Income loss greater than property loss	143	39	45	59
Percentage	77 7	65 0	79 0	88 0
Property loss greater than income loss	41	21	12	8
Percentage .	22 3	35 0	21 0	12 0
Number of families for which data incomplete .	22	8	11	3

relative stability among the occupational groups of median income loss per family, which is attributable to similarity in the length of time in the centers and to relative homogeneity in income levels among the prewar occupational groups. Wage and salary workers not only had lower earning power than the self-employed in 1941, but a larger proportion of the families in this occupational group had been dependent on a single Nisei worker who left the relocation center relatively early for work outside. This summary by medians is presented in figure 15.

The distributions of per family and per adult property losses and per family and per worker income losses are shown as cumulative percentages in figures 16, 17, and 18. These figures are useful in estimating the proportion of evacuee families whose claims would be fully covered by a specified amount. Thus, if we assume a claims bill that would allow claims for losses of the type included in our survey and upon the kind of evidence which the evacuees had, figure 18 may be read as follows: an upper limit of \$5,000 per family on claims would make approximately 15 per cent of these families eligible for the total amount of their losses. An upper limit of \$5,000 per adult would make approximately 65 per cent of these families eligible for the complete amount of their losses,

provided that the total losses suffered by a family were prorated equally among all adult members. The claims legislation enacted by the 80th Congress makes no explicit provision for prorating family holdings.<sup>25</sup>

From figures 16 and 17 it is clear that income losses were greater than

TABLE 34  
REASONS FOR PROPERTY LOSSES BY KINDS OF PROPERTY  
(Loss Survey)  
(Percentage of dollar loss)

Family occupational group and reason for loss	Household and personal property	Occupational property	Total property
All families			
Loss by sale	45 0	53 9	51 2
Loss by abandonment	10 7	16 3	14 6
Loss in storage	21 0	2 9	8.4
Loss, other	23 3	26 9	25 8
Amount lost..	\$297,563	\$675,538	\$973,101
Family enterprise, farms and nurseries			
Loss by sale	50 3	58 2	56 7
Loss by abandonment	16 5	20 1	19 4
Loss in storage	17 6	2 0	4 9
Loss, other	15 6	19 7	19 0
Amount lost	\$102,735	\$455,617	\$558,352
Family enterprise, business			
Loss by sale	41 3	45 1	44 0
Loss by abandonment	7 1	8 5	8 1
Loss in storage	20 4	4 7	9 2
Loss, other	31 2	41 7	38 7
Amount lost	\$89,401	\$219,921	\$309,322
Wage and salary workers only			
Loss by sale	43 0		43 0
Loss by abandonment	18 0		8 0
Loss in storage	24 9		24 9
Loss, other	24 0		24 0
Amount lost..	\$105,427		\$105,427

property losses. Only among farm families was there an appreciable proportion whose income losses were less than the property losses of any of the farm families in the sample. Comparison by individual cases (table 33) shows that three-fourths of all families in the sample, varying from two-thirds among farm families to almost nine-tenths of wage

and salary families, suffered income losses greater than their property losses. These estimates ignore the general rise in income levels and, since they were based on time spent in relocation centers, they ignore also the transitory nature and unskilled character of many jobs found after relocation. (See chap. ii.) Furthermore, in our calculations for income loss, individuals who volunteered or were drafted into the Army were considered to have relocated. Of the 206 families in this sample, 89, or 43.3 per cent, had one or more members who served in the armed forces. The fact that the eldest son was in the Army would frequently have




Fig. 19. Reasons for property losses, by family occupational group. (Loss Survey)

deterred the family from relocating until his return had they not been compelled to leave the relocation center.

The ways in which losses were sustained must necessarily condition the admissibility of evidence. We therefore show in table 34 and figures 19 and 20 the proportions of loss assigned to various causes. All percentages are based on 1942 dollar values totaled for the families in each occupational category. Figure 19 shows that business families and those dependent on wages and salaries lost less through sale than did farm families. Farm families were officially "discouraged" from storing their farm equipment, since substitute farm operators needed the scarce equipment. The most common arrangement was that the lease on the land was reassigned for little or nothing. The new operator secured, for a lump sum of 10-20 per cent of the real value, houses, barns, greenhouses, irrigation equipment, farm animals, tractors, seed and fertilizer,

miscellaneous small equipment, and the crops in the fields. Such transactions usually took place only a few days before Evacuation. Where sacrifice sales were not concluded, the property was of necessity "abandoned." Vandals and squatters were often unhampered in their exploitation of the property. Some farm families managed to obtain substitute operators and retain ownership or control for a time. Their losses are reported as sale after the property had deteriorated through mismanagement, or as "other causes," such as theft, damage, or "disappearance," while in the control of substitute operators.





Fig. 20 Reasons for property losses, all families, by kind of property. (Loss Survey)

Business families more frequently than farm families managed to lease, sublease, or rent out their businesses to substitute operators, so that they had more losses through embezzlement, theft, and damage. They were unable to collect accounts receivable in many cases because their Japanese American debtors were unable to pay and it was difficult if not impossible to bring pressure to bear on non-Japanese debtors who were several hundred miles away. Defaulting of debts by members of the Japanese American community to each other had a cumulative effect and, because of the integrated character of the community, reduced the ability of the whole population to absorb the financial shocks of Evacuation and to prepare for resettlement. Wage and salary families, with only household and personal property to dispose of, lost proportionately more of their total property in storage, by theft, vandalism, fire, and the like.



The importance of understanding the nature and amount of evidence available to substantiate individual claims must be considered in evalu-



ating any program for compensating evacuees. It was not within the scope of this survey to determine the evidence with which each loss could be verified. We included in the interview schedule, however, a check on the nature of evidence available to support any part of the losses claimed. The categories suggested to the respondent were: income-tax returns, sales-tax returns, cash books, witnesses, letters, storage receipts, transport receipts, diaries, and other specified evidence. Table 35 shows that one-third of the families have no evidence of any kind.

TABLE 35  
NATURE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS  
(Loss Survey)

Family occupational group	No evidence of any kind		Witnesses, letters, or diaries only		Other evidence*		Total	
	No.	Per-centage	No.	Per-centage	No.	Per-centage	No.	Per-centage
All families . .	64	31 1	38	18 4	104	50 5	206	100 0
Family enterprise								
Farms and nurseries	21	30 9	12	17 6	35	51 5	68	100 0
Family enterprise								
Business .	19	28 0	11	16 2	38	55 8	68	100 0
Wage and salary workers only.	24	34 3	15	21 3	31	44 4	70	100 0

\* Income-tax returns, sales-tax returns, cash books, storage and transport receipts

Only one-half have impersonal documentary evidence to support some part of their claims; much of this evidence is for prewar income, and would be useless in substantiating claims for property loss.

The lack of documentary evidence for the details of how, when, and where each item of loss occurred will surprise no one familiar with the prewar Japanese American community and with the history of the Evacuation. Oral contracts in business were the rule. Violations by other Japanese Americans were handled within the community; dealings with non-Japanese were mostly on a cash basis. When evacuee debtors defaulted on contracts because their income was cut off by Evacuation, Japanese American creditors often had no written documents for their claims. Panic sales and even well-considered sacrifice sales of furniture, equipment, businesses, and farms were often made without itemized receipts, so that no written evidence exists to prove each in-



stance of sale made below real value. Property was often left with non-Japanese friends or neighbors for protection or administration under informal oral agreements. And although some of these agreements worked well, many resulted in theft, misappropriation, fraud, and other violations of trust so aptly summarized by evacuees as "swindle." Others turned out badly not because of malicious intent but because of changes in the lives of the caretakers themselves. Inevitably, much of the documentary evidence evacuees did have immediately after Evacuation was lost or misplaced in the years of movement and make-shift living arrangements.

In order to see whether there was any relation between a family's loss and the evidence available to substantiate claims, we tabulated separately families whose property loss was less than \$2,500. There is slight evidence that families whose loss was relatively low, usually because they had least to lose, have less evidence to substantiate claims, but the number of families is too small to demonstrate statistically significant differences.

In summary, we found that about half of the property loss was through sales in which the evacuee was unable to realize the 1942 value of the property. Either he sold in the buyer's market during Evacuation, he was unable to protect his interests in a sale contracted after Evacuation, or the property had so deteriorated through mismanagement or vandalism during his absence that even at later inflated selling prices he could not recover the 1942 dollar value. Only when there was a business transaction have we an indication of the losses from deterioration and the less drastic forms of damage. Thus there is a category of hidden loss that is not assessed.

Abandonment of property was more important for farm families than for other occupational groups. Had the evacuees been willing to take a loss of 90 per cent or more, most of them might have been able to make a sale. Their failure to sell on such disadvantageous terms must be viewed in the context of the Evacuation. Upon being removed to the assembly center, they did not know whether they would be able to return to their homes in a matter of days, weeks, or years. The decision of a very few not to sell may have been due to their stubbornness and refusal to be a party to a business relationship that was regarded as exploitative. However, most such decisions may be viewed as a calculated risk in which the evacuee chose to risk a sure return of perhaps a tenth of his life savings in the hope that he would be able to salvage a more substantial part of it upon his return.

Although storage losses account for less than 10 per cent of the total dollar value lost, they make up about 20 per cent of the losses in personal and household property for each occupational group. Often these stored goods were the items of least dollar value but of great intrinsic meaning to the owners, articles of symbolic value that they could not bring themselves to sell.

"Other" reasons account for approximately 26 per cent of the total losses of all families. In this category were 40 per cent of the losses of business families. Reasons classified under "other" include such situations as inability to collect from debtors; confiscation by the government of cameras, "weapons" (e.g., Samurai swords), and radios; gifts to friends because fair sale or storage was found impossible; damage or deterioration during use by suboperators or renters; loss or damage in shipment from private or government storage to the relocation center; and fraud or disadvantages in negotiating and enforcing the terms of contracts. The main groups suffering heavy losses through confiscation were wealthy businessmen, who do not occur in our sample, and Terminal Island residents, whose special problems are discussed in chapter vi.

## CHAPTER VI

### THE TERMINAL ISLAND COMMUNITY

BEFORE PRESENTING the findings of an intensive study of the role of Japanese Americans in the fishing industry,<sup>1</sup> we should describe the setting of Terminal Island and the nature of fishing operations in this area.

Terminal Island in Los Angeles Harbor was headquarters for the fishing industry in Southern California. It is also a naval base, a federal quarantine station and prison, and a shipbuilding center. The Island, about three-quarters of a mile wide and three and one-half miles long, is connected with the mainland by a drawbridge near the northeastern end and by ferry service at the western end. Fish Harbor and the fish canneries are clustered in the southwestern corner of the Island, from which juts Reservation Point with its federal quarantine station and prison.<sup>2</sup> During the war the only residents were military and naval personnel, government employees, and prisoners, but the prewar population included fishermen, cannery workers, tradespeople, and their families. The western half of the Island, Los Angeles City Census Tract 294, had almost all the Island's residents, a total of 3,831 in 1940. Of these, 2,253, or 59.8 per cent, were classified as "other nonwhites," most of whom (2,051) were Japanese.<sup>3</sup>

A dozen Japanese abalone fishermen settled on the Island in 1901. Other fishermen came after 1906, and between 1907 and 1910 three fish canneries began operation. The Japanese population first built pile houses on the western shore of the Island. Later, as harbor development built up the land with channel dredgings, new canneries were built. Houses for fishermen were constructed by the canneries to the south of the original settlement and south of the present highway, and the community known as East San Pedro, or Fish Harbor, shifted in that direction over a period of years. After 1918 the population grew rapidly. Fishermen moved to the Island after a destructive fire on the mainland near by; there was some migration from Monterey; and after the 1921 Alien Land Law was passed, farmers who had had fishing experience in Japan turned again to fishing. By 1925, the community had reached the size it subsequently maintained. The population remained almost entirely Japanese American, and mobility was very low.<sup>4</sup>

Along the main highway and separated from East San Pedro was a smaller settlement that was started in the 1890's as a beach resort, but,

with industrial development on the Island, it declined. It never achieved the size of East San Pedro, and in 1940 it had not quite three-fourths as many occupied dwelling units. About 40 per cent of the housing units were occupied by Japanese Americans and the remainder by Mexicans and other whites.<sup>5</sup> Because of the mixed population and its position on the highway, Terminal Island was not so tightly organized or isolated as East San Pedro. A large proportion of the Japanese Americans were single men who lived in boarding or camp houses and patronized the business enterprises in East San Pedro.

Most of the Japanese American families lived in East San Pedro in houses built and owned by the fish canneries. Women, old men, and some of the children worked as fish cleaners and packers. The able-bodied men engaged in catching sardines, mackerel, tuna, and other fish for canning. The fishing fleet on which they worked operated from the docks in Fish Harbor and took on supplies there. Tuna Street, leading to the wharf, was lined with shops, restaurants, and other service facilities. Most numerous were the restaurants, serving both Island residents and many cannery workers who came from the mainland. The businesses were operated as family enterprises by Japanese Americans who lived in rooms behind their shops. Some of the buildings were owned by Nisei, but the land could not be purchased and had to be leased from the Harbor Authority. The economy of the entire community was dependent upon fish. If the catch were poor or if fish prices were low in relation to other prices, there was not a person in the community—whether in the fleet, the canneries, or in the shops—who was not directly affected.

Crews of one to four manned the small boats and fished with brail nets for mackerel or used hooks and lines to catch albacore and other fish that cannot be netted profitably. But more than four-fifths of the men worked on purse seiners, the larger boats engaging principally in sardine and tuna fishing.

Before the war the lives of the fishermen and their families were geared to the movements of schools of Pacific fish. The nature of their occupation required the fishermen to be industrious workers willing to spend long periods away from their homes and families at hard and often dangerous work.

For the sardines they fished north and south along the coast and out to and beyond the Channel Islands, usually leaving port one day and returning the next. The sardine season began in July along the northern coast of Washington and moved south, reaching Monterey in October. The season for California, set by the California Fish and Game Com-

mission, was from the first of October to the middle of February. The boats at Los Angeles frequently went north to meet the early runs at Monterey and then returned to Los Angeles for the rest of the season. For those who chartered boats and engaged only in sardine fishing, the charter period approximated this Monterey-Los Angeles sardine season.

Fishing for sardines is done at night when the moon is down. The most important crew member is the specially qualified "mast man" who keeps a lookout from the crow's nest. In the dark of the moon, the schools of sardines appear to the mast man as areas of phosphorescence at the water's surface. Dawn or the rising moon interrupts the search for fish. The return trip is often a race because boats are unloaded in the order in which they arrive at Fish Harbor. Motor-driven scoops shovel the fish onto conveyors called flumes, which carry the catch to the second floor of the cannery for processing. After the unloading, the crew clean the boat, fuel and groceries are brought aboard, and in a few hours the boats are ready for the next night's run. On Saturdays, as soon as the catch is unloaded and the boat made ready, the crew is free for the week end. There is also a rest of six days during the full moon.

The daylight tuna fishing requires trips ranging from a few days to two weeks or more. The smaller seiners and others without refrigeration fish Southern California waters close enough to port so that they can return with a catch before the fish spoils. Seiners with refrigeration spend part of the season on trips into Mexican waters, sometimes venturing down the coast beyond Central America and westward to Hawaiian waters. The tuna season begins in April and continues until the sardine season in the fall.

Among Japanese Americans there were three chief roles in fishing that represented fairly clearly defined areas of status separation, function, and points of achievement within a striving system. This differentiation was almost a pure case of individualized striving according to capitalistic criteria, involving the accumulation of power and wealth by the provident care of earnings from productive enterprise and the handling of savings as risk capital.

The individuals on the bottom of the status system were the crew members who had no occupational property. In the discussion and tabular presentation that follows, crew members are coded with the prefix C. Wages or shares were and are controlled by collective bargaining with fishermen's unions. In Monterey the American Federation of Labor affiliates are dominant, but in the Los Angeles area the Congress of Industrial Organizations is also represented. Each boat, however, is a

closed shop. Upon the return of Japanese Americans to the Coast, the C.I.O. waived initiation fees, whereas the A F. of L. did not waive either the reinstatement fee of \$10 for their old members or the initiation fee of \$25 for new members.

On the second step in the hierarchy were equipment owners, designated by the prefix E. The most important pieces of equipment were nets, which often represented a substantial accumulation of capital. We also include, in the category of equipment owners, ship engineers who owned the tools of their trade valued between \$300 and \$400, and small boat operators (but not boat owners) who owned their hooks and lines.

At the top of the status system were the boat owners, designated by the prefix B. They usually owned nets and other equipment and had ascended from the ranks of equipment owners. Typically, the operator owned an interest in the boat—up to 49 per cent if he were Issei—which he had purchased from the cannery. It was this ownership interest that classified him more appropriately as an “own-account” worker than an employee. Men who aspired to be boat owners chartered a boat and made a down payment on a net. When the net was paid for, the operator negotiated for a boat, so that earnings were immediately reinvested in the industry. In 1947, boats large enough to engage in sardine fishing cost \$30,000 or more; tuna and sardine purse seines (nets) cost between \$15,000 and \$20,000 each, and a boat requires one of each if it is to participate in both seasons. In general, boat and net prices in 1947 were more than double prewar prices.

Share assignments are made after running expenses (mainly food and fuel) are deducted from the gross returns of the catch. Returns to the boat owner, the net owner, and crew members are standardized by the union, which acts as a kind of arbitrator, even though the owner may also be a member of the union. The portion set aside for the boat owner varies with the size of the craft.

In one case in 1947 the net return was divided into twenty shares: five for the boat owner, three for the owner of the sardine net, and a single share for each of the twelve members of the crew. The owner of the net, a Japanese American, chartered the boat from a Caucasian who usually went along as a member of the crew. The latter received six shares of the returns, five for his boat and one for his work as a member of the crew. The net owner, similarly, received four shares, three for his net and one as a crew member. He was skipper of the boat as well, but in none of our cases did the captain or operator of the boat get more for his work and skill than other members of the crew. The expected

return in 1947 was \$200 a month per share. From his shares the net owner must keep the net in repair and build up a reserve to replace it when it becomes damaged or deteriorates beyond repair. Similarly, the boat owner pays from his own shares for the maintenance of his craft.

By order of the California Fish and Game Commission, fishermen must have a written order before they may deliver fish to a cannery. The canneries post the prices they will pay for fish. During the war, ceiling prices, which were the effective prices, were set by the Office of Price Administration. After the decontrol of prices, fishermen through their unions resumed attempts to negotiate contracts with the canneries at the beginning of the season, so that they would know, before setting out, the minimum prices the catch would bring. Such contracts had been in operation in the San Pedro area from 1934 until the establishment of wartime price controls. The procedure had been for the boat operators to ask in their individual contracts with the canneries the minimum price previously agreed upon by the union. In the summer of 1946, cannery fishermen in San Pedro successfully struck to enforce their demand for a minimum price for tuna. The canneries had been reluctant to negotiate price clauses because of the indictment a month before of other union leaders for conspiracy to fix fresh-fish prices in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. The government contended that the boat operators were independent businessmen, whereas the union maintained that they were primary producers, like farmers, who may market co-operatively without restraint under antitrust laws. The court found for the government and in 1948 the case was still under appeal.<sup>6</sup>

The 1940 Census reported 768 Japanese American fishermen on the West Coast. Almost all of them (740) were in California, and over 70 per cent (556) were in Los Angeles County.<sup>7</sup> The rolls of the Southern California Japanese Fishermen's Association, to which most of the fishermen belonged, listed 537 members in December, 1941. Of these, 373 were Issei and 164, 30.5 per cent, were Nisei.<sup>8</sup>

The most skillful fishermen—those who made the key decisions—were Issei who had been fishermen before leaving Japan. They were pioneers in the development of an industry that now makes Los Angeles the nation's largest fishing port. The Nisei, most of whom were in their late teens and early twenties, were usually the sons or nephews of Issei fishermen. In 1931 only 11 of 429 fishermen living in East San Pedro were Nisei.<sup>9</sup>

Our 20 per cent sample of the Japanese American labor force in Los Angeles County showed that in 1941 half of the Issei fishermen had 20

years or more of experience, but that few Nisei had as much as 5 years, and most had only 2 or 3 years of experience. In our 1947 interviews we found that 37 Issei fishermen had prewar experience ranging from 4 years to 50 years, with a mean of 22 years. There was no apparent difference in length of experience between boat owners, equipment owners, and crew members. In the same survey 22 Nisei had a mean of 5.5 years of experience. The occupational stability of this group is a measure of the selectivity of a rather highly specialized occupation. Only a small part of the working life of men in the sample had been spent in other occupations.

Had the Evacuation not intervened, the Nisei would have continued in fishing and eventually assumed the place of the Issei. This tendency would have been reinforced by the pattern of family enterprise and the common practice of registering ownership in the name of the Nisei relative. The latter practice was often an evasion of discriminatory laws, but also manifested the property-holding precepts of the group. Although the Nisei were accumulating experience in the trade, few of them by 1942 had served sufficient apprenticeship to replace the Issei in any but routine jobs. Very few Nisei had had experience as skippers.



Terminal Island Japanese Americans probably suffered more heavily in the Evacuation than any other occupational or locality group. Their residence and work had long been attacked by the West Coast press. Upon the outbreak of war many alien males were arrested by the FBI,<sup>10</sup> and the other aliens were not allowed to operate their fishing boats. The Nisei were too young and too unskilled to operate alone during the few weeks when they might have done so. With fishing cut off, the canneries had no work for the women, and many families were left entirely without income. On February 10, 1942, the confusion began that made it almost impossible for Terminal Islanders to salvage their property. One day after they had received notice from the Department of Justice to vacate the Island within a week, an executive order placed the Island under the jurisdiction of the Navy, and residents were notified that they would be evicted within 30 days. The implied reprieve was canceled the next week and they were ordered to be off the Island within 48 hours. Islanders were helped by friendly church groups to move with some hand baggage to hotels or the homes of relatives and friends. In Boyle Heights a former community center and language school was converted into a hostel to provide additional housing. Even with this assistance,






Fig. 22 Age-sex distribution, Terminal Island - "Other races," 1940, and Terminal Island Survey sample, 1943.

much property had to be abandoned, especially business property and fishing gear. For the next two months, until Manzanar was prepared by the Army to receive a mass evacuation, Terminal Islanders were scattered throughout the metropolitan area, exhausting in living expenses whatever little resources they had been able to salvage. Later they discovered that their homes and shops had been razed by the Navy. Some of them received official offers of government payment, long after the property and all evidence of its value had been destroyed.

The property-holding situation was as follows: most of the land, which was held by the Harbor Commission, was leased to the canneries that had built the houses and industrial buildings. The former were rented in turn to the fishermen and cannery workers, and it was in these dwellings that much of their goods were left at the time of eviction. Small pieces of property were also leased directly to businessmen who had constructed and equipped stores. Although cannery representatives may have been able to make direct representations regarding the value of their property that was cleared for naval purposes, the holdings of Japanese Americans were much more difficult to assess, and evacuees in our survey had not been consulted in the evaluation.<sup>11</sup> We have not been able to determine whether the assessment included household gear abandoned in the dwellings or store fixtures and inventories that could not be removed.

As a result of these experiences and the poor prospects for a return to the only occupations the evacuees knew, thirty-one of the Terminal Island families at Manzanar applied for repatriation or expatriation to Japan. Some applications, of course, were canceled.<sup>12</sup> One out of every four Terminal Island families was segregated at Tule Lake.<sup>13</sup> Of those in the Terminal Island Survey who returned to Los Angeles County, only one of every eight families had one or more members segregated at Tule Lake, and few members, if any, expatriated or repatriated. If the amount of loss was related to bitterness and refusal to swear "loyalty," we may guess that our sample of families lost less than the average for Terminal Islanders. It may be representative, however, of the families that remain in this country and can present their claims for losses suffered.

In the Terminal Island Survey sample were 97 families (18.1 per cent) of the 537 "other nonwhite" households in Census Tract 294 in April, 1940. The sample included 403 persons (17.9 per cent) of the 2,253 persons of "other races" enumerated by the 1940 Census. The 188 prewar workers comprised 16.7 per cent of the nonwhite labor force.

With regard to size of family or household, although our sample has too few one-person families and too many three-and-four-person families, it is within random sampling error.<sup>14</sup> The mean number of workers per family in the sample (1.9) was slightly less than the mean number of workers per nonwhite household in the Census enumeration (2.1

TABLE 36  
CLASS OF WORKER OF EMPLOYED PERSONS  
(Terminal Island Survey)

Class of worker	Terminal Island Survey, Nov., 1941 <sup>a</sup>		Census Tract 294, April, 1940 <sup>b</sup>		Terminal Island workers, Nov., 1941 <sup>c</sup>	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
Total	188	100.0	1,118 <sup>d</sup>	100.0	135 <sup>e</sup>	100.0
Employers (E) and own-account (OA) workers	43 <sup>f</sup>	22.8 <sup>f</sup>	65	5.8	24 <sup>g</sup>	17.8 <sup>g</sup>
Wage or salary workers in private (PW) or government (GW) employment	124	66.0	1,037	92.7	105	77.8
Unpaid family workers (NP)	21	11.2	16	1.4	6	4.4
Class of workers not reported	.	.	5	.	6	.

<sup>a</sup> Employment status as reported for November, 1941.

<sup>b</sup> U. S. Census, 1940 *Population and Housing. Statistics for Census Tracts Los Angeles-Long Beach, California*. These figures include all nonwhites, about 100 of whom were non-Japanese.

<sup>c</sup> 20 per cent random sample of all Japanese Americans employed prewar in Los Angeles County who entered War Relocation Authority Centers. From WRA Form 26, employment status as reported for November, 1941.

<sup>d</sup> Total labor force of 1,125 includes two unemployed and five persons with class of worker not known.

<sup>e</sup> 20 per cent sample of 143 includes two unemployed and six fishermen with class of worker not known. The latter probably are OA and E workers by our definitions, which would make OA and E workers 21.3 per cent of the total, and directly comparable with the Loss Survey cases.

<sup>f</sup> Includes 27 fishermen operating own boat or owning net. The U. S. Census classified these as PW since most are under contract to deliver catch to particular canneries. If the survey sample is so classified, the proportion of E and OA workers becomes 8.5 per cent, and the proportion of PW and GW workers increases to 80.3 per cent.

<sup>g</sup> Includes seven fishermen operating own boat. If classified with PW (see footnote f), the OA and E workers become 12.6 per cent of the total, and PW workers 83.0 per cent of the total.

workers). The age-sex distribution of our sample, however, is far different from that shown by the Census for "other races" resident in Tract 294. (See fig. 22.) The discrepancies are probably due to differential relocation to other areas and differential repatriation-expatriation by family types.<sup>15</sup>

The only published tract statistics on occupational status of nonwhites are for class of worker. Table 36 compares, by class of worker, the Terminal Island sample, the 1940 Census, and our 20 per cent

sample. Note that we classified fishermen who operated a boat and delivered the catch to canneries for a fixed price as independent workers and not merely employees. This is appropriate because they received no regular wage or salary, but rather a share of the price obtained for the catch. Although it was true that crew members on fishing boats also received their pay in shares of the catch, crew members were directly hired by the boat operator or master. Note also in table 36 the small

TABLE 37  
PREWAR OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS OF FAMILIES  
(Terminal Island Survey)

Occupational group, 1941	Number	Percentage
All families	97	100 0
Family enterprise	41	42 3
Trade . .	10	10 2
Personal service	2	2 1
Contract gardening.	2	2 1
Fishing, own boat or net	27	27 9
Families with employees only, by occupation		
of head of family	56	57 7
Clerical and sales workers	1	1 0
Canning and packing operatives	14	14 4
Service workers	3	3 1
Farm and nursery laborers	1	1 0
Other laborers	1	1 0
Fishermen, crew members on shares	36	37 2

number of unpaid family workers reported by the Census. With this population, such a low figure probably signifies that the Census classified some unpaid workers as wage workers and (or) failed to enumerate all unpaid family workers. With these modifications in mind, it appears that our Terminal Island sample contains slightly more employers and own-account workers and their unpaid family workers than their proportionate number in the prewar population.

In table 37 this weighting also appears. In 1930 there were 60 businesses, other than fishing, operated by Japanese on the island,<sup>10</sup> and this number remained about the same in 1940. The Census listed 65 persons as employers and "own-account" workers, and a few of them were partners. In our sample there were 14 families who had operated businesses, or about one-fourth of the total number of businesses, whereas our sample as a whole runs between 16 and 18 per cent of the total

population. There were 11 restaurants in 1930; we have 5 in our sample, but 4 of the families began their operation after 1930. All occupations of individual wage and salary workers from Terminal Island are represented in the sample in proper proportion.<sup>17</sup>

Relocation was much slower among Terminal Island families. Only 22 (22.7 per cent) in the Terminal Island Survey had one or more members relocated before the Coast was opened in January, 1945. In only 4 (4.1 per cent) was the complete family living outside the centers, and all 4 were voluntary evacuees who had never been in a relocation center.

TABLE 38  
DEPENDENCE UPON FAMILY ENTERPRISE  
(Terminal Island Survey)

Family occupational group	Number of families	Workers in family enterprise	Workers outside family
All families . . . . .	97	63	125
Percentage of total workers . . . . .	100 0	33 5	66 5
Family enterprise . . . . .			
Business . . . . .	14	29	..
Fishing, own boat or net . . . . .	16	18	
Mixed* . . . . .	11	16	27
Employees only, inc. fishermen, crew members on shares . . . . .	36		66
Wage and salary workers only . . . . .	20		32

\* Family enterprise plus one or more wage or salary workers outside the family enterprise

Of the total evacuee population, 45.5 per cent of the families had at least one member and 19.1 per cent had the complete unit relocated by January, 1945.<sup>18</sup> By the end of June, 1945, 35 Terminal Island families (36.1 per cent) had one or more members relocated, but no complete units had yet left the relocation centers. Of all evacuee families, 58.4 per cent had at least one member relocated by August 1, and 37.6 per cent of all families were completely relocated. In other words, of Terminal Island families in our sample who went to relocation centers, no complete units relocated before the compulsory relocation program was announced in August, 1945. Of those families in which at least one member relocated before that date, half had members in the Armed Forces.

To round out the description of the sample, at the time of the survey 74 (76.3 per cent) of the families were living in trailers, 10 (10.3 per

cent) in the housing project, and 11 (11.3 per cent) were living outside. In two cases the type of housing was not known to us. This may be compared with the Loss Survey families, of whom 49.0 per cent (101 of 206) were in trailers, 19.9 per cent (41) in the housing project, and 31.1 per cent (64) outside or unknown.<sup>39</sup> The more disadvantageous position of the Terminal Islanders in securing housing is clearly indicated. As to family size, 61 families (62.9 per cent) still had all their 1942 members, plus whatever additions had occurred. Like the Loss Survey group, Nisei parents were disproportionately represented: 12 out of 15 families with one or both parents Nisei remained intact, but this was true of only 27 out of 58 families with Issei parents.

Fewer Terminal Island families were engaged in independent enterprise (table 37) than in the total Japanese American population, and two-thirds of the persons in the labor force were employed outside family enterprises (table 38). Thus there was less direct interdependence of members in the Island families. But the community's integration with fishing was such that anything that affected fishing had immediate impact upon the whole community. Of 188 gainfully employed, 75 per cent were fishermen (81) or fish cannery workers (60). Almost all the remainder were in businesses servicing the fishing industry or the community.



We are now prepared to describe the severity of losses incurred by this part of the population. Table 39 and figure 23 present the median losses per family and per family per adult for the Terminal Island occupational groups. In comparing these median losses with those for the Loss Survey (table 32), the following points may be noted. There were relatively few Terminal Island businesses, but their losses throughout were greater than for non-Island businesses; they were able to save virtually nothing in the 48-hour period before removal. The Loss Survey businesses had a longer period for liquidation and were accessible to the non-Japanese population. They were therefore able to make sacrifice sales. Families of fishermen who owned boats or nets suffered about the same amount of property losses as business families in the non-Island population, but the former probably lost a greater proportion of their total prewar assets. Household and personal property losses in general are relatively low among the nonbusiness families of the Island, not because such property was salvaged, but because not much had been accumulated in the small houses rented from the fish canneries. Income losses in general are high because most of the Terminal Island families

TABLE 39  
SUMMARY OF EVACUATION LOSSES  
(Terminal Island Survey)<sup>a</sup>

Family occupational group	No. of families	Mean No. of adults per family	Median per family loss						Median per family per adult loss				
			Household and personal property	Occupational property	Total property	Income, in 1941 dollars	Fees and ex-penses	Total	Household and personal property	Occupational property	Total property	Income, in 1941 dollars, per worker	Total
All families	97	2 8	\$ 735	\$1,833 <sup>b</sup>	\$1,196	\$7,500	\$164	\$10,982	\$291	\$567 <sup>c</sup>	\$464	\$4,500	\$4,107
Family enterprise, business	14	3 0	1,750	7,000	10,000	8,500	175	21,250	600	1,700	2,750	4,250	6,250
Fishermen, own boat or net	27	3 3	695	2,250	3,500	8,250	170	13,440	233	580	775	5,500	5,250
Fishermen, crew members on shares	36	2 7	714	322 <sup>d</sup>	818	8,833	120	10,434	300	100 <sup>e</sup>	346	4,850	4,188
Wage and salary workers only	20	2 2	500		500	4,000	200	5,500	233		233	2,875	2,800

<sup>a</sup> See footnotes to table 32 for explanation of how dollar values were reached and how to read figures

<sup>b</sup> Number of families = 50

\*Some crew members on share basis had occupational equipment such as tools, corks, ropes, etc. Number of families = 9.




Fig. 23. Summary of evacuation losses (Terminal Island Survey.) For explanation of items see text, pp. 142-143, and footnotes to table 32, p. 144.






Fig. 24. Distribution of per family property losses and per family income losses, by cumulative percentages. (Terminal Island Survey)

remained in the relocation centers until they were closed. Among families of crew members, a large proportion of whose women worked part time in the canneries, income losses are highest. Income losses per family per worker are relatively higher than among Loss Survey families, both because of the longer average period in the relocation centers and because of the smaller number of unpaid family workers in the Terminal Island sample. The figures for fees and expenses are too low because of incomplete returns on living costs during the interval between their removal from the Island and their entering assembly centers. For two months they were in no position to seek new employment.

In summary, median losses for families in the Terminal Island sample reflect lower property losses because these families had less to lose, and higher income losses because of long residence in the relocation centers. Median losses per family per adult and per worker were relatively higher because of the smaller number of adults per family in this sample. For all families considered together, median total loss figures are fairly close to those for families in the Loss Survey, but the losses represent a greater proportion of the total prewar assets of the Terminal Island families.

The distribution for Terminal Island families of property losses per family and per adult and income losses per family and per worker are shown as cumulative percentages in figures 24, 25, and 26. Several comparisons may be made with the distributions among the Loss Survey families.<sup>20</sup> Among Terminal Islanders the various occupational groups show greater divergencies. Of business families, 36 per cent had property losses greater than \$20,000, but of families with only wage and salary workers, excluding fishermen, 50 per cent had property losses of \$500 or less. Although the range of losses for Terminal Island families was about the same as that for Loss Survey families, a greater proportion of the former are in the lower part of the distribution. The various occupational groups among the Terminal Island families also show wider divergencies in income losses per family, but the curves for all families in each sample are similar, i.e., approximately the same proportion of Terminal Island and Loss Survey families had income losses of any specified amount.

The same facts appear in the comparison of Terminal Island and Loss Survey families with regard to property losses per family per adult and income losses per family per worker. Note that among Terminal Island families a very small proportion had per family per worker income losses of less than \$2,000, reflecting the postponement of relocation by these families until a relatively late date.




Fig. 25. Distribution of per family per adult property losses and per family per worker income losses, by cumulative percentages. (Terminal Island Survey)




Fig. 26. Distribution of per family and per family per adult combined property and income losses, by cumulative percentages. (Terminal Island Survey)

Figures 24 and 25 indicate that among Terminal Island families, as among the families in the Loss Survey, income losses were greater than property losses, even when anticipated income was estimated at the lowest possible figure, i.e., at 1941 income levels. Table 40 presents a

TABLE 40  
RELATIVE SIZE OF PROPERTY LOSS AND INCOME LOSS  
(Terminal Island Survey)

	All families	Family enterprise		Fisher- men, crew members	Wage and salary workers only
		Business	Fisher- men, own boat		
Number of families . . . . .	89	13	21	35	20
Percentage. . . . .	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Income loss greater than property loss . . . . .	73	7	12	35	19
Percentage . . . . .	82 0	53 8	57 2	100 0	95 0
Property loss greater than income loss. . . . .	16	6	9	0	1
Percentage. . . . .	18 0	46 2	42 8	0 0	5 0
Number of families for which data incomplete . . . . .	8	1	6	1	0

tabulation by individual families. Whereas almost half of the business families and families with fishing boats or nets lost more in property than in income—a reflection of their extremely heavy property losses—almost all other families lost more in income than in property. Of all the families, 82 per cent had greater income losses than property losses. Distributions of combined property and income losses were very similar for the Terminal Island and Loss Survey samples (figs 26 and 18).

The conditions under which Terminal Island families were evacuated are reflected in the tabulation of reasons for loss (table 41). We recorded as “abandoned” the household and personal property that could not be removed from the rented buildings in the 48-hour period allowed. The situation was somewhat different for business families who owned combined residences and stores. Household and occupational property was often locked up at the time of Evacuation and lost when the government later destroyed most of the buildings on the Island. Such losses were classified under “other” reasons. Note that among Terminal Island fami-

TABLE 41  
 REASONS FOR PROPERTY LOSSES BY KINDS OF PROPERTY  
 (Terminal Island Survey)  
 (Percentage of dollar loss)

Family occupational group and reason for loss	Household and personal property	Occupational property	Total property
All families			
Loss by sale	27 3	26 9	27 0
Loss by abandonment	34 2	11 5	17 6
Loss in storage	8 7	14 2	12 8
Loss, other	29 8	47 4	42 6
Amount lost .	\$112,174	\$305,070	\$417,244
Family enterprise, business			
Loss by sale	10 4	25 8	22 6
Loss by abandonment	24 8	7 2	10 9
Loss in storage	4 5	4 1	4 1
Loss, other .	60 3	62 9	62 4
Amount lost	\$45,264	\$167,581	\$212,845
Fishermen, own boat or net			
Loss by sale .	36 8	28 7	29 8
Loss by abandonment	44 9	15 8	19 7
Loss in storage	15 7	26 6	25 2
Loss, other	2 6	28 9	25 4
Amount lost	\$20,872	\$134,753	\$155,625
Fishermen, crew members on shares			
Loss by sale . . .	39 6	3 8	36 6
Loss by abandonment	41 5	66 9	43 6
Loss in storage	10 1	29 3	11 7
Loss, other	8 8	0 0	8 1
Amount lost	\$30,132	\$2,736	\$32,868
Wage and salary workers only			
Loss by sale	39 4		39 4
Loss by abandonment	32 8		32 8
Loss in storage	9 3		9 3
Loss, other	18 4		18 4
Amount lost	\$15,906		\$15,906

lies only about one-fourth of all property losses were from sales, as compared with half among Loss Survey families (table 34). The proportion abandoned is not very different between Island and Loss Survey families, an indication that the monetary value of the household furnishings left behind on the Island was small relative to the loss by confiscation or sale of houses, stores, boats, and nets. The data of table 41 are presented graphically in figures 27 and 28.




Fig. 27. Reasons for property losses by family occupational group. (Terminal Island Survey)

Terminal Island families appeared to have better evidence to support claims than Loss Survey families (table 42) because the former had government documents for confiscated real property, and wage and salary workers had prewar income records in the form of receipts for social-security tax deductions. Some 60 per cent of Island families, as compared with 50 per cent of Loss Survey families, had impersonal evidence to substantiate part of their claims. Since Terminal Islanders had worked for the big canneries, they more frequently paid such taxes than did Loss Survey wage and salary workers who had been in the clerical-sales, farm labor, and domestic servant categories. As with Loss Survey families, we cannot determine whether families with total losses of \$2,500 or less have more or less documentary evidence than families with losses greater than \$2,500.

It will be advantageous here to supply some reference points for the interpretation of statistical statements about occupational property losses. Parker obtained complete information from 63 fishermen, of whom 25 were crew members, 21 were equipment owners, and 17 were boat owners. The distribution and details of equipment losses of boat and equipment owners are shown in table 43. Among the equipment owners, losses ranged from \$45 to \$22,650. Equipment losses suffered by boat owners ranged from nothing to \$17,500. Losses on boats ranged




Fig. 28. Reasons for property losses, all families, by kind of property.  
(Terminal Island Survey)

from \$200 on a small jig boat to \$34,000 on one of the largest seiners. The combined losses of boat owners are presented in table 44.

The difficulty in estimating losses in the sale of fishing property is illustrated in the extreme case of the tuna boat owned by a corporation made up of B16 and three other Nisei. The 110-foot seiner was mortgaged for \$30,000 to Cannery D. When war made it necessary to dispose of the boat and pay off the mortgage, the boat was appraised at a replacement value of \$65,000. Today B16 feels that this was a fair valuation for the boat and estimates losses from it. Cannery D, however, would pay only \$1,000 for the boat, in addition to their mortgage, and demanded either their money or the boat. Considering the sum inadequate, B16 and his associates decided to insure the boat and charter it out for the period of their absence. The insurance company would not write a policy until the boat had been given a new bottom, which would have cost nearly as much as the mortgage already on the boat. B16 is convinced today that the insurance company representatives and the cannery worked in connivance to force him to turn the boat over to the



cannery, which he finally did. Although B16's estimate of a \$34,000 loss on this boat is used in discussing the case, the new bottom, if actually needed, might have made up most of the difference between the \$31,000 received and the \$65,000 valuation claimed.

Lack of reliability was more commonly due to other factors. We know that a new tuna net cost about \$8,000 and a sardine net about \$5,000 in 1941. Therefore, when someone claimed that his tuna net was worth

TABLE 42  
NATURE OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS  
(Terminal Island Survey)

Family occupational group	No evidence of any kind		Witnesses, letters, or diaries only		Other evidence <sup>a</sup>		Total	
	No.	Per-centage	No.	Per-centage	No.	Per-centage	No.	Per-centage
All families . . . . .	27	27 8	12	12 3	58	59 9	97	100 0
Family enterprise								
Business . . . . .	3	21 4	2	14 5	9	64 1	14	100 0
Fishing, own boat . . . . .	10	37 0	4	14 8	13	48 2	27	100 0
Employees only, including fishermen crew members on shares . . . . .	14	25 0	6	10 7	36	64 3	56	100 0

<sup>a</sup> Income-tax returns, sales-tax returns, cash books, storage and transport receipts

\$10,000 when he had to abandon it on Terminal Island docks in February, 1942, we may suspect but we cannot be certain that he overvalued it. Tuna nets vary in size and in the quality of netting. The resultant difference in value may easily account for a differential of \$2,000-\$3,000. Actual depreciation also varies a great deal, depending on the care given the net.

The frank admission that absolute reliability cannot be claimed for some specific figures obtained by the study does not mean that the loss data should be ignored. The case cited does indicate the kind of difficulties that will be encountered in administering a loss bill. That there were substantial and often disastrous losses is beyond question.

Boat owners could either sell their boats or charter them for the indeterminate period of their absence. Net owners also had but two possible choices. They could sell their nets or store them for their own future use, but because nets deteriorate rapidly in storage, the latter was hardly an alternative. As sellers the boat owners were in a very

poor bargaining position. Pressed for time as they were, it is not surprising that only one boat was sold without loss (table 44, p. 184). Some owners tried to retain control by chartering the boats to Caucasians during the evacuation period.

B6, for example, made an agreement with Cannery A whereby the latter would get the catch and act as his agent in chartering the boat for the duration of the war. He was to receive the boat's share of 20 per cent, approximately three and three-fourths shares, of the catch returns during that time. Out of this he was to pay for the upkeep of the boat and pay the captain an extra one-fourth share. When B6 returned to Los Angeles in August, 1945, he was presented with a bill for \$7,000, which the cannery claimed had been the excess of expenses over income from the operation of the boat during his absence. Whether B6's operation of the boat during this period would have had similar results is a matter for pure speculation. He was reluctant at the time of interview to make charges of mismanagement against the agent cannery because he was negotiating with the same cannery over the loss or theft of several nets from the cannery warehouse during the war period.

Unusual risks of sale, also, were faced by boat owners. When the war began, a Nisei owned a fantail for which sale was arranged through an agent who promised to deliver the sale price "the next day." The papers transferring title had been signed, but he had received no money, and after Evacuation he lost track of the purchaser. When he returned to Los Angeles in January, 1947, he found the purchaser and at the time of interview had renewed hopes of collecting his money. Incidentally, he had learned that the boat had been put up for resale in October, 1945. This case illustrates, among other things, the ineffectiveness of the WRA property office in handling even the most blatant instances of fraudulent practice. We suggest that even a gesture at making recovery would have been effective, for the date on which the boat was put up for resale, October, 1945, coincides much too closely with the time of the closing of the centers. The "purchaser" seems to have been remarkably alert to what was going on in the relocation centers.

Discriminatory legislation against Issei that prohibited them from owning large fishing craft made them especially vulnerable to exploitation. However, the boats could be owned by United States citizens who had reached majority, and, as for real estate, title was vested in Nisei relatives or other citizens. Frequently, arrangements were made with one of the canneries with which the Issei had done business. Legally, the citizen-owner was expected to have a 51 per cent interest in the boat. In

TABLE 43  
ITEMIZED EQUIPMENT LOSSES OF 1941 BOAT AND EQUIPMENT OWNERS  
(Parker Interviews)

Case	Equipment	1942 value	Disposition	Loss on item	Total loss	Remarks
B1	Tuna net	\$8,000	Forfeited			
	Sardine net	3,000	Forfeited			
	Mackerel net	3,000	Forfeited			
	Bait net	300	Forfeited			
	Miscellaneous	250	Forfeited			
B2	Bait net	500	Abandoned	\$ 500	\$9,950	(a)*
	Rope, leads, corks, lures, lines, etc	600	Abandoned	600	1,100	
B3	Tools	100	Abandoned	100		
	Lines	150	Abandoned	150	250	
B4	Sardine net	4,400	Sold	1,400	1,400	
B5	Bait, motor, rope, jugs, lines, etc	250	Abandoned	250	250	
B6	Sardine net	?	Stored	?	?	(b)
	Tuna net	?	Stored	?		
B7	Lures	200	Abandoned	200	200	
B8	Rope	350	Sold	345		
	Lines, jugs, anchor, chain, etc.	42	Abandoned	42	387	
B9	Corks	680	Stored	680		
	Rope	540	Stored	540		
	Netting	225	Stored	225		
	Miscellaneous	400	Stored	400	1,840	(c)
B10	Mackerel net	2,000	Stored	2,000		
	Sardine net	3,000	Stored	3,000		
	Bait net	1,000	Stored	1,000		
	Tuna net	4,000	Stored	4,000		
	Miscellaneous	300	Stored	300	10,300	(d)
B11	Tuna net	7,000	Stored	7,000		
	Sardine net	5,000	Stored	5,000		
	Mackerel net	4,000	Stored	4,000	17,500	(e)
B12	Equipment sold with boat; no itemized loss obtainable					
B13	Bait net	325	Sold	315		
	Gill net	600	Abandoned	600	915	
B15	Equipment sold with boat, no itemized loss obtainable					
B16					None	
B17	Sardine net	5,500	Sold	5,500		
	Bait net	500	Sold	500	6,000	(f)
E1	Mackerel net	3,000	Abandoned	3,000		
	Bait net	300	Abandoned	300	3,300	
E2	Engineer's tools	90	Abandoned	90	90	
E3	Tuna net	4,500	Stored	4,500	4,500	(g)
E4	Tuna net	3,500	Stored	3,500		
	Sardine net	3,000	Sold	2,400		
	Mackerel net	1,000	Stored	1,000		
	Bait net	450	Stored	450		
	2 wagons	30	Abandoned	30	7,380	(h)
E5	Tuna net	10,000	Stored			
	Sardine net	9,000	Stored			
	Bait net	5,000	Stored			
	Radio-telephone	500	Stored			
	Engineer's tools	450	Stored		21,150	(i)
E6	Tuna net	7,000	Stored			
	Sardine net	1,700	Stored			
	Cork and leads	1,000	Stored			
	Rope	200	Stored		7,400	(j)

\* See footnotes to table.

TABLE 43—Continued

Case	Equipment	1942 value	Disposition	Loss on item	Total loss	Remarks
E7	300 yds. set lines	\$ 90	Sold	\$ 45	\$ 45	
E8	Bait net	850	Abandoned	850		
	Lines and lures	1,115	Abandoned	1,115		
	Engineer's tools	45	Abandoned	45		
	Carpenter tools	75	Abandoned	75	2,085	
E9	Tuna net	3,500	Sold			
	Sardine net	1,500	Sold			
	Mackerel net	1,500	Sold			
	Netting	1,000	Sold			
	Rope and leads	500	Sold		5,000	
E10	Tuna net	7,000	Sold	10,500 to		
	2 sardine nets	8,000	Sold	13,150		(k)
	Mackerel net	3,500	Abandoned	3,500		
	Netting, rope, cork, and leads	5,000	Abandoned	5,000	19,000 to 21,650	
E11	2 skiffs	175	Abandoned	175		
	2 sets of oars	15	Abandoned	15		
	Lures	50	Abandoned	50		
	Tools	20	Abandoned	20	260	
E12	Bait tank	300	Abandoned	300		
	Bait net	400	Stored	400		
	Tools	250	Stored	250	950	(l)
E13	Lines and lures	100	Abandoned	100	100	
E14	Tuna net	1,500	Stored	1,500		
	Sardine net	1,000	Stored	1,000		
	Mackerel net	1,000	Stored	1,000		
	Bait net	850	Stored	850		
	Rope	300	Stored	300		
	Miscellaneous	125	Abandoned	125	4,775	(m)
E15	Sardine net	6,000	Abandoned	6,000	6,000	
E16	Engineer's tools		Stored		None	(n)
E17	Lines and lures	200	Abandoned	200	200	
E18	Bait net	500	Abandoned	500	500	
E19	Rope, lines, and lures	500	Abandoned	500	500	
E20	Bait net	800	Abandoned	800		
	Gill net	1,500	Abandoned	1,500		
	Brail net and tools	1,000	Abandoned	1,000	3,300	
E21	Boots, raincoat, gloves, etc	110	Abandoned	110	110	

\* Property stored, then seized and sold under federal supervision to liquidate a debt on the nets. Loss is the value of the property less the amount of the debt. B1 received no return from the sale.

<sup>b</sup> Netting rotted, corks, ropes, and leads stolen. B6 declined to set a value on them. He considers the cannery responsible for part of his loss and is still negotiating with them.

<sup>c</sup> Missing from storage.

<sup>d</sup> Deteriorated beyond use while in storage.

<sup>e</sup> Deteriorated beyond use while in storage. Total loss includes \$1,500 in storage fees paid over a four-year period.

<sup>f</sup> Sold by the cannery, which did not reimburse B17.

<sup>g</sup> Netting rotted, corks, leads, and ropes stolen from storage.

<sup>h</sup> Nets left in cannery warehouse with understanding that there would be no storage fees. While E4 was interned the warehouse was sold. The new owner claimed storage fees at the rate of 1¢ per square foot had accumulated to the sum of \$760, and in 1944 demanded this sum at once. E4 let the nets go for storage, since he could not handle the matter himself while still in camp, and assumed that the nets had already rotted.

<sup>i</sup> Property sold under federal supervision to settle a debt. E5, in relocation center, received nothing from the sale. Loss total is the value less the \$3,800 debt.

<sup>j</sup> Property stored in 1942. Later claimed and sold by a hardware company to cover an unpaid balance due on nets. Loss total is value of the property less the \$2,500 debt.

<sup>k</sup> Tuna and sardine nets sold for \$4,500. Payment on the check was stopped by a lien placed against it by a cannery for alleged debts. E10 denies the debt and is suing for the rest of the \$4,500. Loss on nets will depend on outcome of the suit.

<sup>l</sup> Stolen from storage.

<sup>m</sup> Stored items deteriorated or were damaged beyond use.

<sup>n</sup> Still in storage.

TABLE 44  
OCCUPATIONAL PROPERTY LOSSES OF 1941 BOAT OWNERS  
(Parker Interviews)

Case	Ownership of boat	Type of boat	Length of boat (feet)	1942 value	Disposition	Loss on boat	Loss on equipment <sup>a</sup>	Total loss
B1	Individual	Purse seiner	64	\$15,000	Forced sale	\$ 3,000	\$ 9,950	\$12,950
B2	Individual	Jig	?	1,500	Forced sale	800	1,100	1,900
B3	Individual . . .	Jig	?	1,500	Forced sale	700	250	950
B4	Buying on time	Purse seiner	70	Equity of	Reposessed			
B5	Buying on time	Fantail	33	15,000	(nonpayment)	15,000	1,400	16,400
B6	Individual .	Purse seiner	80	Equity of	Reposessed	900	250	1,150
B7	Individual .	Purse seiner	70	35,000	(nonpayment)	7,000 <sup>b</sup>	In dispute	?
B8	Individual .	Jig	41	1,300	Chartered	None	200	200
B9	Corporation	Purse seiner	70	Equity of	Forced sale	900	387	1,287
B10	Individual .	Purse seiner	74	11,000	Forced sale	3,000	1,840	4,840
B11	Corporation .	Purse seiner	74	14,000	Forced sale.	10,000	10,300	20,300
B12	Individual . .	Jig	45	Equity of	Sale	1,000	17,500	18,500
B13	Individual	Fantail	48	7,500	Sale	600	None	600
B14	Individual	Jig	?	10,000	Forced sale	10,000 <sup>c</sup>	915	10,915
B15	Individual	Jig	32	1,000	Forced sale	700	?	?
B16	Corporation <sup>d</sup>	Purse seiner	110	1,000	Forced sale	200	None	200
B17	Corporation	Jig	?	65,000	Sale	34,000	None	34,000
				?	Sale	?	6,000	?

<sup>a</sup> See table 43 for itemized statement.

<sup>b</sup> Deficit from operation while chartered.

<sup>c</sup> Unable to collect sale price (\$5,000).

<sup>d</sup> Four Nisea with equal interests comprised the corporation. See pp. 179-180 of text for discussion of this case.

practice some of these arrangements were merely paper transfers supplemented with verbal agreements that left the Issei owner complete boss of his own boat. The legal position of such Issei owners was very precarious even in normal times. The following case may suggest the weakness of their position during the war.

B10 purchased a seiner in 1924. When the alien ownership restrictions were passed, he transferred 51 per cent of the stock to Cannery H, with the verbal agreement that this stock would be reassigned to his Nisei son when the latter became of age. When the war intervened, the boat was sold outright to Cannery H because it would have been too expensive to leave it idle for the duration. The price received was about one-third of B10's estimate of the boat's value.

Losses among equipment owners were not aggravated by restrictions on ownership. Sales of nets were, however, made hurriedly and at a loss. Many net owners tried to store their nets until they could return and use them. There were three types of loss while in storage. The netting deteriorated in storage; if the nets had been used before storage, there was little left of the netting when the owners reclaimed them three or more years later. Corks, leads, and ropes often remained in a good state of preservation, but these represented a small part of the total value of the original net. These durable parts were sometimes missing from storage when the owners went to reclaim their property. Owners generally charged that the warehouse management, usually canneries, had let other men go in and pick over the stored nets for what they wanted. Some fishermen suspected that the corks, leads, and ropes had been sold by the warehouse management. The third type of storage loss resulted from the payment of storage fees. One Issei was still paying fees on nets in storage at the time of his interview, although he had already paid approximately \$1,500. Often the net owners were unable to pay storage for long periods and let their equipment go for storage costs. Some net owners found sympathetic warehousemen who permitted them to store their equipment without charge, but when such arrangements were made neither party realized how long the need would last. When the storage period became burdensomely long or when the responsibility conflicted with the warehouseman's wants, the evacuee's interest suffered.

E4 left his nets in Cannery G's warehouse with the understanding that no fees would be asked. During the war the warehouse was sold. In September, 1944, he received a letter from the lawyer of the new owner claiming \$760 in storage fees and stating that the nets would be sold if the fees were not paid. Unable to pay the fees, E4 now presumes that

TABLE 45  
PREWAR AND POSTWAR OCCUPATIONAL AND INCOME DISTRIBUTIONS BY INDIVIDUAL WORKERS  
(Terminal Island Survey)

Class of worker and occupation	1941		1946		Annual income*	1941		1946	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage		No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
Total	188	100 0	188	100 0	Total	188	100 0	188	100 0
Own enterprise	42	22 4	14	7 4	\$10,000 or more	0	0 0	0	0 0
Contract gardening	2	1 1	12	6 4	5,000-\$9,999	2	1 6	2	1 6
Produce	1	0 5	1	0 5	4,000-4,999	8	4 3	1	0 5
Fishing, own boat	27	14 4	0	0 0	3,000-3,999	12	6 3	4	2 1
Others	12	6 4	1	0 5	2,500-2,999	9	4 8	1	0 5
Unpaid family workers	21	11 2	0	0 0	2,000-2,499	6	3 2	13	6 9
Fishermen	7	3 8	0	0 0	1,800-1,999	10	5 3	7	3 7
Others	14	7 4	0	0 0	1,600-1,799	10	5 3	8	4 3
Wage and salary workers	125	66 4	125	66 5	1,400-1,599	18	9 6	9	4 8
Professional, semiprofessional, and managerial	6	3 2	0	0 0	1,200-1,399	17	9 0	6	3 2
Clerical and sales workers	4	2 1	2	1 1	1,000-1,199	14	7 4	17	9 0
Craftsmen and foremen	1	0 5	4	2 1	800-999	12	6 3	20	10 6
Operatives, canning and packing	60	32 0	81	43 0	600-799	28	14 9	12	6 3
Operatives, except canning and packing	0	0 0	7	3 7	400-599	12	6 3	10	5 3
Domestic service workers	1	0 5	2	1 1	200-399	5	2 7	7	3 7
Other service workers	4	2 1	2	1 1	0-199	6	3 2	4	2 1
Farm and nursery laborers	1	0 5	7	3 8	Income not known	19	10 1	34	18 1
Fishermen, crew	47	25 0	13	6 9	Unemployed or not in labor market			30	16 0
Other laborers	1	0 5	7	3 7	Died			3	1 6
Unemployed	0	0 0	2	1 1					
Not in labor force			28	15 0					
Army			5	2 8					
Other...			23	12 2					
Employment status not known			16	8 5					
Died			3	1 6					
					Median income for all employed persons				
						\$1,288			\$1,088

\* Income from family enterprise prorated equally among family workers.

his tuna net and mackerel net have been sold. Again there is no record of WRA assistance.

Two less common cases fall in neither the boat nor equipment category. In November, 1941, E10 paid a charter fee of \$4,500 cash in advance to the "I" Boat Building Company of Tacoma, Washington, for the use of a 78-foot seiner for the duration of the sardine season. He had just got the boat into good condition and was starting out on regular sardine runs when the war began. The boat was returned to the control of its owners, but no part of his charter fee was refunded to E10.


B10 was a storekeeper on Terminal Island and also owned a seiner and \$10,000 worth of nets. As storekeeper he had extended \$25,000 in credit to individual fishermen and their families. Some of this credit had been given to the fishermen for the purchase of special nets that B10 imported for them from Japan. The rest represented charged grocery accounts. He had been unable to collect anything on these debts at the time of interview.



Table 45, based on the Terminal Island Survey, compares the distribution of occupations for Terminal Islanders in the labor force in 1941 with the distribution of occupations for the same persons in 1946. Note that the 1946 column accounts for those who were working in 1941 but not in 1946. It does not include any who entered the labor force after 1941, because our objective in the survey was to provide the basis for loss estimates. In 1941, fishermen with their own boats constituted the largest proportion of self-employed workers. In 1946 only a few workers were self-employed, as contract gardeners for the most part; none were fishermen. The absence of unpaid family workers in 1946 indicates that even the self-employed had not established family enterprises in the prewar sense. At least 15 per cent of the prewar workers did not return to the labor force. Information is lacking on the 1946 occupational status of 16 prewar workers, but most of these had retired or were wage workers. Wage and salary workers constituted about the same proportion of the labor force in 1946 as in 1941, but they were even more heavily concentrated in cannery work. There were fewer professionals, clerical workers, and fishermen crew members in 1946.

It will help in understanding what happened to the occupational status of Japanese Americans if we refer to figures 29 and 30, which show changes in status of individual workers classified by age, sex, and occupational group in 1941. On the vertical scale, occupations of wage and salary workers and unpaid family workers are arranged according









Fig. 29. Changes in occupational status, prewar workers in family enterprise: Business and fishing boat or net owners, by sex and age, 1942. (Terminal Island Survey)






Fig. 30. Changes in occupational status, prewar wage and salary workers and fishermen crew members, by sex and age, 1942. (Terminal Island Survey)

to the Census classification. We have modified the Census classification somewhat, and the order may be regarded as a rough scale of status, a composite of skill, income, and prestige. Fishermen crew members on shares are classified by the Census as laborers, but we have listed them between craftsmen and operatives in recognition of their relative skill and income. We have included, in the category of own-account workers, proprietors, who are reported by the Census together with managers, and contract gardeners and fishermen with their own boats, who are reported as laborers by the Census. Farmers and nursery operators are listed first in order to place them near other own-account workers on the scale.

Figure 29 shows that most prewar proprietors, fishermen, and unpaid family workers were employed in 1946 as laborers or fish cannery operatives or had left the labor market. Figure 30 shows the changes in occupational status of prewar wage and salary workers and fishermen crew members on shares. Of the crewmen, a few became contract gardeners, half of those in the youngest age group returned to fishing, and the majority of those over thirty years of age went to work in the fish canneries. Among females, the principal prewar occupation was fish cleaning and packing, on a seasonal and often part-time basis; they have returned to this work or left the labor market.

Of prewar Nisei fishermen interviewed by Parker, six who had not returned to fishing were engaged in factory or cannery work, contract gardening,<sup>2</sup> and transient farm labor. Four of them asserted that they lacked confidence in the younger fishermen who were running the boats, and would have returned to fishing had the Issei been licensed to fish. Issei were unable to secure commercial fishing licenses in California until June, 1948.<sup>21</sup> One Nisei who was on the crew of a local boat said that he planned to go to Astoria, Oregon, where Issei could fish. In the interviews Nisei did not imply that the Issei would give them competition for jobs. Rather, they hoped for a change in regulations that would permit the experienced Issei to rejoin the fishing fleet.

Of thirty-seven Issei interviewed by Parker (see table 46), seventeen were working in canneries at Long Beach and Wilmington. Two were selling fish and one was licensed to fish because his service in the United States Army in World War I gave him citizenship. Seven had retired because of age or illness and, with two exceptions, considered themselves permanently out of the labor market; three were gardening; and two were farming. Another had done seasonal farming during 1946, but had been employed principally as a cannery worker and has been so classified

TABLE 46  
1941 ROLE AND 1946 SITUATION OF ISSEI PREWAR FISHERMEN  
(Parker Interviews)

Case	Age in 1946	Prewar occupation					1946 occupation					Reason for not fishing			Present desired occupation			
		Owner-skipper	Charterer	Fish captain	Crew member	Miscellaneous	Cannery operative	Farmer, farm laborer, gardener	Miscellaneous	Retired	Unemployed	License ban	Age	Preference	Corporation purchaser	Charterer	Crew member	Retired
B2	60	X																
B7	51			X			X				X							
B8	50	X									X							
B9	70	X									X							
B10	71					(a)					X			X				
B11	48	X					X				X				X			
B12	41	X					X				X							
B15	55	X					Fishing as crew member											
E4	45		X				X				X							
E5	63		X				X				X				X			
E6	58				X					X	X					X		
E7	71				X		X				X					X		
E8	69				X		X				X					X		
E9	48			X			X				X					X		
E10	57		X							X	X					X		
E11	59				X						X	X						X
E12	44					(b)				X	X					X		
E13	59				X		X				X					X		
E14	50			X			X				X				X			
E15	59				X						X		X	See prefer col				
E16	?					(c)		X			X						X	
E19	68				X							X						X
E20	59			X							III							III
E21	49				X		X				X					X		
C1	58				X		X				X					X		
C3	47			X					X		X					X		
C6	49				X		X				X					X		
C7	45					(d)			X		X					X		
C10	36				X			X			X					X		
C13	?				X		X				X					X		
C14	57			X					X		X					X		
C16	61				X			X			X		X			X		X
C17	61				X			X			X					X		
C18	42					(e)	X				X					X		
C19	59		X				X				X					X		
C21	55				X		X				X					X		
C25	69				X				X		X		X			X		X
Total		6	4	6	16	5	17	5	6	7	2	29	5	1	1	8	19	7

\* Nonoperating owner.

\* Skipper.

\* Engineer.

\* Skiff man.

\* Cook.

TABLE 47  
UNEMPLOYMENT AND INCOME OF PREWAR FISHERMEN, 1941 AND 1946  
(Parker Interviews)

Case	1941			1946		
	Months unem- ployed*	Average earnings per month worked	Annual income	Months unem- ployed*	Average earnings per month worked	Annual income
<i>Issei</i>						
B2	0	\$136	\$1,500	Retired		
B7	0	423	4,658	0	\$200	\$2,375
B8	0	673	7,500	0	133	1,600
B9	2	555	5,000	9	300	900
B10	0	136	1,500	Retired		
B11	0	364	4,000	8	250	1,000
B12	0	273	3,000	7	160	800
B15	?	?	?	?	180	1,800
E2	5	316	1,900	0	142	1,700
E4	?	?	?	?	62	250
E5	1	600	6,000	3	145	1,400
E6	0	47	520	Retired		
E7	5	100	600	?	80	80
E8	8	260	800	8	260	1,050
E9	0	140	1,680	0	145	1,751
E10	0	250	2,750	12	0	0
E11	0	150	1,800	Retired		
E12	0	363	4,300	12	0	0
E13	4	214	1,500	5	100	700
E14	0	133	1,500	2	177	1,775
E15	7	725	2,900	0	170	2,040
E16	2	133	1,200	?	?	?
E19	0	164	1,800	Retired		
E20	0	409	4,500	Retired		
E21	3	125	1,000	2	257	1,800
C1	1	100	1,000	0	100	1,200
C3	0	209	2,300	3	200	1,800
C6	0	164	1,800	3	166	1,500
C7	6	340	1,700	0	167	2,000
C10	0	175	2,100	0	185	2,220
C13	2	122	1,100	?	?	?
C16	0	150	1,800	5	150	1,040
C17	0	145	1,600	3	166	1,500
C18	0	173	1,900	0	191	2,287
C19	3	278	2,222	9	98	295
C21	0	127	1,400	0	173	2,077
C25	?	?	700	Retired		

\* See footnote to table.

TABLE 47—Continued

Case	1941			1946		
	Months unemployed*	Average earnings per month worked	Annual income	Months unemployed*	Average earnings per month worked	Annual income
<i>Nisei</i>						
B1	?	?	\$1,500	?	?	\$ 700
B3	0	\$273	3,000	0	\$160	1,500
B4	0	318	3,500	0	250	1,500
B5	0	409	4,500	0	375	4,500
B6	0	181	2,000	0	150	1,500
B13	5	50	300	Army		
B16	0	150	1,800	6	250	1,500
B17	5	200	1,200	0	120	480
E1	3	312	2,500	Army		
E3	1	307	3,073	2	175	1,750
C2	0	250	3,000	0	158	1,900
C4	0	273	3,000	4	240	1,920
C5	0	374	4,117	0	180	1,800
C8	2	133	1,200	3	255	2,300
C9	0	300	3,600	8	180	700
C11	0	636	7,000	?	?	?
C15	1	300	3,000	0	283	3,400
C20	1	120	1,200	1	150	1,200
C22	2	133	1,200	0	183	2,200
C23	0	227	2,500	4	40	317
C24	0	250	3,000	2	100	1,000

\* Unemployed means not working and seeking work. It does not include time during vacations, illnesses, etc. December, 1941, when almost all fishing was suspended, and any time spent in relocation centers in early 1946, are also excluded from unemployment calculations.

in our data. Of the rest, two were unemployed throughout 1946, one was a laborer at a ship supply company, one was a dishwasher, and another operated a filling machine in a mattress factory. In summary, nearly one-fifth of the Issei interviewed had retired. Of those working, two-thirds found jobs in the fishing and canning industries, five were in farming or gardening, and the rest were in diverse occupations. Because repatriation figures are not broken down by occupations, we do not know how many prewar fishermen were repatriated to Japan. A former official of the Southern California Japanese Fishermen's Association estimated that about half of the Issei returned to Japan.

Almost all employed Issei (28) asserted that only their inability to secure licenses kept them from fishing. A single respondent said that he



preferred the job he then held, and seven reported that they were too old to fish. Of those who wished to resume fishing, nineteen planned to be crew members, one wished to help his son purchase a seiner, and eight intended to charter boats. However, five of those who said they would like to return to fishing may have been too old for the rather strenuous life, and it is too early to estimate the effects of the Supreme Court decision on Issei employment.

As fishermen the Issei were skilled workmen, but in their 1947 jobs they were unskilled laborers and their pay was below their expected earnings in fishing. Had it been possible for the Nisei to work with the Issei, the former would also have had greater earnings because of more efficient operations. Furthermore, because of additional apprenticeship training the Nisei would continue to be more productive after the Issei retired.

Other variables affect the reestablishment of Japanese Americans in the fishing industry. The vacancies left by them were filled after the Evacuation, although often at a lower level of skill. In 1945, 1946, and 1947, sardines were scarce in northern waters; so the smaller fishing fleets from Monterey and San Francisco moved into the Los Angeles area. Although the 1946 Los Angeles sardine catch was good, the yield per boat was reduced by this additional competition. In 1947 the Los Angeles sardine catch was poor.<sup>22</sup> Up to the time of our survey in 1947, only about one-tenth of the approximately 550 prewar Japanese American fishermen had been able to reënter the local industry. We estimated that less than half of prewar Issei fishermen, who had numbered less than 400, were prepared to return to fishing.

Table 45 gives the distribution of individual workers from Terminal Island by income level in 1941 and 1946. Note the absolute drop in median income in 1946. In chapter ii we analyzed the implications for Japanese Americans of the general rise in income and price levels between 1941 and 1946. The income level of Terminal Islanders relative to the rest of the Japanese American population may be seen in figure 8 and by comparing tables 15 and 45. In the prewar period the median income of Terminal Island workers was somewhat higher than that of other Japanese Americans, but fewer workers from Terminal Island had very high or very low incomes. The same situation obtained in per worker income, shown in table 16.

The mean period of unemployment<sup>23</sup> was 19.35 weeks. Of 141 prewar residents of Terminal Island in the labor force in 1946, 88, or 62.5 per cent, were unemployed for some part of the year. The mean period of

unemployment was 24.71 weeks. (See table 17 ) The Parker survey (see table 47) found that, of 34 Issei fishermen for whom 1941 unemployment data were available, 13 had been unemployed for an average of 3.8 months. Of this sample, we secured information on 25 who were in the 1946 labor force; 15 of them were unemployed in 1946 for an average of 6.1 months. Similarly, for a Nisei sample of 21, 8 had been unemployed in 1941 for an average of 2.5 months; of 17 for whom we have 1946 data, 8 were unemployed for an average of 3.8 months. The Issei suffered relatively more than the Nisei both in rate and duration of unemployment during resettlement. The median annual income for 56 fishermen in 1941 was \$1,900. Of 46 who were again in the labor force and for whom we have 1946 data, the median annual income was \$1,500, or less than 80 per cent that of 1941, in spite of the higher general wage and price level.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE TREATMENT OF EVACUEE CLAIMS

IN CHAPTERS V and VI we discussed the ways in which losses were incurred; the dimensions, kinds and distribution of losses; and the kind of evidence available to substantiate claims. On that foundation we can examine the claims law and indicate the criteria for determining the adequacy of the legislation and its administration.

In the second session of the 79th Congress, in the spring of 1946, companion bills S 2127 and HR 6780 were introduced. The bills were reported favorably by the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House and the Senate passed its bill unanimously. In the final days of the session, HR 6780 was brought to the floor of the House, but failed to gain consideration under the unanimous consent rule. In the 80th Congress, the same bill was introduced as HR 2768, and the Judiciary Committee reported favorably a somewhat revised version, HR 3999. Further revised, the bill was passed by the House and Senate in the last days of the second session and became law on July 2, 1948. It is designated Public Law 886 of the 80th Congress.<sup>1</sup>

Whereas the first bill provided for an Evacuation Claims Commission of three men under the general supervision of the Secretary of the Interior, HR 3999 gives jurisdiction to the Attorney General. Claims are restricted to "damage to or loss of real or personal property . . . that is a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation . . ." and must be filed within eighteen months of the date of enactment. Losses connected with voluntary evacuation are admissible. Claims "by or on behalf of any person who after December 7, 1941, was voluntarily or involuntarily deported from the United States to Japan or who is otherwise resident in a foreign country," damages arising out of actions pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, or damages on account of "death or personal injury, personal inconvenience, physical hardship, or mental suffering" are specifically prohibited. The most serious limitation is the exclusion of claims "for loss of anticipated profits or loss of anticipated earnings." The Attorney General is authorized to make and pay awards not exceeding \$2,500 from a Congressional appropriation which had not been made by April, 1949. All awards not paid from funds assigned to the Attorney General would be transmitted to Congress for payment "in like manner as are final judgments of the Court of Claims."

The law does not make clear whether an award exceeding \$2,500 could be paid up to that amount out of the Attorney General's funds without disqualifying the remainder of the award. If the whole payment were deferred in the event of an award exceeding \$2,500, the urgent need of claimants for liquid assets would impel many of them to reduce the amount of their claims as a matter of expediency.

Payment of an award or dismissal of a claim, unless set aside by the Attorney General, would be final and conclusive for all purposes. Attorneys' fees are limited to 10 per cent of the amount awarded. The law in its final amended form defines the powers of the Attorney General according to the Federal Trade Commission Act. However, the amount of discretion invested in him in regard to the substantiation of claims does not seem to be clearly defined. *If narrowly interpreted*, the law will be wholly unsatisfactory. It will then provide an additional and fatal obstacle to the presentation of most claims, instead of facilitating their presentation and processing. A large proportion of the population can do no more than assert that they owned property that was lost, and are in no position to provide legally rigorous documentation. If all family holdings are classified as the property of the nominal head, the number of claims possible will be sharply reduced, and less than half can be settled under the \$2,500 limitation. Community property laws may ameliorate this difficulty somewhat. Even if many claims are automatically rejected, administrative costs will loom very large, indeed.

In order to cover adequately any large proportion of real damages, the law would have to be much more broadly interpreted than is at all likely. It would have to be administered so that an affidavit unsupported by documentary evidence would be acceptable as adequate evidence, and so that family members could prorate family losses and file separate claims. Furthermore, it would be necessary for the Attorney General to be able to make payments up to the limit authorized for him without jeopardizing the remainder of the award. If all these conditions were met, the most serious remaining defects would be the prohibition of claims for income losses and the lack of provision for extraordinary expenses attendant upon Evacuation and relocation.

Should a broad interpretation of the law be applied and family holdings be prorated equally to all 1942 adult members, approximately 80 per cent of families would be covered for property losses under the \$2,500 limitation. (See fig. 17.)<sup>a</sup> If losses are not prorated in such a fashion, we can make no reliable estimate of the proportion of claims that would fall under the \$2,500 ceiling. By allowing for two claims

to a family under community property laws, which would in effect make the ceiling \$5,000 per family, 68 per cent of the families would be covered. We are assuming here that the number of families without both husband and wife would be offset by families in which children would legally be able to file separate claims. At the risk of being redundant, we must reiterate that these estimates apply only if the generous interpretation of evidence, which we regard as the only realistic approach, would obtain.

The principal defect of the law is that it makes no provision for losses of earned income and earning power. Table 33 shows that income losses exceeded property losses for more than three-quarters of the families. Of families with wage and salary workers only, 88 per cent suffered losses in income greater than in property. The importance of income losses is amply illustrated in figures 16 and 17. The need for some recognition of the reduction in general earning power as well as direct earning losses was shown in chapter v.

With such serious apparent defects, one may well wonder to what extent the law can be administered to rectify damages sustained by the evacuees. The law seems to have been designed without attempt to ascertain the dimensions or sources of losses, and with no regard to the ability or lack of ability of claimants to substantiate such losses by probative evidence. This is illustrated in the testimony of Mr. Dillon Myer, who was director of the WRA, which prepared the initial version of the bill.

MR. G'WYNNE. Can you give us any estimate of the number of claims which may be filed?

MR. MYER. Mr. Chairman, it is almost impossible to make any reasonable estimate. I can tell you this: There was somewhere between 25,000 and 30,000 family heads or adult individuals in the groups that might have had property on which they might file claims under this bill if they thought they had sufficient proof to support their claims. However, what percentage of those folk will file if they feel they have adequate claims, I have no way of judging. I would like to make a guess, and if I were to make a guess I would guess that the total claims paid will probably not exceed \$10,000,000.

MR. G'WYNNE. You estimate that would be the amount paid?

MR. MYER. Yes. However, it is a very rough guess. It could go above or below that. I have no idea how many people would file their claims, and whether they could present their evidence in proper form that the Claims Commission would feel they could adjudicate the claims is another question.\*

One is struck by the cavalier way that inability to file airtight claims was offered, not as a challenge to the adequacy of the bill to satisfy its

presumed objectives, but as a convenient way of reducing the number of claims to be filed. It may further be interesting to note that the irresponsible estimate of \$10,000,000 was accepted as authoritative, for in the presentation of the bill to the House, Mr. Gwynne quoted the estimate as if it included administrative cost. "While it is impossible to estimate the cost to the Government were the bill to become law, it is estimated that the cost would be in the neighborhood of \$10,000,000."<sup>4</sup> In the debate Mr. Gwynne again cited the figure as follows: "So we have done the best we could in writing this bill to allow compensation only for those elements of damage which can be traced directly to the evacuation order I regret we are not able to give you the exact details as to what the cost will be. The highest figure we had, incidentally, was \$10,000,000. Personally, I believe the rewriting of the bill will result in a much less amount. This is the substance of the bill."<sup>5</sup> By this time, the estimate of \$10,000,000, which was the only one presented, had become the "highest figure."

Indeed, \$10,000,000 or much less might be adequate to fulfill the obligations of the law if it were narrowly interpreted and rigidly administered. If that is done, however, one doubts that any function beyond the soothing of the national conscience will have been achieved. Surely the economic status of those Japanese American families least able to recuperate from the damages of the Evacuation will not have been improved. A broad interpretation of the bill, administered so as to rectify so far as possible the damages that have been sustained, would require an appropriation several times that of Mr. Myer's estimate. In table 48 we present a basis for estimating the size of appropriation that would be needed by the Attorney General under three different sets of conditions. It will be noted that the lowest estimate is more than five times Mr. Myer's figure. We cannot estimate the total sum that might be claimed above the limit of \$2,500 per claim, for our sample did not include the largest property holders.



A rather different approach to the claims problem would have taken as its point of departure the socio-economic realities that have been indicated. These would include a recognition of the predominance of income over property losses, the general absence of orderly financial records in households and in small businesses, and the fact that substantial losses could be assumed as inevitable under the circumstances of the Evacuation. The chief purpose of a bill designed with these facts in mind would

be to provide remuneration for that part of the damage that might be designated *presumptive loss* and to give the population the kind of financial aid that would facilitate their rehabilitation. By making direct minimum grants, these conditions could be satisfied and administrative costs and time cut to a minimum. A grant of \$1,000 to each person who at the time of Evacuation was at least 18 years old, would cost about \$77,000,000.<sup>6</sup> This amount would cover the property losses of about half the families (See fig. 17.) It would eliminate for them the need for legal counsel, and would solve the problems of admissibility of evidence and the assignment of specific property losses to individual family members. To be sure, when we state that the property losses of half the families would be covered, we indicate at the same time that almost all of these would have their property losses more than covered. However, very few

TABLE 48

ESTIMATES OF CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY LOSS UNDER PUBLIC LAW 886  
(Payable by Attorney General under \$2,500 limit, with broad interpretation of evidence, and based on three different assumptions)

ASSUMPTION I. ONLY ONE CLAIM PER FAMILY ESTIMATED CLAIMS \$52,500,000			
Average claim	Percentage of families <sup>a</sup>	Estimated number of families	Amount of claims
\$ 250	7 5	1,875	\$ 469,000
750	17 4	4,350	3,261,000
1,250	11 4	2,850	3,561,000
1,750 . . .	5 5	1,375	2,410,000
2,250 . . .	5 0	1,250	2,813,000
2,500 (max )	53 2	13,300	33,250,000
	100 0	25,000 <sup>b</sup>	\$45,764,000
1,000 <sup>c</sup> . . .		6,800 <sup>c</sup>	6,800,000
			\$52,564,000
ASSUMPTION II AVERAGE OF TWO CLAIMS PER FAMILY (UNDER COMMUNITY PROPERTY RULE): ESTIMATED CLAIMS \$79,000,000			
Average claim	Percentage of families <sup>a</sup>	Estimated number of families	Amount of claims
\$ 250-\$2,250	46 8 (as in I)	11,700 (as in I)	\$12,514,000 (as in I)
2,750 . . .	3 5	875	2,410,000
3,500 . . .	9 4	2,350	8,230,000
4,500 . . .	8 5	2,125	9,560,000
5,000 (max )	31 8	7,950	39,750,000
	100 0	25,000 <sup>b</sup>	\$72,464,000
1,000 <sup>c</sup> ....		6,800 <sup>c</sup>	6,800,000
			\$79,264,000

TABLE 48—Continued

ASSUMPTION III CLAIM FOR EACH ADULT,<sup>d</sup> WITH LOSSES PRORATED EQUALLY TO ALL ADULT FAMILY MEMBERS: ESTIMATED CLAIMS, \$90,000,000

Average claim	Percentage of adults in households of two or more persons <sup>a</sup>	Estimated number of families	Amount of claims
\$ 100	7 6	5,320	\$ 532,000
300	15 9	11,130	3,339,000
500	10 2	7,140	3,570,000
700	11 3	7,910	5,537,000
900	5 5	3,850	3,465,000
1,250	13 8	9,660	12,075,000
1,750	11 4	7,980	13,965,000
2,250	9 7	6,790	15,278,000
2,500 (max )	14 6	10,220	25,550,000
	100 0	70,000 <sup>f</sup>	\$83,311,000
1,000 <sup>c</sup>	..	6,800 <sup>e</sup>	6,800,000
			\$90,111,000

<sup>a</sup> From Loss Survey data for fig 16, p 146

<sup>b</sup> Estimate of 25,000 families, excluding single-person households, based on 1940 U S Census data and 10 per cent sample of WCCA SDR forms, completed by family units

<sup>c</sup> Single-person households not represented in Loss Survey Estimate of 6,800 single-person households, based on 10 per cent sample of WCCA SDR forms Average of \$1,000 property loss assigned as rough estimate, based on median per family per adult loss obtained in Loss Survey

<sup>d</sup> Adult means 18 years of age or older in 1942

<sup>e</sup> From retabulation of data for fig 17, p 148, to correctly weight for number of adults in each family.

<sup>f</sup> Estimate of 70,000 adults in households of two or more persons With estimated 6,800 single-person households comprises 76,800 persons 18 years of age and older in California, Oregon, and Washington enumerated in 1940 U S Census

(55 per cent) would receive awards in excess of property plus income losses. (See fig. 18.) Over and above the minimum blanket payment, there would need to be provision for regular claims court procedures But it is improbable that more than a small proportion of the population would be able to file such claims.

We have directed our analysis of this problem to a set of arbitrary limits established by criteria of legislative expediency and statistical intuition. Had the claims bill, once introduced, not necessarily become the focus of interest, a more sensible approach would have been to start from the point of view of over-all losses. If one includes both income and property losses, we estimate that the total would exceed \$350,000,000. (See table 49.) We must reiterate that this estimate is based on a sample that does not adequately represent the top income and property-holding segment of the population, and that the sample is based on pre-inflated, i.e., 1941-1942, values. Viewed in another way, these losses are in large part an expression of the amount of damage to the war economy in the loss of productive labor, damage to and destruction of property, and reduction of efficiency in use.



TABLE 49

ESTIMATE OF COMBINED PROPERTY AND INCOME LOSSES: \$367,500,000

Average loss	Percentage of families <sup>a</sup>	Estimated number of families	Amount of loss
\$ 1,000.	2.7	675	\$ 675,000
3,000.	6.0	1,500	4,500,000
5,000	9.8	2,450	12,250,000
7,000	19.7	4,925	34,475,000
9,000.	12.6	3,150	28,350,000
12,500.	19.7	4,925	61,562,000
17,500	10.9	2,725	47,687,000
22,500	6.6	1,650	37,125,000
27,500	2.7	675	18,562,000
40,000	7.1	1,775	71,000,000
50,000 (max.)	2.2	550	27,500,000
	100.0	25,000 <sup>b</sup>	\$343,686,000
3,500 <sup>c</sup>	.	6,800 <sup>c</sup>	23,800,000
			<u>\$367,486,000</u>

<sup>a</sup> From Loss Survey data for fig. 18, p. 149.<sup>b</sup> Estimate of 25,000 families, excluding single-person households. Based on 1940 U. S. Census data and 10 per cent sample of WCCA SDR forms, completed by family units.<sup>c</sup> Single-person households not represented in survey. Estimate of 6,800 single-person households, based on 10 per cent sample of WCCA SDR forms. Average \$3,500 combined property and income loss assigned as rough estimate, based on median per family per adult loss obtained in Loss Survey.

## NOTES



## NOTE TO INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup> "Americans of Japanese ancestry" is the preferred but cumbersome locution for designating this ethnic group. We shall use "Japanese Americans" without the hyphen because the hyphenated form has come to have invidious connotations. The term "Japanese" will be used only in discussing the immigrant population before the Exclusion Act of 1924 and in some direct references to Bureau of the Census tabulations in which the group is so designated "by race." "Non-Japanese" refers to all persons other than those of Japanese ancestry. *Hakujin*, the Japanese equivalent of "white people," is used here in status contexts. See Leonard Bloom, "Transitional Adjustments of Japanese American Families to Relocation," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol 12 (April, 1947), p 202. *Nihonjin* (Japanese people) is employed as an in-group reference. The word "Nisei" is popularly applied to all persons of Japanese ancestry and is another instance of the search for an uncontaminated word. It will be used here only in its appropriate connotation to refer to the children of immigrant Japanese. In some instances we shall distinguish as "Kibei" those native-born persons who had a period of education in Japan. As employed, Kibei is a rough indicator of a degree of acculturation to Japanese modes. Unless specified in such a context, however, Kibei will not be distinguished from other native-born persons, and are included among the Nisei. Immigrants themselves are designated "Issei."

## NOTES TO CHAPTER I

<sup>1</sup> G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan*, pp 56-60

<sup>2</sup> U. S. Census data on Japanese Americans for 1900-1940, much of it not published in the Bureau of the Census reports, is conveniently summarized in WCCA Statistical *Bulletins* 1-12 and *Final Report*. Extensive bibliographies prepared by WRA and the U. S. Department of Agriculture on Japanese in the United States are listed in the bibliography. (See Appendix A.)

<sup>3</sup> For general discussions of Japanese occupational history, see Tolan Committee Report, Supplement, Part I, "The Japanese", and Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States*.

<sup>4</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Agriculture*. Second Series

<sup>5</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. WCCA Statistical *Bulletin* 12, pp 25-31.

<sup>6</sup> Based on calculations from U. S. Census, 1940 *Population*. Data published in WCCA *Final Report*, p 416, and WCCA Statistical *Bulletin* 12, pp. 42-44

<sup>7</sup> WCCA *Final Report*, p 410

<sup>8</sup> See U. S. Census, 1940 *Population*. Third Series, *The Labor Force*, Introduction, *Alphabetical Index of Occupations and Industries*; and *Classified Index of Occupations*. It is only proper to make it clear that this is not intended as a general criticism of the Census. The defects become serious because of the characteristics of this population, in which small enterprises, built upon the skills of a single person augmented by the labors of his family, are the rule.

<sup>9</sup> The detailed occupational breakdown of Japanese Americans in Los Angeles County from the 1940 Census is reported in WCCA Statistical *Bulletin* 12, pp. 42-44

<sup>10</sup> *Rafu Shampo Yearbook and Directory*, 1940-1941

<sup>11</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. WCCA Statistical *Bulletin* 12.

<sup>12</sup> *Rafu Shampo Yearbook and Directory*, 1940-1941.

<sup>13</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Population*. Third Series, *The Labor Force*.

<sup>14</sup> Estimate from 20 per cent sample.

<sup>15</sup> WCCA Statistical *Bulletin* 12

<sup>16</sup> Five times sample number  $\pm 2\sigma = 510 \pm 89$ .

<sup>17</sup> See table 4, p. 13

<sup>18</sup> Richard Nishimoto, unpublished manuscript based on analysis of WRA Form 26.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> Letter from Alien Enemy Control Unit, Department of Justice, April 22, 1948

<sup>2</sup> See Alexander H. Leighton, *The Governing of Men*, chap. i, and WRA, *Wartime Exile*, pp. 104-137.

<sup>3</sup> WCCA *Final Report*, 1943, p. 205.

<sup>4</sup> WRA *Semi-Annual Report*, July 1-December 31, 1943, pp. 47-48.

<sup>5</sup> WRA, *The Evacuated People*, p. 26. These 750 persons were assigned to WRA, however, and are included in our 20 per cent sample.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, table 13, and WRA, *Returns to West Coast*, Cumulative Summary, Monthly Reports

<sup>8</sup> For a report of the occupational adjustment of Nisei in Chicago in 1944 and 1945, see D. M. Okada, "A Study of Nisei Workers in Two Chicago Industrial Plants."

<sup>9</sup> See Appendix C.

<sup>10</sup> In the Nishi-Caudill schedule, "usual" occupation was interpreted as prewar occupation. The internal consistency of the responses and their relevance to the known prewar occupational characteristics indicates that this interpretation is correct

<sup>11</sup> For an analysis of resettlement in Seattle, see Shotaro Frank Miyamoto and Robert W. O'Brien, "A Survey of Some Changes in the Seattle Japanese Community since Evacuation," *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*, 1947, *Research Studies*, State College of Washington, Vol. 15 (June, 1947), pp. 147-154.

<sup>12</sup> See chap. v.

<sup>13</sup> War Agency Liquidation Unit, *People in Motion*, pp. 100-102.

<sup>14</sup> Generalizations on relief statistics are based upon confidential records of public assistance to persons of Japanese ancestry between January 1, 1946, and November 30, 1947, after which the cases were not separately recorded. We have avoided statistical specification in order to respect the confidential nature of the data and to comply with the terms on which they were made available to us.

<sup>15</sup> War Agency Liquidation Unit, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-181

<sup>16</sup> *Japanese Telephone and Business Directory of Southern California*, 1947.

<sup>17</sup> Unpublished manuscript.

<sup>18</sup> War Agency Liquidation Unit, *op. cit.*, pp. 100-106

## NOTES TO CHAPTER III

<sup>1</sup> The best brief accounts of the history of Japanese in American agriculture are: Varden Fuller, "The Supply of Agricultural Labor as a Factor in the Evolution of Farm Organization in California," chap. v, Exhibit 8762-A in LaFollette Committee Hearings, Part 54; Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States*, chaps. xi-xiii; E. G. Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast*, chap. xi, Tolan Committee Report, Supplement, Part I. An extensive bibliography is U. S. Department of Agriculture, *Bibliographical Bulletin* No. 3.

<sup>2</sup> California Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Fourteenth Biennial Report, 1909-1910*, p. 270.

<sup>3</sup> U. S. Census, 1910. *Bulletin 127*.

<sup>4</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Agriculture, California*. Second Series.

<sup>5</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. WCCA Statistical *Bulletin 9*.

<sup>6</sup> Mears, *op cit*, p. 255

<sup>7</sup> U. S. Census, 1910. *Bulletin 127*; U. S. Census, 1920. *Agriculture*.

<sup>8</sup> The Census reported 5,152 Japanese operated farms with 361,276 acres in California in 1920. Other sources, however, give the much higher figure of 458,056 acres, 16 per cent of which was owned and 42 per cent leased for cash rent. See Mears, *op. cit*, p. 255, California State Board of Control, *California and the Oriental*, p. 47; K. K. Kawakami, *The Real Japanese Question*, p. 264. The larger estimate is attributed variously to Japanese Association and Government officials. Although we cannot establish the originating source, it was probably the report of the State Board of Control of California, which was not unbiased. For example, the report (p. 8) estimated the Japanese population of California at 87,279 when the 1920 Census found 71,952, and the report estimated that California had between 80 and 85 per cent of the total Japanese population of continental United States, when in fact it had but 65 per cent. The Japanese Association of America (State Board of Control report, Appendix, p. 204) reported 390,637 acres under Japanese operation in September, 1918. This is not far from the 1920 Census figures, and is probably as close as we are likely to come to the facts. We have been unable to obtain the Japanese Association of America documents on which this figure and the citations of Kawakami and Mears are based.

It should be borne in mind that all figures on Japanese landholding after 1913, and especially after 1920, are subject to varying error. The actual situation, characterized by informal and often unwritten contractual agreements and by legalistic devices designed to circumvent restrictions of the anti-alien land laws, is distorted in all official statistics, but the extent of distortion cannot be readily ascertained.

<sup>9</sup> Mears, *op. cit.*, p. 255

<sup>10</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Agriculture, California*. Second Series.

<sup>11</sup> California Bureau of Labor Statistics. *Fourteenth Biennial Report, 1909-1910*, p. 268.

<sup>12</sup> Sidney L. Gulick, *The American Japanese Problem*, p. 316. Appendix B is a summary by Labor Commissioner J. D. Mackenzie of the Report of the "Special State Investigation of 1909" of the Japanese in California, which was never published in full. The summary was given to the press on May 30, 1910.

<sup>13</sup> Chester Rowell, "The Japanese in California," in *World's Work*, Vol. 26 (June, 1913), pp. 195-201.

<sup>14</sup> California State Board of Control. *California and the Oriental*, p. 101.

<sup>15</sup> State figures for 1920 not available.

<sup>16</sup> U. S. Census, 1920, 1930, and 1940. *Agriculture and Population* volumes for each.

<sup>17</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. WCCA Statistical *Bulletin 6*.

<sup>18</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Agriculture, California*. First and Second Series and unpublished tabulations for county. Although farms operated by Japanese Americans were small by United States standards, they were exceedingly large by Japanese criteria. In 1938, 91 per cent of all farms in Japan were less than two *cho* (1 *cho* = 2.45 acres). Shiroshi Nasu, *Aspects of Japanese Agriculture*, p. 12.

<sup>19</sup> For a sample copy of such a contract for 1920, see California State Board of Control, *op cit.*, pp. 83-86.

<sup>20</sup> Tolan Committee Report, p. 129

<sup>21</sup> Cf testimony of U. S. Employment Service official in Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 31, pp. 11739-40.

<sup>22</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Agriculture*, Vol. 3, table 14, pp. 482-483; and table 26, pp. 214-215.

<sup>23</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. WCCA Statistical Bulletin 12.

<sup>24</sup> Farms operated by Indians (864) averaged only 6.5 acres harvested and were in marginal areas, so that they could have employed little or no paid labor. If Indian operators are excluded, farms operated by Japanese Americans were about 85 per cent of all nonwhite-operated farms. Farms operated by Chinese Americans were cultivated almost as intensively as those by Japanese Americans and averaged almost twice as many acres harvested per farm, indicating a higher rate of employment of paid labor; but the 236 farms operated by Chinese Americans were only 3.5 per cent of all nonwhite-operated farms and therefore would not change our estimates appreciably. U. S. Census, 1940 *Agriculture*, Vol. 3, table 26, pp. 214-215.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, table 14, pp. 482-483

<sup>26</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. WCCA Statistical Bulletin 12.

<sup>27</sup> We are assuming that Census of Population reports on the number of paid farm workers have greater reliability than reports on unpaid family workers.

<sup>28</sup> Tolan Committee Report, p. 130. The figures are calculated from the data presented to the Tolan Committee.

<sup>29</sup> Data from U. S. Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, presented in Tolan Committee Report, pp. 126-128.

<sup>30</sup> Data from Los Angeles County Agricultural Commission, presented in Tolan Committee Report, p. 130.

<sup>31</sup> S. Wada, *The History of the Japanese Farmers' Association*, cited in I. Nodera, "A Survey of the Vocational Activities of the Japanese in the City of Los Angeles," pp. 99-103

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> Interview with official of City Market.

<sup>34</sup> Japanese sources cited by Nodera, *loc. cit.*

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 110, and *Rafu Shimpo Yearbook and Directory*, 1940-1941.

<sup>36</sup> See below in this chapter for definitions of dealers, commission merchants, etc.

<sup>37</sup> Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 31, p. 11723. Estimate based on report of survey made by Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles.

<sup>38</sup> Federal-State Market News Service, *Wholesale Market Prices at Los Angeles, Fruits and Vegetables*, reported \$68,000,000 total market receipts for 1941.

<sup>39</sup> Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 29, p. 11007

<sup>40</sup> Interview schedules for our survey of prewar and postwar produce operations are presented in Appendix C. The interviews were conducted by Hiroshi Ito.

<sup>41</sup> Unpublished manuscript.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with a member of the Junior Produce Club.

<sup>43</sup> Nodera, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-87.

<sup>44</sup> War Agency Liquidation Unit, *People in Motion*, p. 90.

<sup>45</sup> Tolan Committee Hearings, Part 31, p. 11724.

<sup>46</sup> Unpublished manuscript.

<sup>47</sup>  $5(X \pm 2\sigma) = 5(155 \pm 21.6) = 667 - 883.$

<sup>48</sup> Richard Nishimoto quotes an informant to the effect that the initial investment in opening a retail produce market need not have exceeded \$2,000

<sup>49</sup> The number of fruit, vegetable, and grocery stores listed in the *Rafu Shimpo Yearbook and Directory* for 1928 was about the same as in 1939. Tabulations in W. T. Kataoka, "Occupations of Japanese in Los Angeles," in *Sociology and Social Research*, Vol. 14 (1929), pp. 53-58, and R. Nishimoto, unpublished manuscript.

<sup>50</sup> Tolan Committee *Hearings*, Part 31, p. 11724.

<sup>51</sup> Unpublished manuscript.

<sup>52</sup> Case material of the Thomas-Nishimoto studies presented in Nishimoto's unpublished manuscript.

<sup>53</sup> Unpublished manuscript. The samples used by Nishimoto are from the same source as our 20 per cent sample, WRA Form 26, but were selected differently

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Federal-State Market News Service, *Annual Unload Summary, Los Angeles*, and *Wholesale Market Prices at Los Angeles, Fruits and Vegetables*, 1941 and 1942.

<sup>56</sup> *Southern California Crops*, 1942 and 1943.

<sup>57</sup> Adon Poh, *Japanese Farm Holdings on the Pacific Coast*, p. 19.

<sup>58</sup> This conclusion is based on a brief examination of the source material for the Poh study, which is deposited in the Library of the University of California, Berkeley, and is supported by FSA *Final Report*, *passim*, and WRA, *The Wartime Handling of Evacuee Property*, *passim*. Since Poh utilized his material only for discussions about the state as a whole, there remains a large body of valuable material which could be processed for smaller areas and which should yield interesting comparative analyses.

<sup>59</sup> Federal-State Market News Service, *Annual Unload Summary, Los Angeles*, 1947.

<sup>60</sup> U S Census, unpublished tabulations

<sup>61</sup> Deering's *General Laws of the State of California*, 1944, and 1947 *Supplement*. Act 261.

<sup>62</sup> *Rafu Shimpo*, December 21, 1946, Sec. 2.

<sup>63</sup> See table 20, p. 84, for 1941 figures.

<sup>64</sup> Letter of June 9, 1948, from Homer A. Harris, secretary-manager of the Associated Produce Dealers and Brokers of Los Angeles.

<sup>65</sup> *Rafu Shimpo*, December 21, 1946, Sec. 2.

#### NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

<sup>1</sup> Yamato Ichihashi, *Japanese in the United States*; E. G. Mears, *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast*.

<sup>2</sup> Cited in I. Nodera, "A Survey of the Vocational Activities of the Japanese in the City of Los Angeles," pp. 32-33.

<sup>3</sup> U S Census, 1940 WCCA Statistical *Bulletin* 12.

<sup>4</sup> As an indication of this, in our 1946 census of Japanese Americans in Sawtelle, 15 per cent of the married prewar gardeners had wives in Japan. Almost all these men were residing in boarding houses in 1946.

<sup>5</sup> War Agency Liquidation Unit, *People in Motion*, p. 95.

<sup>6</sup> Leonard Bloom, "A Controlled Attitude-Tension Survey," *University of California Publications in Culture and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1948), especially pp. 27-31.

<sup>7</sup> War Agency Liquidation Unit, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 97.



# NOTES TO CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> In brief compass the most effective discussion was the article by E. V. Rostow, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake," in *Harper's*, Vol. 191 (September, 1945), pp. 193-201.

<sup>2</sup> WRA, *The Wartime Handling of Evacuee Property*, p. 11.

<sup>3</sup> WCCA *Final Report*, p. 29. Italics supplied.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 41.

<sup>5</sup> Detailed cases are from our Loss Survey. All names are fictitious.

<sup>6</sup> FSA *Final Report*, Exhibit 1.

<sup>7</sup> See WRA, *op. cit.*, pp. 47-69.

<sup>8</sup> Press release of March 18. Federal Reserve Bank *Report*, Exhibit E. Italics supplied.

<sup>9</sup> Claims Bills *Hearings*, p. 70. The infelicities of expression in the *Hearings* may be due in part to faulty stenographic transcription.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

<sup>11</sup> WCCA, Form FRB-2, Personal Property Form, used to list property delivered to Federal Reserve Bank for storage in government warehouses. Italics supplied.

<sup>12</sup> WCCA, "Instructions to Evacuees Regarding Disposition of Motor Vehicles." Federal Reserve Bank *Report*, Exhibit 69.

<sup>13</sup> Claims Bills *Hearings*, pp. 26-27. Italics supplied.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28. Italics supplied.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>16</sup> WRA, *Legal and Constitutional Phases of the War Relocation Authority Program*, pp. 56-57.

<sup>17</sup> See Appendix C.

<sup>18</sup> See chap. vi.

<sup>19</sup> FSA *Final Report* Table 4.

<sup>20</sup> See chap. i.

<sup>21</sup> Figures on the total evacuated population are based on a 10 per cent random sample analyzed in Bloom, "Transitional Adjustments of Japanese American Families to Relocation," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 12 (April, 1947), pp. 201-209.

<sup>22</sup> We obtained records of 1942 family members who were no longer living with the group, but no record of additions to the family since 1942. This information was not necessary for calculation of losses through Evacuation and to obtain it would have lengthened the interviews.

<sup>23</sup> Data for "all families" are for August, 1945.

<sup>24</sup> See chap. ii and fig. 8, p. 54.

<sup>25</sup> For a discussion of claims legislation see chap. vii.

# NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

<sup>1</sup> This chapter is based on the following samples:

A. Ninety-seven families who were prewar Terminal Island residents. Data on the losses of these families, referred to as the Terminal Island Survey, were obtained at the same time as the Loss Survey sample discussed in chap. v. (Prewar Terminal Island residents are excluded from all tables and figures labeled "Loss Survey.") They are analyzed separately because of the different circumstances of the Evacuation of Terminal Island and the highly specialized nature of the prewar community.

B. A series of intensive interviews with 63 prewar fishermen who returned to the Los Angeles area. These were conducted by Gilbert Parker with the assistance of Hiroshi Ito, using schedules presented in Appendix C. These two samples overlap in

regard to the occupational property of fishermen, but the different points of view make it advantageous to discuss the findings separately.

<sup>2</sup> See fig. 21, p. 154.

<sup>3</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. "Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino Population by Sex and Nativity for Los Angeles and Long Beach Cities by Census Tracts." Unpublished special tabulation.

<sup>4</sup> K. Kawasaki, "The Japanese Community of East San Pedro."

<sup>5</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *Housing. Los Angeles Block Statistics*. Table 3, Census Tract 294.

<sup>6</sup> U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit No. 11638. *Transcript of Record*

<sup>7</sup> U. S. Census, 1940. *WCCA Bulletin* 12.

<sup>8</sup> Courtesy of the former executive secretary of the Association.

<sup>9</sup> Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

<sup>10</sup> Of the 85 Issei family heads in the Terminal Island Survey, 55 were detained.

<sup>11</sup> The Harbor Department of Los Angeles has no information about the procedures of evaluation and disposal. (Letter from the general manager, March 25, 1948.)

<sup>12</sup> M. E. Opler, "The Repatriate-Expatriate Group of Manzanar," pp. 36-40.

<sup>13</sup> From our tabulations of a 10 per cent sample of WCCA, SDR forms.

<sup>14</sup> The mean number of persons per household was 4.2 in both the Census and our sample.  $\chi^2 = 10.569$ , with a probability of 18.9 per cent that a random sample would give no closer fit.

<sup>15</sup> See Leonard Bloom, "Transitional Adjustments of Japanese American Families to Relocation," in *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 12 (April, 1947), pp. 201-209.

<sup>16</sup> Kawasaki, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

<sup>17</sup> No Census data on occupations of individual Japanese Americans on Terminal Island are available. Comparison of the survey sample was made with our 20 per cent random sample from WRA Form 26, and differences are well within sampling error.

<sup>18</sup> Bloom, *loc. cit.*

<sup>19</sup> See chap. v.

<sup>20</sup> See figs. 16-18, pp. 146, 148, 149.

<sup>21</sup> A law passed in 1943 and amended in 1945 denied commercial fishing licenses in California to aliens ineligible to citizenship. The law was challenged in the Takahashi case and was declared unconstitutional in the Superior Court, but was upheld by the California Supreme Court in October, 1947. On appeal to the U. S. Supreme Court the law was declared unconstitutional on June 7, 1948.

<sup>22</sup> The Los Angeles *Times* for November 28, 1947, reported 76,550 tons of sardines, compared with 120,418 for the same period in 1946.

<sup>23</sup> "Unemployed" was defined as able to work and seeking work.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B.

<sup>2</sup> Estimates in this chapter referring to the total population are conservative throughout because they are based on our sample from the Loss Survey. For data on representativeness of the sample, see chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> Claims Bills *Hearings*, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 104.

<sup>6</sup> There were 76,829 persons eighteen years of age or older in 1942 who were in relocation centers. WRA, *The Evacuated People*, p. 96.



## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

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## APPENDIX B

### THE EVACUEE CLAIMS LAW

(Public Law 886—80th Congress)

(Chapter 814—2d Session)

(H.R. 3999)

#### AN ACT

To authorize the Attorney General to adjudicate certain claims resulting from evacuation of certain persons of Japanese ancestry under military orders.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled*, That the Attorney General shall have jurisdiction to determine according to law any claim by a person of Japanese ancestry against the United States arising on or after December 7, 1941, when such claim is not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for damage to or loss of real or personal property (including without limitation as to amount damage to or loss of personal property bailed to or in the custody of the Government or any agent thereof), that is a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion of such person by the appropriate military commander from a military area in Arizona, California, Oregon or Washington; or from the Territory of Alaska, or the Territory of Hawaii, under authority of Executive Order Numbered 9066, dated February 19, 1942 (3 CFR, Cum. Supp., 1092), section 67 of the Act of April 30, 1900 (48 U. S. C. 532), or Executive Order Numbered 9489, dated October 18, 1944 (3 CFR, 1944 Supp., 45). As used herein "evacuation" shall include voluntary departure from a military area prior to but in anticipation of an order of exclusion therefrom.

#### LIMITATIONS; CLAIMS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED

Sec. 2. (a) The Attorney General shall receive claims for a period of eighteen months from the date of enactment of this Act. All claims not presented within that time shall be forever barred.

(b) The Attorney General shall not consider any claim—

(1) by or on behalf of any person who after December 7, 1941, was voluntarily or involuntarily deported from the United States to Japan or by and on behalf of any alien who on December 7, 1941, was not actually residing in the United States;

(2) for damage or loss arising out of action taken by any Federal agency pursuant to sections 4067, 4068, 4069, and 4070 (relating to alien enemies) of the Revised Statutes, as amended (50 U. S. C. 21–24), or pursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended (50 U. S. C. App., and Supp., 1–31, 616);

(3) for damage or loss to any property, or interest therein, vested in the United States pursuant to said Trading with the Enemy Act, as amended;

(4) for damage or loss on account of death or personal injury, personal inconvenience, physical hardship, or mental suffering; and

(5) for loss of anticipated profits or loss of anticipated earnings.

#### HEARINGS; EVIDENCE; RECORDS

Sec. 3. (a) The Attorney General shall give reasonable notice to the interested parties and an opportunity for them to be heard and to present evidence before making a final determination upon any claim.

(b) For the purpose of any hearing or investigation authorized under this Act, the provisions of sections 9 and 10 (relating to examination of documentary evidence, attendance of witnesses, and production of books, papers, and documents) of the Federal Trade Commission Act of September 26, 1914, as amended (15 U. S. C. 49, 50), are hereby made applicable to the jurisdiction, powers, and duties of the Attorney General. Subpoenas may be served personally, by registered mail, by telegraph, or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal place of business of the person required to be served. A verified return by the individual so serving the same, setting forth the manner of service, shall be proof of service. The United States marshals or their deputies shall serve such process in their respective districts.

(c) A written record shall be kept of all hearings and proceedings under this Act and shall be open to public inspection

#### ADJUDICATIONS; PAYMENT OF AWARDS; EFFECT OF ADJUDICATIONS

Sec. 4 (a) The Attorney General shall adjudicate all claims filed under this Act by award or order of dismissal, as the case may be, upon written findings of fact and reasons for the decision. A copy of each such adjudication shall be mailed to the claimant or his attorney.

(b) The Attorney General may make payment of any award not exceeding \$2,500 in amount out of such funds as may be made available for this purpose by Congress

(c) On the first day of each regular session of Congress the Attorney General shall transmit to Congress a full and complete statement of all adjudications rendered under this Act during the previous year, stating the name and address of each claimant, the amount claimed, the amount awarded, the amount paid, and a brief synopsis of the facts in the case and the reasons for each adjudication. All awards not paid under subsection (b) hereof shall be paid in like manner as are final judgments of the Court of Claims

(d) The payment of an award shall be final and conclusive for all purposes, notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, and shall be a full discharge of the United States and all of its officers, agents, servants, and employees with respect to all claims arising out of the same subject matter. An order of dismissal against a claimant, unless set aside by the Attorney General, shall thereafter bar any further claim against the United States or any officer, agent, servant, or employee thereof arising out of the same subject matter.

#### ATTORNEYS' FEES

Sec. 3. The Attorney General, in rendering an award in favor of any claimant, may as part of the award determine and allow reasonable attorneys' fees, which shall not exceed 10 per centum of the amount allowed, to be paid out of, but not in addition to, the amount of such award.

Any attorney who charges, demands, receives, or collects for services rendered in connection with such claim any amount in excess of that allowed under this section, if recovery be had, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall upon conviction thereof be subject to a fine of not more than \$2,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

#### ADMINISTRATION

Sec. 6. For the purposes of this Act the Attorney General may—

(a) appoint a clerk and such attorneys, examiners, interpreters, appraisers, and other employees as may be necessary,

(b) call upon any Federal department or agency for any information or records necessary,

(c) secure the cooperation of State and local agencies, governmental or otherwise, and reimburse such agencies for services rendered;

(d) utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services as may from time to time be needed and available;

(e) assist needy claimants in the preparation and filing of claims;

(f) make such investigations as may be necessary;

(g) make expenditures for witness fees and mileage and for other administrative expenses,

(h) prescribe such rules and regulations, perform such acts not inconsistent with law, and delegate such authority as he may deem proper in carrying out the provisions of this Act.

#### APPROPRIATIONS

Sec 7 There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for the purposes of this Act such sums as Congress may from time to time determine to be necessary.

Approved July 2, 1948.



## APPENDIX C

### FORMS AND SCHEDULES

#### **1. Items on War Relocation Authority Form 26. Individual Record**

This form was completed for all persons ever under the jurisdiction of the WRA. Our occupational data are from a 20 per cent random sample of all persons fourteen years of age and older in the labor force in April, 1940, and of all persons who entered the labor market between April, 1940, and Evacuation who gave their permanent address as Los Angeles County. The following items were taken from the schedule for our sample: 4, 5*a*, 7, 14, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23, 28 (for April, 1940, November, 1941, and all jobs after November, 1941).



Form WRA 26—Rev. 1

1. Name
2. Relocation Center; entry date
- 3 Assembly Center; entry date
4. Previous address [Both permanent and temporary pre-Evacuation addresses were often given.]
5. Parents: Name of father, country of birth  
Maiden name of mother, country of birth
- 5a Father's occupation: in U. S.; abroad
6. Person to notify in case of emergency: Relationship, name, and address
7. Education: Name, location, and dates of attendance of each school
- 7a. Degrees, educational specializations, honors, and significant activities
8. Residence outside the United States: Country and dates for each period of residence
9. Military or naval service: Country, branch, and dates of service
10. Public assistance: Aid to dependent children, aid to blind, or old-age assistance
11. Pension: Source, amount, pay period
12. Height
- 12a. Weight
13. Physical condition
14. Individual number
15. Family number
16. Sex

[Continued]



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17. Race: White, Japanese, other

Spouse's race: White, Japanese, other

18. Marital status: Single, married, widowed, divorced, separated

19. Relationship to head of family group

20. Birth date

20a. Age

21. Birthplace: City, county, state or province, and country

22. Alien registration number

23. Attending school: Yes, no

24. Grade

25. Language: English, Japanese, German, Italian (Check speak, read, and/or write for each language.)

26. Major activity or status

27. Occupation: Primary, secondary

28. Employment history: (List *most* recent employment first and account for all periods of unemployment.)

From            to            ; employer, business address, position and duties, pay

29. Skills and hobbies

29a. Social Security Account No.

30. Religion

31. Additional information

Informant, if other than the registrant

Date of interview

Signature of interviewer

## **2. Wartime Civil Control Administration. Social Data Registration Form**

This form (see following page) was completed for each family unit at the time of registration for Evacuation. Our family data, based on a 10 per cent random sample, are used for some comparisons in this monograph.

## WCCA Form S-3 (Revised)

## SOCIAL DATA REGISTRATION

1. Last name      First      Middle      2. Persons in family      3. Family number

4. Present address

5 Assembly Center notations:

(a) Location

(b)

(c)

6 Normal head of family:

☐ With family   ☐ Elsewhere   ☐ Interned

7. Departure to

on:      8 Medical inspection appointment:

Day

Day

Month and date

Month and date

Hour

Hour

Meet at (place)

Reported illness

Mode of travel: ☐ Own car  
☐ Bus or train

9. Present family group:

Name	Relation to head	Sex	Age	Country of birth	Education		Occupation and industry	Alien reg. no. or remarks	Physical condition
					In school	Grade			
A	Head								
B									
C									
D									
E									
F									
G									
H									
I									

10 Property arrangements needed. ☐ Household furniture   ☐ Automobile  
☐ Business                                      ☐ Farm

11. Date of registration

12. Interviewer

### **3. Nishi-Caudill Schedule**

This form (following three pages) was used for a sample census of Japanese Americans in Chicago during the fall and winter of 1947-1948. Our comparative data on the Chicago labor force are based on the full sample.



## EDUCATION

No	In sch	Highest grade		Major (college)	Additional training		Att Jap. lang sch	Yrs school in Japan	Yrs. res in Japan	Employ- ment status
		Grade	Where		Vocational	Other				
A										
B										
C										
D										
E										
F										
G										
H										
I										
J										
K										

## EMPLOYED PERSONS

Ind no.	Present job					1946		
	Occupation	Industry	Class work	Hours per week	Income	Months worked	Income	Source

[Continued]

Ind. no	Usual job			INTERVIEWEE: (Aspirational—10 yrs )
	Occupation	Industry	Class work	
				1 Occup.
				2 Source income
				3 House type
				4 Area
				HOUSEHOLD UNIT:
				1. Dwelling
				2. No. of rooms
				3. Size of family
				4. Total persons in household

## REMARKS:

Recreational activity—

INTERVIEWER .. .. . DATE .....

#### **4. Schedules for Survey of Wholesale Produce Industry**

These schedules (see following six pages) were used for interviews by Hiroshi Ito during the period from August, 1947, to January, 1948. Information on most business firms was obtained from the proprietor, on a few, from salesmen.



# SCHEDULE FOR INDIVIDUALS IN WHOLESALE PRODUCE BEFORE OR AFTER EVACUATION

Persons interviewed . Dates Interviewer

Name Year born Sex Yrs educ in Japan

Place born (ken for Japan, Occupation of  
town and state for U S ) father in U.S.

*Data as of December 1, 1941.* Address (no. and street if in L. A.)

Position in household (underline): head, wife, son, daughter, other (specify)

No. of dependents of this individual who were issei , nisei , sansei

Job (describe duties)

Company Name of proprietor of business

Average monthly earnings in 1941: wages \$ , salary \$ ; commissions \$  
profits \$

No years at this occupation (including 1941) No. years in produce

Date left relocation center . Date returned to L. A

*Jobs after leaving center City Dates Jobs since return to L.A : Dates*

*Data as of August, 1947.* Address (no , street, and city)

Position in household (underline): head, wife, son, daughter, other (specify).

No. of dependents who are issei , nisei , sansei

For nisei or kibe, is father retired? Yes No In U S. now? In 1941?

In Japan now? In 1941?

Job (describe duties)

Company Name of proprietor of business

Average monthly earnings now: wages \$ ; salary \$ ; commissions \$  
profits \$

*Notes* (Cross references to other cases; names of other people to interview,  
additional facts about this person, etc.)

## SCHEDULE FOR PREWAR WHOLESALE BUSINESSES

Persons interviewed \_\_\_\_\_ Dates \_\_\_\_\_ Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_

<b>Name of company</b>	<b>1941 address</b>	.	No doors
			No stalls

Kind of license (underline): commission merchant, dealer, broker, cash buyer.  
For commission merchants and dealers, name of bonding company

Form of company:  
Individual (give name)

Partnership (give names and indicate which were inactive as workers)

Corporation (give names of stockholders and indicate relative share in control)

Cooperative (give names of members and location of their land)

**Other**

Date company organized in 1941 form . . . Previous occupations of members,  
or changes in organization, personnel, or location of company (1927-1942):

<b>Commodities handled</b>	<b>Specialties</b>
----------------------------	--------------------

Volume handled per week (give month) in \$ and/or in crates: In busy season \_\_\_\_\_  
In slow season. \_\_\_\_\_

Employees on December 1, 1941: (use additional sheet if necessary)

Position (mgr., salesman, swamper, driver, buyer, steno, book-keeper, etc.)

Name (if not available, designate J. or non-J.; Issei, N, or K, and how related to proprietor)

Wage, salary, or  
commission in  
dollars per month  
(specify which)

Present whereabouts  
and occupation

[Continued]

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Main growers: (use additional sheet if necessary)

Name (if not available designate Jap., Mex., Cauc., etc.)	Location (county or town)	Products supplied	Volume per year	Present whereabouts and occupation (if Japanese)
---	---------------------------------	----------------------	--------------------	--

Main retail buyers: (use additional sheet if necessary)

Name of individual buyer	Name of prop. or mgr. retail store	Street address of store	Volume bought per year	Present whereabouts and occupation (if Japanese)
-----------------------------	--	-------------------------------	------------------------------	--

Changes in business after December, 1941, order for 100% citizen ownership (note change in form of company). Who sold out? To whom? Any relation to seller or other member of business? For how much? Shifts in real control?

Disposition of business:

Item:	Disposition	Date	Amt. received	Amt. lost	Reason for loss
Equipment					
Leasehold					
Goodwill					
Stock (if corp.)					
Accounts receivable					
Date when company affairs settled and surety bond returned or cancelled. ... ..					
Any court action involved?					

## SCHEDULE FOR POSTWAR WHOLESALE BUSINESSES

Persons interviewed                      Date                      Interviewer

Name of company                      1947 address                      No. doors  
No. stalls

Form of company:  
Individual (give name)

Partnership (give names, indicate which are active workers, which provided funds, etc.)

Corporation (give names of stockholders, name of manager, indicate per cent of control)

Cooperative (give names of member firms and/or individuals, and [in case of growers especially] location of members)

Kind of company (kind of license): (underline) commission merchant, dealer, broker, cash buyer

Name of bonding company (for commission merchants and dealers)

Date company organized in present form                      Changes in organization, personnel, or location of company since return of members to Los Angeles  
[Partnerships especially have shifted personnel]

How formation of company financed

Price paid for leasehold and by whom

If funds borrowed, from whom?

Rent per month for market space                      Wartime occupant of space in market  
Name of previous occupant from whom present company purchased leasehold, and why willing to sell out

Commodities handled

Specialties

Volume per week. (specify months) In busy season

In slow season

Employees on August, 1947: (use additional sheet if necessary)

Position (mgr, salesman, swamper, driver, buyer, steno, book-keeper, etc)	Name (if not available designate J or non-J., Issei, N, or K., and if related to proprietor)	Wage, salary, or commission in dollars per month (specify which)	December 1, 1941, whereabouts and occup.	Date hired
---	--	--	--	------------

Main growers: (use additional sheet if necessary)

Name (if not available designate Jap, Mex., Cauc., etc)	Location (county or town)	Products supplied	Volume per year	December 1, 1941, whereabouts and occupation (if Japanese)
---	---------------------------	-------------------	-----------------	--

Main retail buyers: (Use additional sheet if necessary)

Name of individual buyer	Name of mgr or prop. of retail store	Street address of store	Volume bought per week	December 1, 1941, whereabouts and occupation (if Japanese)
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Any opposition experienced in opening or operating?

Relations with houses which displaced Japanese Americans in 1941-1942

Relations with unions



## **5. Schedules for Census of Japanese Americans in Sawtelle**

The census was conducted during December, 1946, by students in a course in ethnic relations and, when a Japanese-speaking interviewer was needed, by Arthur Sumio Takei, Hisako Tanaka Sasao, and Hiroshi Ito. Information for each household was obtained from the head of the household or his wife, sometimes with the help of a younger member of the household serving as interpreter. For the five households in which members of the family could not be located or an interview was refused, information was obtained from a neighbor. In this monograph we have used only occupational data. Findings on family and housing characteristics will be reported in a later paper.



## INSTRUCTIONS FOR CENSUS

**Housing schedule:** Each building will have a housing schedule. In cases of duplexes or apartments, use a separate housing schedule for each independent unit.

The question, "What other Japanese American families live in this neighborhood?" is a check on the completeness of our survey. If a family is mentioned living in your area, but not in the list given you, interview it, or, if you haven't time, give the name and address to us for someone else to do the interview.

**Population schedule:** Use a separate population schedule for each family, i.e., if two or more families are living in one dwelling unit, use a separate population schedule for each, indicate the relationship between families, and attach all to the housing schedule covering that unit. Where single relatives (such as aunt, grandmother, or cousin), a couple (such as mother-in-law and father-in-law, or son and daughter-in-law), or nonrelated lodgers are living with the main family, include them on the same population schedule. If additional lines are needed for large families, use another schedule, but number the individuals consecutively. Be sure to account for *all persons* living in the building (see that the number is the same as on the housing schedule).

**Relocation** means leaving the relocation center for permanent residence outside.

**Occupation.** Note the actual job done, such as gardener, truck driver, greenhouse laborer, greenhouse foreman, maid, cook, etc.

**Industry.** Note the kind of business, such as wholesale nursery, retail nursery, contract gardening, domestic work, restaurant, etc.

### Class of worker:

OA — works on own account and has no paid employees.

E — employer. Give number of employees in parentheses.

PW — wage or salary worker in private work

GW — wage or salary worker in government work. Specify federal, state, county, or city in parentheses.

NP — unpaid family worker

**Usual job**—chief job at which worked regularly either before evacuation or since relocation. What we want is what the individual regards as his occupation.

**Income.** This item is last because it may be touchy. We should like to have returns as complete as possible on it, but be careful not to create antagonism.

N.B.

Every question should be answered. The following symbols may be used:

DK means the person supplying the information did not know.

? means the interviewer is uncertain of the accuracy of the information.  
Record the information and the ?.

— (dash) means the question is not applicable in this case.

Ditto marks must be made clearly, and used only directly under the word to be dittoed. The word "same" may be used where applicable, e.g., if usual job is the same as the present job.

If no one who can answer the questions is at home, find out when the interview may be made. If no one is at home and a successful interview is conducted at a nearby Japanese home, you may explain that no one was at home and find out if these people are willing and able to give information about the neighbor. If visits on two days are not successful, turn the case back to us. Underline or write in margin name of person supplying information.

# HOUSING SCHEDULE

Address . . . . . Interviewer . . . . . Date

How many people are living in this building? . . . . .

In what year was the house built? . . . . .

Does head own house? . . . . . Date of purchase . . . . .from Japanese or other (specify) . . . . .

Does head rent house? . . . . . Lease? . . . . . Name of landlord . . . . .

Is there a business on the lot? . . . . . What kind? . . . . . Run by whom?

How many rooms in living quarters? (Don't count bath or business quarters.) . . . . .

What other Japanese American families live in this neighborhood?





## **6. Schedules for Loss Survey and Terminal Island Survey**

These surveys were conducted in a trailer camp housing project in Long Beach, California, during March, 1947. The interviewers were volunteer workers from among project residents and our assistants, Mary Oi and Hiroshi Ito. Spacing has been condensed in the copies below.

## EVACUEE LOSS SURVEY—INSTRUCTIONS FOR INTERVIEWERS

This is *not* an official filing of claims. Persons interviewed are providing material for an accurate survey of losses which will be available to support a claims bill in the national legislature. You may assure all residents that the information they give will be treated in the strictest confidence and will be used only for statistical analysis in which no individual or family can be identified.

Please refer to Dr. Bloom if you have any questions as to the exact meanings of the instructions, if cases arise which do not fit readily into the schedules, or if residents being interviewed wish to ask further questions about the survey.

For statistical purposes it is essential to have schedules completely filled out. This means that *every* space should have some entry. Write "same": do not use ditto marks. Write "none": do not leave blanks. If figures are only estimates write "approx." before the figures. If more lines are needed for any section of the schedules, write "more" in the margin and use an extra sheet. In these cases be sure to keep person numbers straight and to fasten together all the sheets for each family.

### EXPLANATION OF SCHEDULES

*Names.* Include all persons whose property arrangements were such that they would file a joint claim. Ordinarily this will mean all members of the family who were living together before evacuation: father, mother, unmarried children, and other related or nonrelated persons dependent on them. Get the names of all persons to be included before proceeding to the rest of the schedule. Individuals will be referred to in the rest of the schedule by the person number instead of by name.

*Sex.* M for males, F for females.

*Citizenship.* J for Japanese, U S for United States. Write out anything else.

*Relation* means relation to family head: wife, son, daughter, father, mother-in-law, cousin, etc.

*Pre-evacuation address.* Street address and name of town or city. Write "same" where appropriate.

*Date of evacuation.* Day and month removed to assembly or relocation center. For voluntary evacuees write "vol." before date of moving outside 1st and 2d zones (outside California).

*Month and year of relocation* out of relocation center on indefinite or terminal leave. Seasonal or short-term leaves count only if converted to indefinite or terminal leave, i e., if the evacuee did not return to the center as a resident. For voluntary evacuees or others never in a relocation center, write "none."

*Army service.* Give month and year of induction and month and year of discharge.

*Date of return to L A. area.* Month and year.

*Present address.* Street address and town or city.

**NOTE:** All information up to this point should be obtained for each individual. Do *not* assume that all family members returned to Los Angeles on the same date or lived at the same address, but ask the question for each person.

### HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF ALL MEMBERS

*House.* If house was owned or leased give disposition. If the family were renting on a month-to-month basis, note "rented" in the 1942 value column. If housing was provided with the job, or the house was part of the business, note this: e g., "rent

free with ranch," or "lived behind store," etc. It is important that we know whether the prewar residence was owned, rented, leased, or included with the job.

*1942 value* means the fair sale value at the time of evacuation, or the replacement cost in 1942. In the statistical treatment of the data, we will make corrections for inflated values during the war and note the irreplaceable nature of some items. It is important to have the figures given on a common basis, so get the evacuee to give 1942 values as accurately as he can.

*Disposition* means what was done with the property. Here is a suggested list of what was commonly done: sold, stored, loaned, rented, leased, abandoned, hired manager. Some items may require two entries, e.g., stored April, 1942, sold June, 1943. *Date* refers to month and year of disposition, and there should be a date given for each entry in the disposition column.

*Amount received for sale or rent.* If the items were not sold or rented, write "none"

*Amount of loss in dollars.*

*Reason for loss.* Here is a suggested list of possible reasons: forced sale, damage in use, damage in storage, damage in transport, theft, missing, confiscation by government, cancellation, forfeit for failure to make payments, mortgage foreclosure, fire in storage, fire in camp, mismanagement in absence, unable to collect sale price or rent. "Swindle" and "fraud" are *not* adequate reasons for loss. We want to know what kind of operation resulted in loss. If the reasons seem too complicated and you can't get the story from the evacuee, complete as much of the schedule as you can, and then refer the case to Dr. Bloom.

**NOTE:** If the family had no property of a given kind, e.g., art objects or books, write "none" in the 1942 value column. If the property was stored or sold without loss, write in disposition column "sold without loss" or "stored without loss." In cases of this kind, the evacuee need not furnish figures for 1942 value or amount received if he does not wish to. *Losses* on any particular item, however, can be counted only when data on 1942 value, disposition, and reason for loss are furnished for that item.

#### OCCUPATIONAL LOSSES

Three schedules are provided for occupational losses: for families operating farms and nurseries; for families operating their own business (including contract gardeners); and for families all of whose workers were working for wages or salaries (such as farm laborers and nursery workers not operating their own farms or nurseries, domestics, clerks and managers in businesses operated by other persons, etc.) If some family members were working outside the family enterprise for salary or wages, that family will require a schedule for the family enterprise *and* a schedule for the wage and salary workers. Use the same person number for individuals on the wage and salary schedule as was used on the first household schedule.

In cases of farms, value of crops should be an estimate of the amount of labor and material invested up to the time of evacuation. It should *not* be given as the selling price expected if there had been no evacuation. We will make the necessary statistical corrections for maturity value and rising market prices.

#### 1945-1946 OCCUPATIONS

Include *all* family members working before evacuation, even though some may not be with the family now. This means that family members now in the East or in the Army or living elsewhere on the Coast, who were in the family group before evacua-



tion, should be listed. If some items are not known, write "not known" but do not leave blanks. Persons now with the family, who were not with the family before evacuation, should fill out schedules for the family they were with before evacuation. E g, a Nisei who married since evacuation should have his wife fill out a schedule for her own family and he should fill out a schedule for his parental family.

*Job* always means specific task, such as manager, clerk, janitor, cook, truck driver, power-machine operator, etc. If person is not working, write "retired," "in school," "ill," "housewife," or whatever the situation is. Use a separate line for each job. An individual who has shifted jobs will need more than one line. Use extra sheets if necessary.

*Company* means name of the concern. With domestics, farm laborers, etc., this may be the name of the employer.

*Type of business* Be specific, as wholesale produce or retail produce, Oriental goods store, grocery, candy manufacture, etc.

*Place* means city or town where the job was held.

*Average monthly earnings.* Record separately for each job.

*Unemployed* means that the person had no job but was looking for a job. Do not count as unemployed time during which an individual was too ill or too old to work, was on vacation, in school, or was not able to work for some other reason. Record month and year for the beginning and end of each period of unemployment.

**NOTE:** Check to see that each individual has accounted for all the months of 1945-1946 as being employed, unemployed, in a center, or not in the labor market.

*Total income* for each year, 1945 and 1946, means earned income. Check to be sure that the amount given is consistent with the average monthly income and the number of months worked. Total income should *not* include income from property, bonds, government allotment, etc., for our purposes.

**NOTE:** Clip to schedules for each family any and all supporting details that the family can supply, e.g., a list of inventories abandoned, a list of furniture stolen, etc. *Do not* take from them, however, any original documents which they may need to substantiate their claims legally—these should be copied.

EVACUEE LOSS SURVEY Interviewer . . . . . Date ..

Conducted by Professor Leonard Bloom, U.C L.A.

This statement is not a claim and is offered for statistical analysis only. Do not sign Make no payment

No.	Name of family members	Year born	Sex	Cit.	Relation to head	Pre-evac. address (no., street, city)	Date of evac.
1							
2							
3							
4							
5							
6							
7							

Person no.	Relocation center	Mo., yr., relocated	Army service		Date return to L A. area	Present address (no., street, city)
			From	To		
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						

## HOUSEHOLD PROPERTY AND PERSONAL PROPERTY OF ALL MEMBERS

Item	1942 value	Disposition	Date (mo., yr.)	Amount received for sale or rent	Amount of loss	Reason for loss
House						
Furniture						
Auto (make, model, year)						
Art objects, books, etc.						
Clothing, jewelry						
Insurance						
Uncollected loans						
Other (specify)						

## FARM AND NURSERY LOSSES

Interviewer

Date

Location

Name of operator

No. acres

No. of family workers, incl. operator

Owned or leased

No. of non-family employees

Principal crops

No. of years operated at this location

Annual net income: 1938 1940  
1939 1941.

Item	1942 value	Disposition	Date (mo., yr.)	Amount received for sale or rent	Amount of loss	Reason for loss
Land						
Bldgs.						
Equipment						
Autos and trucks (make, model, yr.)						
Animals						
Inventories (seeds, fertilizer, etc.)						

Crops—acres (value should represent amount of labor and material invested before evac.)

Insurance						
Contracts, orders						
Uncollected ac- counts						
Others (specify)						

1945-1946 OCCUPATIONS OF ALL FAMILY MEMBERS WORKING ON FARM OR NURSERY  
BEFORE EVACUATION

Person no.	Job	Company	Type of business	Place

Person no.	Av mo. earn- ings	No. mos worked	Unemployed		Total income	
			From	To	1945	1946

FEES AND EXPENSES  
DUE TO EVACUATION.

Attorney or agent \$  
Storage  
Transp of property  
Travel  
Medical  
Other (specify)

## KIND OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS (check)

Income-tax returns      Storage receipts  
Sales-tax returns      Transport receipts  
Cash books      Diaries  
Witnesses      None  
Letters

Other (specify)

**BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL LOSSES**

Location \_\_\_\_\_ Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_  
 Type of business \_\_\_\_\_ Name of operator \_\_\_\_\_  
 No. of years at this location \_\_\_\_\_ No. of family workers, incl. operator \_\_\_\_\_  
 1941 net income \_\_\_\_\_ No. of nonfamily employees \_\_\_\_\_

Item	1942 value	Disposition	Date (mo., yr )	Amount received for sale or rent	Amount of loss	Reason for loss
Land						
Bldgs						
Tools, equipment, machinery						
Autos and trucks (make, model, yr )						
Inventories						
Goodwill, leasehold value, etc.						
Insurance						
Contracts, orders						
Uncollected accounts						
Other (specify)						

**1945-1946 OCCUPATIONS OF ALL FAMILY MEMBERS WORKING IN FAMILY BUSINESS BEFORE EVACUATION**

Person no.	Job	Company	Type of business	Place

Person no.	Av mo. earnings	No mos. worked	Unemployed		Total income	
			From	To	1945	1946

**FEES AND EXPENSES DUE TO EVACUATION**  
 Attorney or agent \$ \_\_\_\_\_  
 Storage \_\_\_\_\_  
 Transp. of property \_\_\_\_\_  
 Travel \_\_\_\_\_  
 Medical \_\_\_\_\_  
 Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

**KIND OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS (check)**  
 Income-tax returns \_\_\_\_\_ Storage receipts \_\_\_\_\_  
 Sales-tax returns \_\_\_\_\_ Transport receipts \_\_\_\_\_  
 Cash books \_\_\_\_\_ Diaries \_\_\_\_\_  
 Witnesses \_\_\_\_\_ None \_\_\_\_\_  
 Letters \_\_\_\_\_

Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYEE LOSSES

Interviewer \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Person no.	1941 job	Company	Type of business	Av. mo. earnings	Total 1941 income

## 1945-1946 OCCUPATIONS

Person no.	Job	Company	Type of business	Place

Person no.	Av. mo. earnings	No. mos. worked	Unemployed		Total income	
			From	To	1945	1946

## FEES AND EXPENSES DUE TO EVACUATION

Attorney or agent \$  
 Storage  
 Transp. of property  
 Travel  
 Medical  
 Other (specify)

## KIND OF EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT CLAIMS (check)

Income-tax returns      Storage receipts  
 Sales-tax returns      Transport receipts  
 Cash books              Diaries  
 Witnesses                None  
 Letters

Other (specify)

**7. Schedule for Fishermen Survey**

This schedule was used for interviews by G. Elliott Parker, with Hiroshi Ito as interpreter, during the period April-July, 1947.



# FISHERMEN SURVEY

Person Interviewed	Interviewer	Address	Date
Age Birthplace		Prewar Address	
Years Fishing Experience	Crew Status (yrs )	Owner	Skipper
Member Union Then	Now	S Calif. Japanese Fishermen Assn.	Crew
Wartime Occupations:			
Voluntary Evacuee: Date	Where	Work	
Seasonal Leaves (yrs )	Where	Work	
Relocated: Date	Where	Work	
Stayed in Camp			
Return to L. A.: Date	Work	Employer	
If Fishing: Crew Function	Date began	Boat	Operator
Why not fishing now? No Job	Lic Ban	Age	Preference
Issei: If ban lifted would be	Crew Member	Corp	Purchaser
			Charterer . .
1941 Boat	Base Port: L. A	Monterey	San Diego
Date last worked on it	Relatives		Other
Position: Skipper	Mast Man	Engineer	Fish Capt.
Deckhand	Other		Skiff Man
Crew Payment: Straight Share	Cash Guarantee	Guarantee plus Share	
Other			
Was 1941 fish catch normal?	Normal Monthly Wage, 1941		
Profit Division 1941	Boat	Net	Crew
Owner: Person Interviewed	Other Jap.	Italian	Slav.
Name	Where Now?	Work	
Operator: Owner	Interviewee	Other Japanese	Italian
Other			Slavonian
Name	Where now?	Work	
Nature of Control of Boat:			
Charter. Term	St Share	Cash Guarantee	Combination
Corporation. Members (% stock each)			
% Stock Issei	Capital Investment		
Purchase Date	Contract Price		
Owned in Full by Operator	Being Purchased by Operator		
Purchase Date	Contract Price	Equity	
Boat Size	Jig	Fantail	Seiner
Mackerel	Other		Fished Tuna
			Sardine
Boat Disposition: Charter Expired	Lost for Non-Payment	Sold	Char-
tered	Other		
Disposition Date	Recipient		
1942 Valuation	Price Received	Est. Loss	

Equipment	1942 value	Disposition	Date	Amount received	Loss	Reason for loss

Prewar Income: Monthly Average, 1941 .	Months Worked	1941 Total .
Other Family Workers and Jobs		
Present Income: Monthly Average, 1946	Months Worked.	1946 Total .
Other Family Workers and Jobs		